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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
NIHILIST PERDURANTISM: 
A NEW ONTOLOGY OF MATERIAL OBJECTS 
Ordinary material objects, such as guitars and houses, do not seem to pose any 
serious philosophical problems. However, the nature of the material objects and their 
part-whole relation raises serious questions about fundamental ontologies. Furthermore, 
part-whole relations are not necessarily spatial; they can be temporal as well. 
My dissertation investigates the problems posed by ordinary material objects, 
and the different ontological views that attempt to provide answers to these problems. I 
then present a new and radical view, which I call Nihilist Perdurantism (NP). NP claims 
that objects have temporal parts, but not spatial parts. I arrive at this view by first 
exploring and arguing against different views on composition, with a focus on arguments 
against common sense ontologies of ordinary objects. I then discuss the nature of 
mereological simples and argue against several views that claim that qualitatively 
heterogeneous simples are possible (Markosian and McDaniel). Next, I present my 
arguments against perdurantist, endurantist, and presentist view of persistence. I 
especially focus on endurantism, and use the aforementioned argument against the 
possibility of qualitatively heterogeneous simples to construct a similar argument against 
endurantism. Finally, I argue in favor of my view, NP. This view combines a mereological 
nihilist view (defended at various times by Unger, Van Inwagen, Merricks, and Sider) 
about spatial parts with a perdurantist view (defended at various times by Lewis, 
Hawley, Heller, and Sider) of temporal parts. Therefore, according to NP, there are no 
guitars, trees, or houses.  
The only objects that exist are NP objects; these are line-shaped objects that 
extend through spacetime. With respect to the three spatial dimensions, these objects 
have no parts. However, with respect to the temporal dimension, NP objects do have 
parts in the form of points and line segments. My work shows that NP has better 
solutions to many of the puzzles and problems posed by material objects, such as the 
puzzle of change, over the three standard views. Hinchliff argues that change is puzzling 
because in order for there to be real change, then the following four intuitions must be 
true: (1) The candle persists through the change. It existed when it was straight, and it 
exists now when it is bent…(2) Shapes are properties not relations. They are one-placed, 
not many-placed…(3) The candle itself has the shapes. Not just a part but the candle 
itself was straight, and not just a part but the candle itself is bent…(4) The shapes are 
incompatible. If the shapes were compatible, there need not have been a change. The 
puzzle of change is the mutual inconsistency of these four intuitions. I argue that 
perdurantists must deny intuition (3), endurantists must deny intuition (2), and 
presentists must deny intuition (1). I then argue that only NP can accommodate all four 
intuitions about both macroscopic and microscopic change while resolving the 
inconsistency of the four intuitions. 
My dissertation presents a new view that provides a fresh perspective on the 
debate about the nature of material objects. My development of NP touches on a number 
of other philosophical problems. In Chapter One, I discuss the role of intuitions in 
metaphysics, and argue that many supposedly “common sense” intuitions are already 
philosophical positions. In Chapter 2, I argue against Korman’s and Markosian’s 
common sense ontologies of ordinary objects. In Chapter 3, I argue that the endurantist 
view of persistence is inconsistent and should be rejected. In addition to making the case 
for NP and its solution to the puzzle of change in Chapter 4, I also argue that NP can 
solve the problem of motion in a homogenous substance. Finally, in Chapter Five, I argue 
against the possibility of both gunky and junky material objects.  
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Chapter 1: Motivation and Methodology 
This dissertation will propose a new view of the nature of material objects and their 
persistence through time.  In this chapter, I will present some puzzles that illuminate 
some of the basic problems that surround material objects and persistence. These two 
topics have traditionally been addressed as separate issues. However, in the next section 
I will argue that if one really wants to have a comprehensive picture of the status of 
material objects, then composition and persistence must be examined as interrelated 
issues that address similar concerns with respect to their spatial and temporal makeup. 
1.1 Material Objects 
In everyday life, you use the concept of ‘part’ all the time. You can buy car parts at an 
auto store for your car, you can watch part of a season of a television show, and you can 
be a part of your family. In each of these cases, the parts are understood in relation to the 
thing they are a part of: your car, the television show, and your family. You might also 
sometimes refer to these things with parts as “the whole car”, “the whole show” and “the 
whole family”. The whole of the car is made up of all the parts of the car and nothing else. 
The whole family is made up of all the family members and nothing else.  
Since this project will focus on material objects, I will now only consider the use 
of parts and wholes with respect to material objects. Intuitively, material objects are 
made of their parts. These parts are in certain relations to each other that unify them as a 
material object. A car has many parts: a transmission, brake pads, spark plugs, and so 
on. Each of these parts is physically connected to the other parts of the car, and they all 
work together to achieve the function of the car: transporting passengers. When 
discussing the relation between parts and wholes, philosophers typically use the term 
composition. For example, the parts of a car compose the car, and the car is a composite 
object. Many other intuitive material objects meet the same conditions. For example, 
guitars, coffee mugs, houses, trees and humans (or at least their bodies) all have parts 
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that are physically connected and together fulfill a function. So perhaps a single material 
object is a united collection of parts that fulfills some function. 
However, material objects lose parts all the time. A car’s spark plugs are 
removed. A clumsy person will drop their coffee mug and the handle will break off. Trees 
shed their leaves in the fall. Human beings lose limbs in accidents. Even though these 
objects have lost parts, we ordinarily to not cease to think of them as objects. We still 
refer to a car without spark plugs as a car, and a human with a missing limb as a human. 
Therefore, the above intuition about the connection between an object and its parts is 
violated.  
Not only does losing parts violate the above intuition that objects are composites 
of their parts, but it may also violate the intuition that a material object has a specific 
function. A car without an engine cannot move, and a human being without a limb 
cannot perform many normal human activities. Yet again, this does not deter us from 
referring to the car and human as material objects. But there is a point where an object 
can no longer lose any more parts and remain an object. If a car has its front half cut off 
and melted down for scrap, then it is no longer a car. When a human being dies and the 
body decomposes, there is no longer a body. In both cases, the object no longer exhibits 
its previous unity or its previous function 
This brings us to a puzzle: objects can survive the loss of some parts, but objects 
cannot survive the loss of too many parts. Where then, is the dividing line between object 
and non-object? Are there essential parts that an object cannot lose? Or is there some 
number of parts that an object must maintain? In Unger’s “I do not exist,” Unger uses 
the sorites of decomposition to show that any attempt to identify a dividing line between 
object and non-object is arbitrary and ad hoc. To show this, Unger uses a thought 
experiment where atoms are removed from a wooden table one by one. Unger uses atom 
to mean a very small piece. This could be a molecule of cellulose, a standard atom, or 
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something smaller. My interpretation of Unger’s argument is as follows; n is a finite 
number, and m is a finite number such that 0<m≤n:  
P1. A table is composed n atoms.	
P2. If n atoms compose a table, then n-1 atoms also compose a table.	
C1. So n-1 atoms compose a table.	
P4. If n-1 atoms compose a table, then n-2 atoms compose a table. 
P5. If n-2 atoms compose a table, then n-3 atoms compose a table and so on. 
C2. Therefore, n-m atoms compose a table. 
P6. So, n-(n-1) atoms compose a table.	
P7. If n-(n-1) atoms compose a table, then n-n atoms compose a table.	
C3. So, n-n atoms compose a table.1	
	
P2 is supported by the intuitions that removing one atom from a table does not make the 
table cease to exist, nor does removing two, three, or even 10,000 (there is nothing 
special about the choice of table; feel free to substitute any material object that you like). 
P1 and P2 entail C1. After that, modus ponens is simply repeated over and over again. 
Since modus ponens is valid, it follows that the removal of any of the table’s atoms does 
not make the difference between table and non-table. When the argument is carried to 
its logical conclusion, it yields the absurd conclusion that a table can be composed of no 
atoms.  
One might try modifying Premise 2 and claim that it holds for a certain number 
of iterations, but fails after that number is surpassed. In other words, after removing 
some non-zero quantity of atoms, the removal of a further atom will make the difference 
between a table and a non-table. This is true; there will be a point where the table falls 
apart and ceases to exist. In this specific sorites case, there is an atom that made the 
difference between table and non-table. However, if another table has its pieces removed 
in a different order, then a different atom will make the difference between table and 
non-table. Since there are many ways to remove atoms from the table, then it follows 
that there are many atoms that make the difference between table and non-table. 
                                                        
1	See	Unger	1979	pp.	176-181.	If	you	don’t	like	atoms,	feel	free	to	substitute	‘hunks	of	
matter.’		
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Examining the two following cases of decomposition shows this: 
P1. The removal of one atom cannot destroy the table. 
P2. In case 1, after the removal of many atoms, atom A is the atom that makes the 
difference between table and non-table. 
C1. Therefore, there is a special atom A such that the removal of A destroys the 
table. 
P3. In case 2, the only atom removed is atom A. 
C2. So the table is destroyed by the removal of 1 atom. 
C3. C2 contradicts P1; reject C1. 
 
This argument shows that identifying any one atom as the one that makes the difference 
between table and non-table must be arbitrary. In order to resolve the sorites of 
decomposition, it seems that one must do one of three things: (1) reject P2 and claim 
that if an object loses a part, then the object ceases to exist, (2) hold that objects can lose 
all their parts and continue to exist, or (3) hold that objects do not exist in the first place. 
The sorites of decomposition shows that that material objects cannot simply be the 
things that we classify as such. There is a genuine problem here that requires 
philosophical investigation. 	
1.2: Material Objects and Persistence 
Most people believe that objects persist over time. We attribute properties and relations 
to past, present, and future objects all the time. For example, we might say “My car was 
broken, but now it is fixed.” The car has the property of past brokenness and present-
fixedness. Or we might say “The table was unfinished, but now it is stained.” In the past 
the table lacked the property of being finished and presently has the property of being 
stained. However, working out an account of just how this is done is not straightforward. 
This can be illustrated with the puzzle of change. 	
Most of us believe that we live in a world of change. The sun changes position in 
the sky, a leaf changes from green to red in the autumn, and shovels rust when exposed 
to water and air. In each of these examples, a thing changes: the sun, a leaf, and a shovel. 
But in order for a singular thing to change, it presumably had certain qualities before 
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and has different qualities now. A leaf is green in the summer and red in the autumn. But 
the leaf before the change is the same leaf after the change. If the leaf is the same leaf, 
then the leaf is both green and red. But the leaf cannot be green and red. If change is 
possible, then there must be an explanation for how these things have incompatible 
qualities. This is the Puzzle of Change.2 
 There is something genuinely puzzling about change. But just what, exactly, is 
the puzzling feature of change? Does it result from the identity relation, or from some 
other feature of change? Mark Hinchliff argues that change is puzzling because our 
intuitions about change form an inconsistent set of propositions. Consider a candle 
where at some time t1 it was straight, and some time later, t2, the candle has melted and 
is now bent:	
 
(1) The candle persists through the change. It existed when it was straight, 
and it exists now when it is bent…  
(2) Shapes are properties not relations. They are one-placed, not many-
placed.  
(3) The candle itself has the shapes. Not just a part, but the candle itself was 
straight, and not just a part but the candle itself is bent.  
(4) The shapes are incompatible. If the shapes were compatible, there need 
not have been a change.3  
 
Here is the argument in the form of a modus tollens: 
 
P1. If change is possible, then (i)-(v) will be true:  
(i)   One and the same thing exists before and after the change. 
(ii) The thing that has the properties just plain has them; change involves 
properties, not relations. 
(iii) The thing that changes has the properties involved in the change, not 
the things parts. 
(iv) Properties involved in any change are incompatible.  
(v)  Nothing can have incompatible properties. 
P2. (i)-(v) entail a contradiction. 
C. Change is not possible. 
	
If (i) is true, then the candle before the change is identical to the candle after the change. 
                                                        
2 See Hinchliff 1996. I will discuss Hinchliff’s formulation of the puzzle and his proposed solution 
later in the paper. 
3 Hinchliff 1996, p 119. 	
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If (ii) and (iii) are true, then the candle itself instantiates the property of ‘straight’ before 
the change and the candle itself instantiates the property of ‘bent’ after the change. If (iv) 
and (v) are true, then ‘straight’ and ‘bent’ are incompatible and nothing can instantiate 
both properties. Since the bent candle is identical to the straight candle, and objects 
cannot have incompatible properties, change leads to a contradiction. Either one of the 
intuitions must be given up or some or some way to resolve them must be found.	
 The sorites of decomposition and the puzzle of change both are both puzzles 
about material objects. The first is a puzzle only concerned with the spatial extension of 
objects, while the second is concerned with the temporal extension as well. These two 
topics have traditionally been addressed as separate issues. However, in the next section 
I will argue that if one really wants to have a comprehensive picture of the status of 
material objects, then composition and persistence must be examined as interrelated 
issues that address similar concerns with respect to their spatial and temporal makeup.	
1.3: Asking the Right Question 
There are many questions one could ask about composition or persistence. For instance, 
one could ask, “Why is a coffee mug an object while a pile of sand is not?” or “Does a 
house persist in the same way that a human being persists?” These are interesting 
questions that deserve answers; however, the focus of each question is too specific and 
our preconceived beliefs about the coffee mug, pile of sand, house, and human will most 
likely obscure any investigation. For this reason, many contemporary investigations of 
material composition begin by asking the Special Composition Question:	
SCQ: Under what conditions, if any, does composition occur?4	
	
The SCQ does not ask for an analysis of composition without reference to mereological 
concepts. This is because mereological concepts do not have any non-circular analysis. 
                                                        
4	Van Inwagen first formulated this in “When Are Objects Parts”, 1987. He also discusses it in his 
Material Beings, 1990.	
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Therefore, there seems to be no answer to the question “What is composition?” (what 
Van Inwagen calls the General Composition Question). Instead, the SCQ inquires about 
the necessary and sufficient required for composition to obtain.  
There are three broad answers to the SCQ: (1) composition occurs under any 
conditions; any collection of matter, such as a pile of sand or a human body, composes 
an object, (2) composition occurs under no conditions; there are no objects that have 
parts and (3) composition occurs under some conditions; some collections of matter are 
objects, such as human bodies, while others, such as piles of sand, are not. These 
answers will be the focus of Chapter 2. 	
Using the SCQ as a framework, one can formulate an analogous question 
concerning the persistence of material objects; call this the Special Persistence Question:	
SPQ: Under what conditions, if any, do objects persist through time?5	
	
Like the SCQ, the SPQ does not attempt to give an analysis of persistence without the use 
of temporal concepts since there does not seem to be any analysis of these concepts 
forthcoming. Instead, answers to the SPQ identify the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for persistence to obtain.  
However, trying to frame the answers to the SPQ as analogous to the “under any 
conditions, under no conditions, under some conditions” approach of the SCQ  is not a 
fruitful approach. In the case of composition, it is open whether composition actually 
occurs. But even if one denies the existence of composite objects, one does not deny the 
existence of material objects; one only denies the existence of material objects that have 
                                                        
5	As far as I know, my formulation of the STCQ is original (albeit it is inspired and analogous to 
Van Inwagen’s SCQ). Since I will be discussing the problems of composition and persistence 
together, I find it helpful to state the problems in a similar manner. However, if this incorrectly 
states the problem, I do not believe that anything important rides on it. In Four Dimensionalism, 
Sider asks a similar question: “Under what conditions does an assignment have a minimal D-
fusion?” or less technically, “Under what conditions do things begin and cease to exist?” The main 
difference between his question and my question is that Sider’s question suggests that things do 
in fact come in and out of existence, while mine does not. By asking about persistence, I can avoid 
making any assumptions about whether things can genuinely begin or cease to be.	
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parts.  
However, in the case of persistence, almost everyone accepts the primitive fact 
that all things persist through time, even if they do not agree on a specific definition of 
persistence.6 If persistence never occurs, then we either live in a timeless world or in a 
world of bare temporal structure. In a timeless world, there is no persistence because the 
world consists of only one instant. In a bare world, there is no persistence because there 
are no material things. Since our world is in fact not bare, and not timeless, then the “no 
conditions: answer to the SPQ is a dead end. 
The “some conditions” answer to the SPQ is also problematic because it is not 
analogous to the SCQ’s “some conditions” answer. As mentioned above, the sometimes 
answer to the SCQ counts some collections of matter as objects and others as non-
objects. But whether a collection of matter composes an object or not, the matter still 
remains in existence. But in the case of persistence, there is no intuitive evidence for 
claiming that some things persist while others do not. We talk about the temporal 
properties of cars, piles of sand, people, mountains and suns in the same way. While we 
treat some collections of matter as material objects and not others, we treat all existing 
things as have the same temporal nature. Since the SPQ’s “some conditions” and “no 
conditions” answers are out of the question, it must be the case all conditions are 
sufficient for an object to persist. However, this answer does nothing to resolve the 
puzzles of persistence, such as the puzzle of change discussed above.  
Since the SPQ is a non-starter, the right question still needs to be identified. I 
believe that the best way to do this is in terms of temporal composition. While I will 
explore temporal composition in Chapter 3, a rough idea is needed here. The first step is 
to think of time as another dimension, just like space. This move is supported by several 
                                                        
6 Idealists of various types might deny the existence of time and therefore persistence. For 
instance, Buddhism often makes the claim that time is an illusion. Kant argues that time is just a 
structure of our experience. Somewhat more recently, McTaggart argued that time is an illusion in 
McTaggart 1908. 
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reasons. First, we use similar phrases to describe spatial and temporal locations. For 
example, “the book is on the table,” and, “the robbery occurred on the 14th.” Or “I stand 
before you,” and, “Before I go home, I must clean up my office.” In each case, the 
prepositions are used to describe both spatial and temporal relations. Second, we can 
model temporal relations between objects or events using a three dimensional model 
(where the events or objects are represented by two-dimensional figures). Third, the idea 
that space and time are intimately related is not just intuitive. Physicists assume that 
space and time are a unified substance, spacetime; spacetime is used to explain natural 
phenomena such as gravity and time dilation when an object is traveling close to or at 
the speed of light. 
If time is extended like space, then objects populate different temporal locations 
just like they populate different spatial locations. Typically, questions about composition 
are limited to one instant of time. If I wonder whether the grains of sand compose a pile, 
then I am thinking about composition across the spatial dimensions. But since objects 
are located in time as well as space, I might wonder whether there is an object composed 
of the grain of sand before me right now and the grain of sand that occupied the same 
spatial location yesterday. With this in mind, the SPQ can be replaced by the following 
question: 	
Special Temporal Composition Question (STCQ): Under what conditions, 
if any, does temporal composition occur? 
 
Unlike the answers to the SPQ, the “all conditions,” some conditions,” and “no 
conditions” each provide interesting answers. These answers also map onto existing 
views of persistence in the literature; this will be discussed in Ch. 3.  
Now that the STCQ has replaced the SPQ, the relationship between the STCQ and 
the SCQ needs to be determined.  There are three possible ways the questions could 
be combined: (1) the STCQ grounds the SCQ, (2) the SCQ grounds the STCQ, or (3) the 
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two questions can be unified into a signal question. I will argue that TMC is the best 
approach. But before this, I will briefly explain some of the problems with (1) and (2). 
The question formed from 1 is as follows: 
(1) Under what conditions, if any, does temporal composition occur and how 
does this limit and provide the conditions, if any, under which spatial 
composition occurs?	
	
This question is not promising. If we begin by thinking about temporal composition, 
then the objects that we use in our investigation are uncertain. This is because we have 
not settled what counts as a material object yet. Recall the example of the grain of sand 
above. Before we can ask whether the present grain of sand and the grain of sand from 
yesterday compose something, we need to know whether there is even a grain of sand 
before me in the first place. The question formed from (2) has more promise: 
(2) Under what conditions, if any, does spatial composition occur and how does 
this limit and provide the conditions, if any, under which temporal 
composition occurs?	
	
First, this answer to the SCQ seems to have more at stake than an answer to the STCQ. 
An answer to the SCQ will tell us whether or not we are mistaken in our beliefs about 
ordinary objects. When we have the answer, we will know if there are no objects, fewer 
than we expected, or many more than we expected. Once the SCQ is answered, then we  
know what the candidates for temporal composition are. If there are no objects, for 
instance, then we do not need to know the conditions under which tables, amoebas, or 
people exist. Alternatively, if objects, such as a table, can survive the loss of all of their 
parts (as suggested by the sorites of decomposition above), then we need to know about 
the persistence condition of the table before and after its decomposition. 	
The grounding approach to question (2) has promise. However, I will argue that 
since both the SCQ and STCQ are framed in terms of composition, the two questions can 
be in combined into one question.	Both the SCQ and the STCQ can be thought of as an 
investigation of mereological concepts applied to the temporal and the spatial 
	
11 
 
 
dimension. Therefore, I suggest the following combined formulation:	
Total Mereological Composition Question (TMC): Under what conditions, 
if any, does mereological composition in concrete entities occur?	
	
I have chosen the phrase “mereological composition” as a term that is neutral as to 
whether the parts are spatial, temporal, or both.  
While there is nothing wrong with investigating the SCQ and STCQ 
independently, these separate investigations do not offer a full understanding of material 
objects. I am reminded of the Indian parable about the blind men and the elephant. 
When several blind men encounter an elephant, they can only describe the parts they 
touch, never realizing that they are all part of a single phenomenon. This is the problem 
with the SCQ and the STCQ; while they both are appropriately directed, they focus solely 
on certain aspects of concrete objects while ignoring others. Solely investigating the 
spatial or temporal aspects of concrete objects results in an incomplete picture of 
concrete objects in the same way as the anecdote above. The blind man may learn much 
about the elephant’s trunk but never come to a full understanding until he realizes the 
role it plays in relation to the other parts of the elephant. 	
There are several advantages to using TMC instead of separately investigating the 
SCQ and STCQ. If we investigate the SCQ and STCQ separately, we think that they share 
no common conceptual ground. By using composition as the driving concept, TMC we 
can evaluate the various views about composition and persistence with the same 
standards. Perhaps we can even apply arguments that have traditionally been restricted 
to only composition or persistence to the other topic.   
Another benefit of asking TMC instead of the individual questions is that TMC 
allows us new ways to evaluate arguments for the various views on the table. Instead of 
arguing for a view on persistence and a view on composition, we can address them as 
package deals. A view’s stance on spatial composition might further support or weaken 
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its stance on persistence. Finally, this approach also opens up resources for new views 
about persistence. There are many more views about the nature of composition than 
persistence. Asking TMC allows one to easily transfer views about composition to views 
about persistence. Any view of spatial composition without a temporal analogue could be 
used as a template for a new view of persistence. 
I think these points make a good case for asking questions about persistence and 
composition in the style of TMC. This does not mean that one cannot focus one of the 
issues more than the other, or that one may forgo discussing one when discussing 
specific features about the other. However, it would be a mistake to remain focused on 
one aspect of the question all of the time. A complete analysis of an object’s mereological 
nature has to account for both its temporal and spatial aspects. In Chapter 2, I will 
discuss the problem of composition and outline my stance on the nihilist (or 
eliminativist) answer to the SCQ, while in Chapter 3, I will discuss the problem of 
persistence and discuss my perdurantist response. This may seem counter-intuitive since 
I have just argued that answering TMC is better than answering the SCQ and the STCQ 
alone. However, given the state of the literature on composition and persistence, an 
independent examination of each issue must occur before my alternative approach can 
be implemented. Before I begin the dissertation proper, I will briefly discuss my 
methodology and the basic assumptions that I make in this dissertation. 
1.4: Methodology and Assumptions 
Within contemporary analytic metaphysics, there are two broad methodological 
approaches to metaphysics . The first approach has its roots in the work of Carnap, while 
the second has its roots in the work of Quine. In Carnap’s “Empiricism, Semantics, and 
Ontology,” he argues that various parts of our language form closed frameworks over a 
domain of discourse. Any existential claims within these frameworks are true or false in 
virtue of the framework itself, not some objective reality.  For instance, in the domain of 
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mathematics, there are propositions that existentially quantify over numbers. These 
propositions are true because the framework takes them to be true. But Carnap argues 
that metaphysicians want to know if numbers really exist; in other words, do numbers 
exist outside of the domain of mathematics? Carnap rejects this question as meaningful, 
since meaning resides within a given domain. Since metaphysicians are asking questions 
outside of any particular domain, there is nothing to give the metaphysical questions 
meaning. Therefore, Carnap believes any attempt by a metaphysician to go beyond 
language and assert things about the world is hopeless.  
 In contrast, Quine rejects Carnap’s claims that language frameworks are domain 
specific. Instead, Quine models his metaphysical methodology using the language of 
science. Quine says that if one wants to know what exists, then one must first create a 
best theory of the world. This theory will unify scientific and philosophical claims about 
the world. Competing theories will be judged on their explanatory power as well as the 
parsimony of their ideology and ontology. A theory’s ideology is the collection of 
quantifiers, relations, and properties that the theory uses. The ontology of a theory is the 
collection of entities that are existentially quantified over by the propositions of the 
theory. The best theory is the one with the smallest ideology, ontology, and the most 
explanatory power. Metaphysics, then, is in the business of determining what sorts of 
entities are needed by the best theory of the world. If the best theory of world requires, 
quarks, then they exist. If the best theory of the world requires Cartesian mental 
substances, then mental substances exist. Any existential claims about things that are 
not quantified over by the best theory of the world are reduced or eliminated. 
 One might broadly describe Quineans as “realists” since they believe that our 
metaphysical and scientific enterprises reveal things about the basic structure of reality. 
In contrast, one might describe Carnapians as “anti-realists,” since they believe that what 
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counts as existence is specific to each language framework. However, being a Carnappian 
is not equivalent to being an anti-realist. I will define realism and anti-realism as follows: 
Realism =def the entities described by a certain domain of discourse exist 
independently of human language, beliefs, conceptual frameworks, and so on. 
 
Anti-Realism =def the entities described by a certain domain of discourse do not 
exist independently of human language, beliefs, conceptual frameworks, and so 
on. 
 
From this definition of anti-realism, it follows that all Carnapians are anti-realists about 
everything because all existential commitments are language dependent.7 However, a 
Quinean is not required to be a realist about everything. For instance, one could be a 
realist about the entities described by physics and an anti-realist about moral properties.  
My project is Quinean in spirit. I will assume that we are able to say true things 
about the mind-external world. I will also assume that explanatory power and parsimony 
are the main virtues of a good theory. I will be proposing a theory of material objects that 
aims to achieve these virtues of explanatory power, ideological parsimony, and 
ontological parsimony. I will determine the success of my view over competing views by 
weighing and balancing of the features of my view against features of these competing 
views. Each view will have its advantages and its disadvantages. The success or failure of 
a view does not depend on the success or failure of any one feature. In order to 
determine which view is successful, I will compare the theoretical commitments of a view 
to the theoretical commitments of competing views. 
 Not all metaphysicians believe this. For instance, Hirsch argues metaphysics 
should strive to be charitable to seemingly true claims about the world. If there are two 
candidate interpretations for a sentence that seems to make a true claim about the world, 
and one interpretation makes the sentence true while the other makes the sentence false, 
                                                        
7 Or perhaps they are agnostic about everything. 
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then the one that makes the sentence true is correct.8 For instance, if nihilism is true, 
then the sentence “There is a lamp on the table” is false. Therefore nihilism should be 
rejected on the grounds that it is uncharitable.  
Hirsch assumes that the principle of charity is so important that nihilism’s 
violation of the principle is enough to reject nihilism. However, nihilism’s failure to 
satisfy Hirsch’s principle of charity must be taken in the context of its other advantages 
and disadvantages. Nihilism incurs a disadvantage for failing to satisfy the principle of 
charity, but it also has other theoretical advantages as well. I will therefore proceed with 
the assumption that a view cannot be rejected on the grounds of a single argument. 
  
                                                        
8 See Hirsch 1992, p. 104 
	
16 
 
 
Chapter 2: Composition 
In chapter 1, I discussed how the contemporary composition debate is framed in terms of 
providing an answer to the Special Composition Question: 
SCQ: Under what conditions, if any, does composition occur? 
In this chapter I will provide an overview of the major answers to the SCQ. I will then 
argue against views that believe that our intuitions about ordinary objects provide the 
conditions for composition to occur. After have rejected these views, I will explore my 
favored answer to the SCQ, mereological nihilism. Finally, I will examine the nature of 
mereological simples (objects with no proper parts) and whether it is possible for 
simples to have qualitative variation. 
2.1: Answers to the SCQ  
As mentioned in Ch. 1, there are three broad answers to the SCQ: composition occurs 
under any conditions, composition occurs under no conditions, and composition occurs 
under some conditions. The first answer is knows as universalism, or unrestricted 
mereological composition. Universalists claim that composition occurs under any 
conditions. Recall the sorites of decomposition discussed in Chapter 1. The problem with 
the sorites occurs when the reiteration of modus ponens ceases to yield a true conclusion 
despite being a valid form of argument. The universalist can resolve this inconsistency by 
appealing to their unrestricted conditions on composition. Let “Table” refer to the matter 
that occupies all and only some table-sized region of space. After enough pieces have 
been removed from Table, it  will appear to be destroyed. However, the universalist says 
that since any conditions are sufficient for composition to occur, then the fact that the 
parts of the table are scattered around the room is as sufficient of a condition as the 
condition of the parts being attached. Table is an object when its parts are attached, and 
Table is an object when its parts are scattered. Therefore, if universalism is true, then the 
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reiterations of modus ponens in the sorites of decomposition never yields a false 
conclusion. 
 However, the universalist’s solution to the sorites of decomposition highlights 
one of the bizarre consequences of the view. It might seem plausible that certain 
scattered things, such as the parts of computer that is taken apart for repair, still 
compose an object, the computer. But at the end of the sorites, Table is just sawdust. 
Intuitively, Table cannot be put back together in the same way the computer can be put 
back together.  Yet the universalist must say that the sawdust Table is identical to the 
attached Table.  
 Moreover, the universalists cannot constrain composition to just the scattered 
parts of a single ordinary object. Any ordinary object, no matter how singular it seems, is 
part of many other scattered objects. For example, the moon and my appendix compose 
the moon-my appendix object.9  Since both the moon and my appendix satisfy the 
condition of being made of matter and any conditions met by objects are sufficient for 
composition, then universalism requires that they compose the moon-my appendix 
object.  The universalist ontology allows for our talk of ordinary objects to be true, but it 
does so at the expense of admitting counter-intuitive scattered objects into its ontology.  
The second answer, nihilism (or eliminativism), is the view that composition 
never occurs. Nihilists reject the existence of composite objects entirely. The only entities 
in the nihilist ontology are the fundamental, part-less objects that most of the other 
ontologies already contain. This ontological commitment entails that almost all of our 
claims about material objects are false and that our beliefs about the material world are 
mistaken. Nihilism claims that guitars, trucks, this dissertation, and even the people 
reading it do not exist. Why would anyone endorse such an extreme claim? First, it can 
                                                        
9 Here is the logical formulation of the claim that there exists a moon-my appendix object (where 
‘«’ is the proper part relation: ∃x∃y∃z(M(x) ^ A(x) ^ ((x « z) ^ (y « z)) 
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resolve the sorites of decomposition (as well as other puzzles of composition to be 
discussed later). Since there are no composite objects, then there are no things with 
removable parts. Second, unlike universalism, it does not admit counterintuitive entities 
into its ontology.  
 The final answer, which I will call sometimesism, is a family of views that all 
share the claim that some collections of objects compose a further object, while others do 
not. For example, some views claim that wood bits that fill a table-sized region compose 
a further object, a table, while wood bits scattered about a room do not compose 
anything. Not all sometimesers views accept the existence of ordinary objects. Van 
Inwagen proposes that only life forms are composite objects, while Merricks claims that 
only conscious beings are composite objects.10 Van Inwagen and Merricks are sometimes 
referred to as nihilists because they reject the existence of ordinary objects like tables 
and guitars. While these are technically sometimesers views, since they allow for the 
existence of some composite objects, I will nevertheless restrict the term sometimesism 
to indicate ontologies that contain ordinary objects..  
 A discussion of some of the underlying theory of classical mereology will help 
clarify the distinction between the three views. Under classical mereology, the concept of 
proper part is taken as primitive. Classical mereology stipulates that a proper part 
cannot be the same size as the whole in which the part exists. I will follow Simons and 
symbolize the proper part relation with ‘«’.11 The proposition that x is a proper part of y 
is formalized as ‘x « y’. A part (symbolized as ‘<’) can be defined with the primitive 
proper part:  
Part =def  x < y iff x « y or x = y 
                                                        
10 See Van Inwagen 1990b and Merricks 2001. 
11 See Simons 1987 ch.1 for an overview of mereological concepts and their definitions. 
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The difference between a proper part and an improper part, then, is that a whole is a part 
of itself. Objects overlap when they have a part in common. The formal definition of 
overlap:  
Overlap =def (∀x)(∀y)(O(x,y) ↔ (∃(z)(x < y ^ x < y))  
It will also be helpful to have a formal statement of a mereological sum (or fusion): 
Mereological Sum =def (∀x)(∀y)(∃(z)(O(z,x) ∨ O(z,y) ⊃ (∃(z)MS(z,x,y))) 
 
Suppose universalism is true. Now, consider a knife made of a blade and a handle. Given 
universalism, there is an object that is the mereological sum of the blade and the handle 
because there is an object, the knife, which completely overlaps the blade and handle. 
Suppose that the term “knife” refers to this sum. Now suppose that the knife blade is 
snapped off of the knife handle. It may seem that the object is destroyed. However, there 
is still a sum of the blade and the handle. Furthermore, since “knife” refers to this 
mereological sum, the object has not been destroyed. The sum remains even though 
knife’s parts no are no longer physically connected. While this is strange, the definition 
of a mereological sum does not require that the parts of a sum have any relationship to 
each other than simply existing.12  
Using these mereological concepts, I can alternatively state the three answers to 
the SCQ. Universalism claims that any mereological sum is an object, while nihilism 
claims that no mereological sum is an object. One might describe sometimesism as the 
view that that some mereological sums are objects while others are not. However, 
sometimesers need not use mereology to understand composite objects. It is more 
accurate to say that the sometimeser’s ontology contains some of the objects indicated by 
classical mereology, but not all of them. For example, the sometimeser’s ontology must 
distinguish between the sum of the knife blade and knife handle when they are attached 
                                                        
12 Proving this point requires a very lengthy discussion of how classical mereology is formulated. 
See Simons 1987, ch. 1 for the proof. 
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to each other, and the sum of the knife blade and the knife handle when they are no 
longer attached.   
Mereological concepts can also be used to define an object with no proper parts, a 
mereological simple: 
Simple =def ∀(x)(S(x) iff (y)~( y « x)) 
Since nihilists claims that there are no objects except for the simples, they must account 
for propositions that seem to make existential commitments to composite objects. 
Nihilists typically accomplish this through the use of a paraphrase strategy that allows 
apparent existential commitments to composite objects to be restated claims that are 
existentially committed to only simples. For instance, in the sentence, “There is a kettle 
on the stove,” it seems that one is ontologically committed to a kettle and a stove. The 
intuitive first-order logic translation of this claim shows this through existential 
introduction:  
P1. K(a) ^ S(b) ^ On(a,b) 
P2. ∃(x)(K(x) ^ S(b) ^ On(x,b)) 
C.   ∃(x)∃(y)(K(x) ^ S(y) ^ On(x,y)) 
 
Nihilists must eliminate the existential quantification over the singular objects “kettle” 
and “stove” from this formalization. One way to do this is to analyze the terms ‘stove’ and 
‘kettle’ as referring to some simples arranged table--wise and some simples arranged 
kettle-wise. However, first-order logic does not have the resources to quantify over 
simples arranged table-wise. Van Inwagen suggests that in order to capture ‘table-wise’ 
and ‘kettle-wise’ plural quantification should be added to first-order logic.13 With plural 
quantification, the sentence can be expressed as follows: 
P1. K(a) ^ S(b) ^ On(a,b) 
P2. ∃(xs)(K(xs) ^ S(b) ^ On(xs,b)) 
C.   ∃(xs)E(ys))(K(xs) ^ S(ys) ^ On(xs,ys)) 
 
                                                        
13 See Van Inwagen 1990, pp. 25-32 
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The names a and b do not refer to one object each. Instead, the name a refers to the 
simples that are located in the kettle-shaped region and the name b refers to the simples 
that are in the table shaped region. The simples filling these each of these regions appear 
us as a kettle and a stove. For the purposes of this project, I assume plural quantification 
to be the best strategy for dealing with everyday language.14  
 Throughout this dissertation I will be defending a nihilist answer to the SCQ. The 
remainder of this chapter will provide a discussion of and arguments against various 
sometimeser positions that embody a major preliminary objection to nihilism (as well as 
universalism): that our everyday experience is incompatible with nihilism.   With this 
preliminary objection out of the way, I will then examine several different types of 
nihilism, as well as discuss the nature of the simples that populate the nihilist’s ontology. 
I will not be arguing against universalism; giving it a proper rebuttal is beyond 
the scope of this project. That being said, I can offer some brief comments about why I 
find universalism unappealing. The first is a simple incredulous stare; I find it much 
more plausible that there are no objects at all, with the exception of simples, than that 
there are bizarre objects like the aforementioned moon-and-my-appendix. I will be the 
first to acknowledge that this a flimsy defense at best given my discussion of 
philosophical intuitions in the first chapter. After all, the nihilist is often subjected to the 
incredulous stare as well. However, there are other considerations besides intuitions. 
                                                        
14 One might about what it means to be “arranged kettle-wise”. I analyze arrangement in terms of 
regions. To be arranged kettle-wise, then, is for all of the simples in a kettle-shaped region of 
spacetime to instantiate all of the properties that we take a kettle to have, such as mass, density, 
color, etc. Tallant 2014 argues that this analysis fails because in order to pick out the kettle-
shaped region, we must refer to kettles, and there are no kettles (p. 1518). Tallant also goes on to 
explore various other analyses of ‘arranged f-wise’ and concludes that they all fail. If he is correct 
about these other analyses, and if he is also correct about the region analysis, then nihilism is in 
serious trouble. However, Tallant’s objection to the regional analyses is misplaced. There are 
several ways one could reply to Tallant. One option is to use a counterfactual analysis and claim 
that a kettle-shaped region is a region of space that could be filled by an extended kettle shaped 
simple (extended simples will be discussed later in this chapter). Alternatively, one could say that 
the kettle-shaped region as shorthand for the region that appears to be filled with matter and has 
such and such dimensions. Neither of these moves involves referring to composite objects that do 
not exist. 
	
22 
 
 
One can appeal to parsimony, the claim that simplicity is a theoretical virtue. When 
compared to a universalist ontology of simples and composite objects, nihilism has the 
virtue of qualitative parsimony since nihilism only requires one ontological type while 
universalism requires two (the universalist’s ontology could contain atomless gunk 
instead of simples; gunk is a material substance that can be infinitely decomposed. I will 
discuss the problems with gunk in Ch. 5).15 Nihilism also has the virtue of qualitative 
parsimony with respect to ideology. A given theory’s ideology is the collection of 
primitive, undefined concepts the theory uses in its explanation of a phenomenon.16 As 
previously discussed, universalism requires the primitive concept of ‘proper part,’ while 
nihilism does not. Therefore, when compared to universalism, nihilism has the virtue of 
qualitative parsimony with respect to ideology since nihilism requires fewer undefined 
primitives.  
Universalism also requires the existence of objects that have parts that do not 
appear to have any physical connection with one another, for example, the 
aforementioned moon-my-appendix object. One could object that material objects 
cannot lack physical connection between their parts. For instance, one might argue that 
it is analytic that material objects are physically connected somehow. However, I will not 
pursue this line of argument since it requires and in-depth discussion of analyticity. Even 
if this argument from analyticity fails, there is still something strange about a material 
                                                        
15 Following Quine, I will assume that qualitative parsimony is a virtue of a theory and not provide 
a further defense of the claim. See Quine 1948, 1951  section 6, and 1960, chapter 7, 197. Lewis 
also claims that qualitative parsimony is a theoretical virtue in Lewis 1973; however, Lewis rejects 
that quantitative parsimony is a theoretical virtue. Nolan 1997 argues that not only is qualitative 
parsimony a theoretical virtue, but that quantitative parsimony is a virtue as well. Nolan justifies 
this claim by discussing the discovery of the neutrino. The spin of electrons in a radioactive atom 
was observed to decrease by ½ during beta decay. To account for this, physicists posited that the 
decaying electron emitted a neutrino, a particle with 1/2 spin. Nolan notes that physicists could 
have instead chosen to posit that the electron emits any number of neutrinos with smaller 
fractions of spin. For example, the electron could emit four neutrinos that each had a spin of 1/8. 
Nolan claims that while these hypotheses are empirically adequate, the ½ spin neutrino 
hypothesis is preferable on grounds of quantitative parsimony.  
16 The term ideology originates from Quine. See Quine 1951a. Quine also discusses the idea of 
ideology in Quine 1948, 1951b, and 1960.  
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object that has parts that have no physical connection with one another. While this is 
only a surface treatment of the debate between universalists and nihilists, I think it 
provides enough motivation for moving on. In the next section, I will discuss 
sometimesism. 
2.2: Sometimeser Answers to the SCQ 
Sometimesers are advocates for ontologies that contain the things that we would 
intuitively classify as objects. Sometimesers might quantify over things like trees, 
airplanes, and cellos, but they would not quantify over tree-cellos or airplane-trees. 
While this sort of view may seem plausible, I will argue that sometimeser views face 
major obstacles and should be rejected. I will first examine the problem with a 
sometimeser position that attempts to define composition in terms of restrictive 
conditions. After I have shown that this approach is not fruitful, I will discuss two further 
ordinary object views that pursue different strategies. Korman attempts to make an 
argument that a sometimeser ontology is less problematic than alternatives, while Ned 
Markosian argues for a view where ordinary objects are taken as primitive. I will show 
that both of these views face serious difficulties and should be rejected. 
2.2.1: Common Sense Answers to the SCQ 
At first glance, answering the SCQ might not seem that difficult. Isn’t it obvious that 
objects are just hunks of matter that hang together in a certain way? A defender of this 
intuition might answer the SCQ as follows:  
Contact: To get the x’s to compose something, one must, and need only, bring 
them into contact; if the x’s are in contact, they compose something and if they 
are not in contact, they do not compose something.17 
 
There are several reasons for rejecting Contact. The first is that Contact requires an 
ontology that is populated by many objects that are counter-intuitive. For instance, 
Contact tells us that a pile of pebbles is a composite object. Most people would believe 
                                                        
17 Van Inwagen 1987, p. 26 
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this to be false. It seems that a pile is not an object; it is just a collection of small, loosely 
organized objects. Call this objection the counterintuitive objection. It may seem that 
this objection does not count against Contact. After all, philosophical theories should be 
informative and not merely confirm what we already believe to be true. One might think 
that it is desirable that Contact should rule out or include objects that aren’t predicted by 
common sense.  
While I am sympathetic with this line of reasoning, it fails to apply here. Contact 
is invoked as a common sense solution, yet it defies common sense in many cases. For 
instance, I have a pile of garbage in my basement. Each piece of garbage is in Contact 
with the other pieces. However, common sense does not indicate that the pile is a 
composite object. If one is proposing a common sense solution to a philosophical 
problem that relies on appeal to intuitions, then the solution should not yield a variety of 
counter-intuitive cases. Van Inwagen provides another problem for Contact: the case of 
two people shaking hands. If Contact is true, when the hands meet in the shake, a new 
object that has both people as proper parts is brought into existence. Van Inwagen 
argues that this simply defies belief; there cannot be composite objects with two human 
persons as proper parts.18  Therefore, Contact as a common sense answer should be 
rejected. 
One might try to argue for Contact on grounds other than common sense 
(although I find it hard to imagine what these grounds could be). Even if this can be 
done, Contact still faces further objections. Since Contact allows for the ex nihilo 
creation and destruction of objects, Van Inwagen argues that the defender of Contact will 
                                                        
18 See Van Inwagen 1990, pp.  25-6. Although this line of thought runs into problems when 
considering cases of conjoined twins. This will become relevant while examining Fusion. It is 
worth pointing out that using human persons as part of a counterexample typically makes the 
status of the counterexample more confusing since we must import our intuitions about not only 
the problem at hand, but our intuitions about personhood. However, since Contact is motivated 
by intuitions, I believe that this a fair use of human persons as counterexamples since our 
intuitions about persons are part of our intuitions about material objects. 
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have to answer difficult questions about identity.19 Suppose Fred and Ted shake hands, 
then let go, and finally shake hands again. When they first shake hands, Fred and Ted 
become proper parts of a new object since they come into Contact, call this new object 
Fred-Ted1. When Fred-Ted1 releases the handshake, the object Fred-Ted1 ceases to exist. 
What happens when Fred and Ted shake hands a second time? Contact demands that a 
new object comes into existence. This object, call it Fred-Ted2, seems a lot like Fred-Ted1. 
Now it must be decided if Fred-Ted1 is identical to Fred-Ted2. Van Inwagen says that it is 
hard to imagine how one could even go about deciding this question.20 Therefore, any 
proponent of Contact has their work cut out for them. Van Inwagen admits these 
arguments are not a solid defeat of Contact, but they provide enough of a reason to 
pursue other types of answers to the SCQ.  
I think that Van Inwagen might have stronger reasons to resist Contact than he 
realizes. The main problem with Contact, independent of the issues of common sense, is 
that it makes the creation and destruction of objects too easy. It seems possible that 
some godlike entities might have the power to create things ex nihilo and annihilate 
them as well, but it seems that we do not have this power. However, Contact gives us the 
ability to create and destroy some objects ex nihilo. We can create and destroy objects by 
simply shaking hands, or pushing and pulling apart stones. However, it just seems false 
that we can do such things. After all, the furniture of the universe seems to remain 
unaffected; the amount of matter and energy remains constant no matter how much 
hand shaking we do.21 This yields the simple reductio:   
                                                        
19 Ibid, p. 36 
20 This problem is really only a problem for the endurantist, since they must decide whether it is 
possible for an object to momentarily cease to exist or to have a gap in its timeline. The 
perdurantist has an easy solution: Fred-Ted1 and Fred-Ted2 are proper temporal parts of some 
temporally and spatially extended object and therefore are not identical. Perdurantism and 
Endurantism will be discussed in ch. 3.  
21 One might argue that if eternalism is true (the view that all moments of time have the same 
existential status; this will be discussed in ch. 3), then we cannot truly “create” anything, since 
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      P1. If Contact is true, then we can create and destroy objects ex nihilo. 
      P2. We cannot create or destroy objects ex nihilo. 
      C1. Therefore, Contact is false. 
 
Call this the ex nihilo objection. I have already argued for P1, but what can be said in 
defense of P2? Well, we cannot create or destroy ex nihilo in the conventional sense. I 
cannot bring it about that a briefcase full of money appears before me, or that a 
bothersome student ceases to exist (no matter how much I want either of these things to 
happen). Since we do not have ex nihilo power over ordinary objects, there would have to 
be another ontological type of object that we do have the power to create and destroy: the 
strange objects formed by Contact like Fred-Ted. However, Contact does not make any 
differentiation between things like Fred and things like Fred-Ted. Stipulating this 
ontological distinction seems ad hoc and it makes for a theory with an ontological 
commitment to another primitive entity. Therefore, parsimony suggests that Contact 
should be rejected unless it can justify the differing metaphysical status of Fred-Ted type 
objects without ad hoc justification. With the truth of P2 secured, the argument is sound 
and Contact can therefore be rejected not only by appealing to intuitions, but also by 
support from theoretical parsimony.  
 When met with these objections, the defender of Contact may simply try to 
switch to a bonding-style SCQ answer that is similar to Contact but can hopefully avoid 
Contact’s counterexamples while still capturing our intuitions about objects. However, 
these sorts of answers is susceptible to the counterintuitive objection and the ex nihilo 
objection. As a sample, consider the following two answers that are candidates for 
replacing Contact:22 
                                                                                                                                                                     
nothing ever comes into or out of existence. However, we are certainly causally responsible for the 
existence of these objects in the counterfactual sense that if hadn’t shaken hands, for example, 
than no objects like Fred-Ted would exist. I believe that this is enough to motivate the ex nihilo 
objection. 
22 Van Inwagen also discusses cohesion (p. 56). There are probably other concepts of this type 
that could be analyzed, but they all would share similar problems. 
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Fastening: To get the x’s to compose something, one must, and need only, cause 
them to be fastened to one another.23 
 
Fusion: To get the x’s to compose something one need only cause them to fuse.24 
 
Van Inwagen uses the handshake counterexample to reject both Fastening and Fusion. 
While Fastening and Fusion keep things like piles of pebbles from counting as objects, 
they still let in too many things to their ontologies that are intuitively not objects. As a 
counterexample to Fastening, he supposes that Fred and Ted are briefly paralyzed during 
their shake. Under Fastening, the paralysis of the Fred and Ted causes a new object to 
form ex nihilo, Fred-Ted. Therefore, Fastening is susceptible to the counterintuitive 
objection and ex nihilo objection for the same reasons as Contact. 
As a counterexample to fusion, Van Inwagen imagines that Fred and Ted each 
have a hand cut off by a mad surgeon who then grafts Fred and Ted together; this makes 
Fred and Ted artificially conjoined twins and also the object Fred-Ted. The fusion case 
bears further examination; how does it fare against the counterintuitive objection? Van 
Inwagen argues that the existence of these artificially conjoined twins is implausible. 
While Van Inwagen is entitled to his own intuitions, I find fusion much more plausible 
than Contact or Fastening. First, it seems plausible to judge naturally conjoined twins as 
one object.25 Even if one does not find this plausible, changing the subjects of the 
example from human beings to inanimate objects may greatly reduce how implausible 
the case seems. Take any two material objects that you wish, a spoon and a plate for 
                                                        
23 ibid., p. 56. Van Inwagen says that Fastening can be thought of as follows: “Suppose that two 
objects are in contact and suppose that they are so arranged that, among all the many sequences 
in which forces of arbitrary directions and magnitudes might be applied to either one or both of 
them, at most only a few would be capable of separating them without breaking or permanently 
deforming or otherwise damaging either of them.” 
24 ibid., p. 58 
25 This, of course, is different than the judgment that they are one person. This is where Van 
Inwagen gets into trouble with using human persons. Also, I don’t personally find it plausible to 
judge the conjoined twins as one object since my commitment to nihilism rejects the existence of 
composite object.  
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example, and fuse them together so that it is indeterminate where the spoon begins and 
the plate ends. It seems plausible to judge this as a composite object.  
One might even argue that the problem with the previous answers Contact and 
Fastening is that they lacked the strength necessary to force two objects into a new 
composite object. One might resist the counterintuitive objection, then, by arguing that 
the supposed counterexamples to fusion are no longer counterintuitive enough to be in 
tension with common sense. However, fusion is still susceptible to the ex nihilo 
objection, since fusion allows for the same problematic ex nihilo creation and destruction 
of objects found in Contact and Fastening. Give the implausibility that we possess the 
power to create and destroy ex nihilo, fusion is just as problematic as Fastening and 
Contact. 
 Each of the previously discussed answers involves only one type of relation that 
analyzes composition. However, Van Inwagen discusses an alternative strategy to these 
single relation answers. This strategy involves, instead, answers that instead involve 
multiple relations in their analysis of composition. Van Inwagen calls these “series-style 
answers” and formulates them as follows:   
Series: (∃y the xs compose y) if and only if the xs are F1 and stand in R1, or the xs 
are F2 and stand in R2, or…, or the xs are Fn and stand in Rn.26 
 
In order to explain exactly how the series-style answer works, it will be helpful to 
consider an example. Consider a simple possible world in which there are three kinds of 
entities: particles, atoms, and molecules (the molecules are not proper parts of anything, 
i.e. they compose no further objects). A series-style answer would involve two different 
composition relations: the A relation that makes particles compose atoms, and the M 
relation makes atoms compose molecules. For some molecule m, it will be composed of 
                                                        
26 Van Inwagen 1990b, p. 63. He uses the “xs” as a plural variable that stands in for plural 
referring expressions such as “Sam and Amy,” “the band,” “the members of Congress”. These 
plural variables are quantified over in the same way as singular variables. 
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some a’s (atoms) and this instance of composition obtains by the M relation. As for the 
atoms, each will be composed of p’s. The p’s will stand in the A relation to some atom a.  
Van Inwagen thinks that this kind of answer is attractive since it allows for the 
construction of a series that could undermine his counterexamples involving the hand 
shakers. In this series-style answer, non-living objects that are in the fusion relation 
compose a further object, but people (such as the hand shakers who have become 
artificial conjoined twins) that are in the fusion relation do not, since the fusion relation 
only brings about composition with non-living things.  
 However, there is a problem with series-style answers. The first problem is that 
they suffer from circularity. Consider an answer to the SCQ in our simple world: 
Series1: (∃y the xs compose y) if and only if the xs are particles and are 
maximally P-bonded or if the xs are atoms and are maximally A-bonded (or 
there is only one of the xs).27  
 
Van Inwagen points out that atom can only mean “something composed of particles,” 
and that particle can only mean “something with no proper parts.” Remember that any 
answer to the SCQ must not use any mereological concepts in its analysis in order to 
remain informative. Therefore, Seriesw is not an answer to the SCQ.28  
 The second problem with series-style answers is that they violate one of the two 
basic axioms of classical mereology: the transitivity of parthood. 
Transitivity of Parthood: If a is a proper part of b, and b is a proper part of c, 
then a is a proper part of c.29 
 
                                                        
27 Ibid., p. 64 
28 Van Inwagen considers the possibility that in w, it is impossible for particles to be A bonded 
and for atoms to be M bonded. Then one could reformulate Seriesw as: (∃y the xs compose y) if 
and only if the xs are maximally M bonded or if the xs are maximally A bonded (or there is only 
one of the xs) (199b, p. 64). He points out that this fails as well, since it collapses into (∃y the xs 
compose y) if and only if the xs are maximally bonded. This is not a series-style answer, but a 
single predicate answer and subject to the same difficulties as other single predicate answers. 
29 See Simons 1987, p. 26. Here is the Transitivity of Parthood formally stated: ∀(x)∀(y)∀(z)((x ≪ 
y ^ y ≪ z) ⊃ (x ≪ z)).  
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In our simple world w, for any molecule m, m will be composed of some a’s that are 
atoms by the M bond. These a’s will be in turn be composed of the ps through the A 
bond. Therefore, the p’s are proper parts of their respective a’s, that the a’s are proper 
parts of m. By the transitivity of parthood, it follows that the p’s are proper parts of m. By 
Seriesw this is impossible; there is no relation that allows particles to compose a 
molecule. 
In this section, I have presented arguments against the answers Contact, 
Fastening, and Fusion as well as series-style bonding answers. In the next section, I will 
discuss two sometimeser answers to the SCQ that are more philosophically robust. I will 
then argue that these answers fail to provide a convincing answer to the SCQ as well.  
2.2.1: Korman’s Sometimesism 
In “Strange Kinds, Familiar Kinds, and the Charge of Arbitrariness,” Korman advocates a 
particularist ontology of ordinary objects that contains all and only the things that we 
intuitively believe to be objects as objects. Korman explains particularism as the 
methodological position that “the view that our intuitive judgments about cases in [a] 
domain are largely correct and that, when intuitive judgments about cases conflict with 
compelling general principles, the cases should in general be treated as counterexamples 
to those principles.”30 Korman’s sometimesist ontology of material objects relies on the 
particularist approach. 
In contrast, generalism (or non-particularism), is the view that general 
philosophical principles concerning a given philosophical domain trump our pre-
philosophical intuitions about that domain. Furthermore, in cases of conflict between the 
two, general principles are counterexamples to intuitions. Of course, few philosophers (if 
any) are strict particularists or strict generalists. These are not two diametrically opposed 
positions, but can instead be thought of as a continuum. This continuum allows for a 
                                                        
30 Korman 2010b, p. 121 
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middle-of-the-road position where one considers pre-philosophical intuitions about 
cases and philosophical general principles to be equally important. 
One could take a strong methodological stance on the generalist/particularist 
debate by arguing that one must consistently apply particularism, generalism, or 
something in between to all philosophical inquiry. One could also take a weaker stance 
and advocate particularism concerning one domain and generalism concerning another. 
For example, a philosopher could advocate a particularist approach to epistemology 
while maintaining a generalist approach to ethics. As an epistemologist, one begins with 
common-sense intuitions about epistemological cases and attempt to develop a view that 
can support these intuitions while violating as few of these intuitions as possible.31 As an 
ethicist, one could advocate a general ethical principle, such as the utilitarian principle of 
the greatest good for the greatest number, and attempt to use this principle to undercut 
conflicting intuitions when they arise. It certainly seems that there is no inconsistency in 
holding each of these views.  
Out of the three methodological approaches just discussed, this generalist 
approach to the metaphysics of material objects is by far the most popular in the 
literature. Both nihilism and universalism are examples of the generalist approach. The 
popularity of the generalist approach is due to what Korman identifies as two types of 
arguments: rebutting arguments and undercutting arguments. Rebutting arguments “are 
                                                        
31 See Hirsch 2002, p. 104. Hirsch believes that the particularist approach described here should 
be sufficient for the truth of particularism. But since these common sense considerations are not 
usually enough to convince generalists, he also presents a linguistic argument from the principle 
of charity. Briefly, Hirsch argues that if there are two candidate interpretations for an utterance, 
and one interpretation makes the utterance true while the other makes the utterance false, then 
the one that makes the utterance true is correct. For instance, if nihilism is true, then the 
utterance “There is a lamp on the table” is false. Therefore nihilism should be rejected. The 
strength of this argument comes from Hirsch’s assumption that the principle of charity is so 
important that it is not up for negotiation. However, I believe that there are no principles that are 
not up for negotiation, and therefore believe the principle of charity must be weighed against 
every other consideration involved. For my part, I believe that the principle of charity is a good 
one if it is understood to be a cetaris paribus principle. However, in many philosophical situations 
there are generalist arguments that can override the cetaris paribus principle of charity. 
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arguments for conclusions that directly contradict some specific range of intuitive 
judgments about cases,” and cites the argument from vagueness and the causal over 
determination argument as examples.32 Korman does not attempt to refute any rebutting 
arguments.33 He makes the claim that “every philosophical domain has its share of 
powerful rebutting arguments, yet it is only in material-object metaphysics that such 
arguments do not typically inspire a Moorean confidence that at least one of the 
principles that drives the argument must be false.”34 Korman claims that the lack of 
Moorean responses in this debate can be attributed to the undercutting arguments, 
arguments that attempt to show that “our intuitive judgments about cases are (probably) 
unreliable, but that do not purport to demonstrate the falsity of any specific range of 
intuitive judgments. 35  These undercutting arguments are designed to make the 
particularist ontology seem implausible. However, Korman believes that defeating the 
various undercutting arguments may restore some plausibility to the particularist 
ontology. Korman’s general strategy for defending a particularist ontology, then, is as 
follows: (1) defeat any undercutting arguments, and (2) take a Moorean stance on any 
rebutting arguments that cannot be argued against.  
Korman does not attempt to provide arguments against all the undercutting 
arguments, but he does provide arguments against a class of undercutting argument, 
what he calls the argument from arbitrariness:  
P1. There is no ontologically significant difference between Ks and K′s. 
P2. If there is no ontologically significant difference between Ks and K′s, then it is      
objectionably arbitrary to countenance things of kind K but not things of K′ 
C.   So it is objectionably arbitrary to countenance things of kind K but not things 
of kind K′.36 
                                                        
32 Korman 121. For examples of the rebutting arguments See Lewis and Sider on the argument 
from vagueness, and Merricks on the causal over determination argument. 
33 However, he does offer possible ways to resist the argument from vagueness in Korman 2010a. 
34 Ibid., p. 121 
35 Ibid., p. 121 
36 Ibid., p. 124 
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These sorts of arguments attempt to show that there is no good reason to include some 
normal everyday object in our ontology while at the same time excluding bizarre objects. 
In other words, normal kinds and strange kinds stand or fall together: either they both 
exist, or neither of them exists.  
What, then, are some of these counterexamples that support the conclusion that 
normal kinds and strange kinds stand or fall together? John Hawthorne provides one 
example. Incars are exactly like normal cars, except that the parts of the incar cease to 
exist as they cross the threshold of the garage.37 To an observer not familiar with incars, 
an incar leaving a garage looks just like a car pulling out of a garage and into a driveway. 
However, as soon as the incar reaches the garage threshold, it begins to disappear and an 
outcar grows into existence at the same rate as the shrinking incar on the other side of 
the threshold. When an outcar pulls into a garage, the process occurs in reverse.  
Hawthorne goes on to argue that islands are like incars, because the rising and 
lowering of the water surrounding the island functions like the garage threshold in the 
incar example. As the water surrounding the island moves up to cover it, the island 
shrinks in size until it no longer exists. As the water recedes, the island comes back into 
existence and grows in size. Since there is no ontologically significant difference between 
islands and incars, and since P2 is true, then the conclusion follows: both islands and 
incars are objectionably arbitrary. Presumably, this example could be generalized to 
other objects as well.  
 How can Korman defeat this incar version of the argument from arbitrariness? 
He could attempt to argue against P2. However, this entails a commitment to what 
Korman calls “deflationary particularism.”38 The deflationary particularist will argue that 
                                                        
37 Hawthorne 2006 
38 ibid. 
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quantification is relative to a conceptual or linguistic scheme.39 If this is true, then P2 is 
false; while it is true that there is no ontologically significant difference between islands 
and incars, it is false that quantifying over islands but not incars is objectionably 
arbitrary. This is because the deflationary particularist believes that linguistic or 
conceptual schemes are inherently pragmatic in what they quantify over. We could have 
chosen a scheme where quantifying over incars and islands is the norm, or quantifying 
over incars and not islands is the norm. Instead, our scheme quantifies over islands, but 
not incars.  
Korman, however, wants to defend a robust particularist ontology, an ontology 
that is not committed to these deflationary views about quantification. He attacks P3 by 
arguing that there is an ontologically significant difference between islands and incars: 
islands continue to exist when they go underwater, while incars do not continue to exist 
when they attempt to leave the garage. One might object that anything completely 
submerged cannot be an island. After all, underwater mountain peaks should not count 
as islands. Korman points out that this misses the mark; all the objector claims is that 
islands cease to be islands when they are submerged, not that they cease to exist. Islands 
and incars are ontologically different because the former continues to exist when 
submerged while the latter does not continue to exist as it leaves the garage. 
The islands/incars example is just one of several that Korman provides. He 
attempts to show that there are ontologically significant differences between the objects 
presented by a variety of undercutting arguments, and that revealing each case’s 
difference requires a novel argument. If one wanted to resist Korman’s argument, then 
one must argue against Korman case by case. Korman claims that islands cease to be 
islands when they are submerged, but that they do not cease to exist. In order to refute 
                                                        
39 See Carnap 1956 and Hirsch 2002a and Hirsch 2002b for a defense of deflationary 
metaphysics. 
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Korman’s argument against Hawthorne’s undercutting argument, Korman’s ontological 
commitments need clarification. It seems that Korman is committed to some x that is an 
island before t and to some y that is an underwater mountain peak after t, and x-before-t 
= y-after-t. Since Korman is committed to something that changes from an island to an 
underwater mountain peak, he does not believe island or underwater mountain peak to 
be essential properties (if he believes in essential properties at all).  
Korman is not clear about how to treat the ontological commitments of island 
and underwater mountain peak; he simply says islands do not cease to exist when 
submerged. If Korman’s claims are understood as simple existential commitments, then 
they amount to a contradiction. Islands and underwater mountains exist, and they 
appear to be identical hunks of matter. However, since islands are not underwater 
mountains a contradiction follows.  
Earlier in his paper, Korman discusses the concepts of phased kinds and individuative 
kinds. While Korman does not use these concepts to analyze the island/underwater 
mountain problem, he might be able to use these concepts to resolve the contradiction 
above. Korman defines phased kind and individuated kind as follows: 
Phased kinds are kinds whose instances can cease to belong to that kind without 
ceasing to exist. Individuative kinds are kinds whose instances cannot cease to 
belong without ceasing to exist: they are of that kind as a matter of de re 
necessity.40  
Islands, then, must be phased kinds since the matter of the island does not cease to exist 
when it becomes submerged. Therefore, the ontological difference between incars and 
islands is that islands are phased kinds while incars are individuated kinds. This 
difference allows Korman to undercut Hawthorne’s argument from arbitrariness.  
 However, it is questionable whether the island is a phased kind in the first place. 
While Korman distinguishes between phased kinds and individuative kinds, he does not 
                                                        
40 Korman 2010, p. 127 
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provide any criteria for classifying a thing as one or the other. What reason is there for 
thinking that an island is a phased kind? Korman’s claim that the island is an instance of 
a phased kind because it does not go out of existence when it is no longer an instance of 
that kind is only supported by the claim that islands do not go out of existence when 
submerged. Simply asserting that this is true is not enough to show that islands are 
significant different from incars.  
 Furthermore, even if one grants that phased kinds exist, they do not solve the 
incar problem. Presumably, Korman’s view includes things like islands in its ontology. 
But the fact remains that when an island is submerged, it is no longer an island. Korman 
wants to have it both ways; islands exist, and they continue to exist when submerged, but 
they are also no longer islands when submerged. In response, Korman could argue that 
calling the thing an island is a mistake. Even though I was once a teenager, it does not 
mean that I am a teenager now. Similarly, the rock may be an island at one time, but it 
does not always have to be an island. However, this analogy is suspect. When I was a 
teenager, the composition of my body was different. With the passage of time, my body 
grew and changed. However, in the case of the island, the island itself does not change. 
Instead, the environment around the island changes. In other words, nothing about the 
island intrinsically changes. Therefore, islands are not phased kinds since they show 
none of the transitory nature of phased kinds.  
When dealing with the puzzle of the island, instead of an analysis that requires 
the existence of phased kinds, islands, underwater mountain peaks, and matter that fills 
the spatial region of the island (and the underwater mountain peak), it would be much 
simpler to claim that there is only matter that occupies the spatial region of the thing we 
call ‘island’ and ‘underwater mountain peak’. Both the nihilist and universalist have no 
need for metaphysically committing phased kinds. The nihilist simply claims there are 
no islands (or incars for that matter), while the universalist can quantify over both 
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islands and incars. Therefore, the phased kinds required by particularism about ordinary 
objects are a theoretical cost. 
The arguments of the particularist and generalist both suffer from the same 
problem: they fail to provide argument for justifying a generalist or particularist 
approach in the first place. The generalists have typically appealed to rebutting 
arguments as evidence for their radical ontologies. Rebutting arguments are generally a 
priori and do not simply undermine one’s confidence in a claim, but instead show that to 
show that the claim leads to contradiction. The sorites paradox and the argument from 
vagueness are two examples of undercutting arguments. In contrast, particularists justify 
their rejection of radical ontologies by arguing that we have a great deal of knowledge 
about material objects already  
This debate is analogous to the problem of skepticism. Philosophers that take 
skepticism seriously are moved by rebutting arguments that undermine the possibility of 
having knowledge, while anti-skeptics reject the skeptical conclusions by arguing that we 
know that we have a great deal of knowledge about the external world. The general form 
of the skeptical argument is as follows, where P is any proposition about the external 
world, and S is a skeptical hypothesis: 41 
P1. I don’t know that not-S. 
P2. If I don’t know that not-S, then I don’t know that not-P. 
C1.  Therefore, I don’t know that not-P. 
 
While there are many different ways that anti-skeptical philosophers have argued against 
skepticism, one of the most famous arguments against skepticism is the Moorean 
argument.  Moore argued that if one is given a set of believable propositions that entail 
an unbelievable conclusion, then one is warranted in rejecting the conclusion if the 
negation of the conclusion is much more believable than the initial set of propositions 
                                                        
41 Examples of skeptical hypotheses include: Descartes’ evil demon, brains-in-a-vat, five-minute-
old earth, everyone but you is a robot, etc. 
	
38 
 
 
combined.42 The anti-skeptics, then, finds P1 and P2 of the skeptical argument plausible, 
but not more plausible that the proposition ‘I know that P’; they argue as follows: 
P1ʹ. I know that P. 
P2ʹ. If I know that P, then I know that not-S. 
Cʹ.  Therefore, I know that not-S. 
 
The anti-skeptic believes that while the premises of the skeptical argument are plausible, 
there must be something wrong with at least one of the premises. So the debate between 
the skeptic and the anti-skeptic comes down to whether the skeptical argument’s 
premises are more or less plausible than the Moorean argument’s premises. This is 
where the dialectic breaks down; either you find the skeptical premises gripping and 
have serious doubts about epistemology or you do not.  
 The debate between the particularist and generalist over the metaphysics of 
ordinary objects makes similar dialectical moves as the debate between the skeptic and 
anti-skeptic. The generalist uses the following argument: 
P1. The rebutting arguments are sound. 
P2. If the rebutting arguments are sound, then particularism about the 
metaphysics of material objects is false. 
C.   Therefore, particularism about the metaphysics of material objects is false. 
 
The generalist is a defender of rebutting arguments, and accepts P1. Rebutting 
arguments like the argument from vagueness or the causal over determination argument 
show that particularist ontologies entail contradictions and should be rejected, hence P2. 
The generalist argument functions in the same way as the skeptical argument; it begins 
with philosophical arguments as motivation and proceeds to a counter-intuitive 
conclusion. The particularist argues as follows: 
P1ʹ. Everyday objects exist and strange objects do not exist. 
P2ʹ. Since everyday objects exist and strange objects do not exist, then 
particularism about the metaphysics of material objects is true. 
                                                        
42 Moore 1959, 247. See DeRose and Warfield 1999, 5 for this interpretation of Moore. Lycan 2001 
presents Moore in a similar manner. 
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Cʹ.  Therefore, particularism about the metaphysics of material objects is true. 
 
The particularist relies on what we intuitively believe to be true about material objects; 
before philosophical investigation, we all believe that there are tables and chairs and that 
there are not bizarre kinds. The particularist argument is a Moorean argument; it begins 
by making the Moorean rejection of the generalist argument’s conclusion, and proceeds 
to confirm the intuitive philosophical view.  
 Skeptics and Mooreans, then, are at a philosophical standoff; each group finds 
their premises more believable than their opponent’s conclusion. Since the skeptic/anti-
skeptic debate is not tractable, one might worry that the generalist/particularist debate 
about the metaphysics of material objects is equally not tractable. While I do not find the 
particularists premises gripping with respect to ordinary objects, would be nice to have 
better reasons to reject particularism. 
Earlier, I mentioned that one could argue for the use of particularism or 
generalism as an approach to philosophy as a whole, or one could argue that the 
particularism/generalism debate must be settled for each domain of philosophical 
inquiry. While one could take a strong generalist or particularist stance towards 
philosophy as a whole, I can think of no good reason to do so. Perhaps one has strong 
convictions that the universe must be governed by general principles or that no such 
general principles exist; I do not know of any good arguments that support either of 
these claims.   
However, if the latter approach is the correct one, then there must be some 
feature of a given philosophical domain (or lack of) that can be used to argue for a 
particularist or generalist approach. I will argue that whether a domain should be 
approached through particularism or generalism corresponds to how mind dependent 
one believes the domain to be. For example, moral realists tend to endorse a generalist 
approach to moral philosophy since they believe that the existence of moral properties is 
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not dependent on human beings; in other words, moral properties are not mind 
dependent. Moral anti-realists, such as normative ethicists, endorse a particularist 
approach to moral philosophy since they believe that moral properties are socially 
constructed systems of norms.  
Why are each of these positions justified in their approach? Each of these 
positions begins moral inquiry by first examining our moral intuitions and then 
developing general principles from these intuitions. Once these principles are 
established, counterexamples will inevitably be put forward. For example, it might seem 
that a society holds the moral norm that murder is wrong. However, that same society 
might also believe that the murder of extreme moral degenerates, such as pedophiles or 
mass murderers, is morally justified.  The normative ethicist is under considerable 
pressure to revise their general principle that murder is wrong (or reject it all together) 
because ethical systems are grounded by the moral beliefs of the individuals that make 
up a society. Each counterexample to a general principle of some normative system 
possibly shows that the normative ethicist’s analysis of a normative system is incorrect. 
If a society has seemingly immoral beliefs or contradictory moral norms, then the system 
must be revised to resolve the perceived inconsistency. 
In contrast, the moral realist is not under as much pressure to revise their 
principles if they have good evidence for those general principles. Counterexamples to 
general moral principles generally attempt to show that if some general moral principle 
is true, then some clearly immoral act is permitted by the general moral principle. But, a 
moral realist, for example, could simply claim that a society’s belief that some murders 
are morally justified is flat out wrong. The moral realist can do this because the moral 
properties independently exist outside of human beings. Since these properties are 
independent, there is no good reason to think that what we believe to be moral must 
correspond with what is actually moral; there is the possibility for real moral error. 
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Therefore, one’s stance on the moral realism/anti-realism debate influences one’s stance 
on the generalism/particularism approach to moral philosophy. This same distinction 
applies to other fields as well. Contemporary epistemology embraces the mind 
dependence of their inquiry; the standards of knowledge are not mind independent. As a 
consequence, epistemology is almost universally approached through a particularist 
methodology. 
Metaphysics in general, and the metaphysics of material objects in particular, has 
its share of realist and anti-realist approaches. The anti-realists are the deflationary 
accounts of metaphysics advanced earlier and stem from the Carnapian methodological 
tradition. So whether one should be a particularist or generalist about the metaphysics of 
material objects has to do with whether one takes an anti-realist or realist approach to 
metaphysics. This may seem like pushing the bump in the carpet from one location to 
another. It would be, too, if this argument were used against particularist metaphysics in 
general. However, remember that Korman emphasizes his rejection of the deflationary 
approaches to the metaphysics of material objects. This means that Korman and his 
generalist opponents are on the same realist side of the coin. In order to strengthen his 
case for particularism, Korman would need to be an anti-realist. However, since he is 
placing himself in the realist camp, he is under the same pressure faced by realists about 
metaphysics to endorse generalism. 
If one believes that there are mind independent facts about the metaphysics of 
material objects, then one should believe that there is a good chance that human beings 
everyday intuitions get those facts wrong. Perhaps the world conforms to what we 
believe, and perhaps it does not. The purpose of the generalist’s rebutting arguments is 
to show that the latter is the case and that these arguments cannot be ignored with a 
Moorean inspired move. This move would be plausible for an anti-realist deflationary 
account of metaphysics, but it is not advisable for any realist account. Therefore, even 
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though Korman may be able to diffuse the undercutting arguments, he cannot make the 
Moorean move to overcome the rebutting arguments and his view remains susceptible to 
them.  
2.2.2: Brutal Composition 
The final sometimeser answer to the SCQ that I will discuss is Ned Markosian’s Brutal 
Composition. Rather than appealing to our intuitions about composition or attempting 
to find a specific relation that governs composition, Markosian argues that there is no 
answer to the SCQ. However, Markosian holds that our common sense intuitions about 
ordinary objects are largely correct; tables, chairs, and people exist and are composed of 
parts. This view rests on two claims, Brutal Composition (BC) and the Brutality of 
Compositional Facts (BCF): 
BC: There is no true, non-trivial, and finitely long answer to the SCQ. 
BCF: For any xs, if there is an object composed of the xs, then it is a brute fact 
that there is an object composed of the xs.43 
 
These two claims do not entail a common-sense ontology of ordinary objects. This 
ontology would require the additional assumption that there are genuine composite 
objects, and our common sense objects are among them. Notice that BC does not rule out 
infinitely long answers to the SCQ. If BC did not have this stipulation, then one could 
answer the SCQ by simply listing off every possible case of composition. Markosian does 
not consider this a legitimate answer, presumably because it is ad hoc, uninformative 
and impractical.  
 BC and BCF complement each other. If facts about composition are brute, then 
there is no answer to the SCQ. Any attempt to answer the SCQ would result in an infinite 
list of all these brute facts, and this provides no real insight into why certain aggregations 
of matter are objects while others are not. Therefore, BCF entails BC. However, BC does 
                                                        
43 Markosian 1998, p.214-5 
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not entail BCF. As McDaniel points out, one could hold a brutal view like BC and 
maintain that there are still informative sufficient conditions about when composition 
occurs; perhaps something like fusion would count as one of these sufficient 
conditions.44 If there are informative sufficient conditions about composition, then not 
all of the facts about composition are brutal. However, BC makes BCF plausible at the 
very least, since BCF offers a uniform explanation for the lack of necessary and sufficient 
conditions about composition.  
One might worry that if facts about composition are brute, then they must float 
free from the other facts of a world. Markosian is quick to reject this idea; he holds that 
the brutal compositional facts of a world globally supervene on the non-mereological 
facts of a world. Therefore, Markosian’s view is the following four claims: BC is true, BCF 
is true, composition globally supervenes, and there are composite objects. From here on 
out, I will refer to Markosian’s view as “Brutal Composition” and refer to the thesis that 
the SCQ has no finite, non-trivial answer as “BC.” Markosian notes that his view is 
similar to certain kinds of views about normative properties. He says, “it is natural to 
think that the following claims about goodness could all be true: (i) there is no true, non-
trivial, and finitely long sentence of the form ‘x is good iff,’ (ii) facts about goodness are 
all brute facts; and (iii) the set goodness supervenes globally on some set of non-
axiological universals.”45 Notice that these three claims are just BC, BCF, and global 
supervenience re-tooled for use with goodness instead of composition.46 Markosian 
thinks that if these three claims about goodness can plausibly be held together, then so 
can brutal composition’s three similar claims. These three claims about goodness outline 
moral anti-reductionist position popularized by Moore. Moore held that goodness was a 
                                                        
44 McDaniel 2007, p. 236 
45 Markosian 1998, p. 216. He also makes this same point about beauty by replacing all instances 
of “good” and “goodness” with “beauty” and “beautiful”. 
46 Historically, this view of goodness preceded Markosian’s view. 
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non-natural property.  He also held that goodness globally supervened on the natural 
properties, but that goodness was not reducible to the natural properties. Moral anti-
reductionism meets (i) because goodness can only be analyzed in terms of goodness or as 
an infinitely conjunctive sentence listing all the things that have the property goodness. 
When (i) is combined with (iii), they entail an anti-reductionist thesis; if goodness 
supervenes globally and there is no informative set of necessary and sufficient conditions 
for goodness, then goodness must be irreducible. Since Markosian already draws the 
analogy between Brutal Composition and moral anti-reductionism (although he doesn’t 
name it as such), then one can think of Brutal Composition as an anti-reductionist view 
about the metaphysics of material objects; this means that the compositional facts do not 
reduce to the non-compositional facts.47 While Markosian invokes the similarity between 
moral anti-reductionism and his Brutal Composition as a subtle argument for Brutal 
Composition, I will argue that he instead makes his view susceptible to a powerful 
objection made against moral anti-reductionism.  
J.L Mackie and Simon Blackburn originally made this objection against Moorean 
style moral anti-reductionism.48 As noted earlier, moral anti-reductionism requires a 
supervenience thesis: 
Normative Supervenience (NS): Two entire possible worlds cannot differ in 
their normative properties without also differing either (a) in their non-
normative properties or (b) in their descriptive properties.49  
 
Without NS, the moral anti-reductionist would be committed to the possibility of a world 
w that exactly resembles the actual world with respect to non-normative (or descriptive) 
                                                        
47 Moral anti-reductionism is also sometimes called “moral non-naturalism” since its defenders 
have not only argues that moral properties are irreducible, but that they are non-natural as well. 
However, the debate between naturalists and non-naturalists usually is about the possibility (or 
impossibility) of reduction, so moral anti-reductionism is a good catch all term. 
48 See Mackie 1977, Blackburn 1984, 1988. 
49 See Ridge 2007. The disjunct (b) is included since some philosophers deny the normative/non-
normative distinction. 
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properties, but does not resemble the actual world with respect to normative (or non-
descriptive) properties. For example, denying NS entails that there is a world where the 
events of the Holocaust are morally acceptable (or even praiseworthy), even though the 
events unfolded exactly as they did in the actual world: the same number of people were 
killed, the same amount of torture was employed, the same amount of emotional 
suffering resulted, and so on. Since admitting this possibility is tantamount to rejecting 
the possibility of objective ethical claims, then the anti-reductionist must commit to NS.  
However, holding NS is problematic for the familiar Humean reason that there 
are no necessary connections between distinct existences. The moral anti-reductionist 
holds that both normative properties and non-normative properties are distinct 
existences, while at the same time claiming that normative properties necessarily 
supervene on non-normative properties. This results in a contradiction: 
P1. Suppose moral anti-reductionism is true. 
P2. Therefore, NS is true and it entails a necessary connection between normative 
properties and non-normative properties.   
P3. However, normative properties and non-normative properties are distinct 
existences. 
P4. There are no necessary connections between distinct existences. 
C.   Therefore moral anti-reductionism is false. 
 
Like the moral anti-reductionist, Markosian also requires a global supervenience thesis; 
since Markosian is committed to BCF, his supervenience thesis should be formulated in 
terms of facts rather than properties: 
Compositional Supervenience (CS): Two entire possible worlds cannot 
differ in their compositional facts without also differing either (a) in their non-
compositional facts. 
 
Given the similarity between Markosian’s view and moral anti-reductionism, an 
argument of the same form can be made against Brutal Composition: 
P1ʹ. Suppose Brutal Composition is true. 
P2ʹ. Therefore, CS is true and it entails a necessary connection between 
compositional facts and non-compositional facts.   
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P3ʹ. However, compositional facts and non-compositional facts are distinct 
existences. 
P4ʹ. There are no necessary connections between distinct existences. 
Cʹ.   Therefore Brutal Composition is false. 
 
One might object to this argument in several ways. The most obvious is to simply deny 
P3ʹ and reject the Humean intuitions supporting it. For myself, I find the Humean 
intuitions incredibly plausible, and do not have anything to say in defense of them. 
However, even if the Humean principle invoked here is false, the burden of proof still 
remains on the defenders of Brutal Composition to explain why these necessary 
conditions exists. Without an explanation of the necessary connection, Brutal 
Composition lacks the explanatory power of competing views such as nihilism or 
universalism. The nihilist simply denies the existence of compositional facts, while the 
universalist can provide plausible arguments (such as the argument from vagueness) for 
the necessary connection between compositional facts and non-compositional facts. 
 The defenders of Brutal Composition could attempt to give such an explanation, 
and I will discuss this strategy in a moment. However, before I do this, there is another 
strategy that the defenders of Brutal Composition could borrow from the moral anti-
realists. They could claim that the argument against Brutal Composition proves too 
much; the Humean principle employed in the argument rules out the possibility of any 
supervenient properties (or facts) that are not reducible to the base level properties (or 
facts). If there are no necessary connections between distinct existences, then the only 
necessary connections that are possible are ones between existences that are not distinct. 
Therefore, the mental cannot supervene on the physical without being identical to it, or 
the normative cannot supervene on the non-normative without being identical to it. By 
rejecting supervenience in the case of composition, the opponent of Brutal Composition 
throws out the baby with the bathwater. 
	
47 
 
 
Of course, the opponent of Brutal Composition could maintain that this is 
correct; there are no supervenient properties that do not reduce to the base properties. 
While I am sympathetic with this position, I do not have the space to argue for it here. 
Instead, I will argue that with respect to composition, the claim that there can be 
supervenience without reduction is implausible. In order to understand why CS is 
implausible, it will be helpful to consider some examples of global supervenience. 
Perhaps compositional facts are supposed to globally supervene on the non-
compositional facts in the same way that the laws of nature at a world globally supervene 
on the local qualitative character of a world. This Humean supervenience of the laws of 
nature does not require brute facts about the laws of nature to explain the existence of 
the laws. The laws of nature are simply the regularities found in the local qualitative 
properties of the world. If we have all of the facts about the regularities, then we have all 
the facts about the laws; we don’t need an extra fact that says that the law obtains.50 A 
given law is nothing more than the regularities of some phenomenon. However, 
according to Brutal Composition, the facts about composite objects are not just facts 
about the matter that composes them. Therefore, the compositional facts do not globally 
supervene on the non- compositional facts in the same way that laws of nature at a world 
globally supervene on the local qualitative properties of a world.  
Brutal Composition makes the facts about composition independent from the rest 
of the facts of the world. It is this independence that makes the supervenience so 
implausible. In the previous case, even if one does not think that laws of nature reduce to 
local qualitative properties, the supervenience is plausible because the supervening 
properties depend on the base properties in some way. By making composition brute, it 
                                                        
50 See Lewis 1986, ix-xii.  
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no longer depends on anything. Therefore, CS is ad hoc in a way that a posited necessary 
connection between laws and local properties is not. This is the same problem faced by 
the moral anti-reductionist: if the properties (or facts) in question really are completely 
independent, then there is no good reason for a NS to hold. Of course, Markosian could 
simply bite the bullet here. However, I think that biting this particular bullet is a serious 
cost of his view, especially since maintaining BC already requires biting the bullet. 
Markosian’s view, then, already has a major ideological and ontological cost. 
In order for Brutal Composition to be a legitimate view, Markosian needs to 
answer the following question: why should we think that our concepts and facts about 
composition are brute? Markosian provides the following three criteria for a brutal 
concept: “(i) being relatively easy to grasp on an intuitive level, (ii) being such that there 
seem to be clear-cut cases of both instantiation and non-instantiation, and (iii) being 
such that no acceptable account of what it is in virtue of which some xs instantiate that 
concept seems to be forthcoming.” For example, the facts about the concept ‘part’ 
(proper or improper) are taken as a brute in classical mereology. The concept of ‘part’ 
meets Markosian’s criteria: (i) every competent speaker of English readily understands 
the concept of ‘part’, (ii) there are clear cases where something is or is not a part of 
something, and (iii) an analysis of part that does not invoke any mereological concepts 
does not seem forthcoming.  
Even though ‘part’ meets Markosian’s criteria, it does not follow that 
‘composition’ does, since the concept ‘composition’ seems more theoretical and less 
intuitive than the concept ‘part’. Markosian thinks that it clearly passes requirements (i) 
and (ii). I grant that composition satisfies (i); we all seem to intuitively understand what 
composite objects are.  
However, I am suspicious that ‘composition’ meets (ii). Who is supposed to think 
that there are clear-cut cases of composition and non-composition? Markosian notes in a 
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footnote that universalists and nihilists will deny this, so perhaps he has philosophers 
who reject both universalism and nihilism in mind.51  However, these are just the 
philosophers who already accept some form of a moderate answer to the SCQ. If the 
point of these criteria is to show that ‘composition’ is a good candidate for a brute 
concept, then it seems like Markosian is just preaching to the choir. However, if the 
people believing there are clear-cut cases of composition are supposed to be ordinary 
people, then I find this interpretation of (ii) problematic.  
In chemistry class, we all learned that matter is a made up of a bunch of tiny 
particles that never come into contact with each other. Since one’s everyday experiences 
with composite objects are devised from common sense approaches such as Fastening or 
fusion, this discovery may undermine one’s understanding of ordinary objects. Perhaps 
it will cause one to doubt the existence of ordinary objects altogether. Therefore, 
Markosian’s claim that composition meets requirement (ii) either begs the question (if it 
is about philosophers) or most likely false (if it is about non-philosophers). Therefore, 
Markosian’s claim that composition fulfills (ii) is dubious at best. Furthermore, 
Markosian’s reasons for thinking that ‘composition’ meets requirement (iii) suffer from a 
similar problem.  
Markosian must show that (iii) is true of ‘composition’. He does this through an 
argument by elimination, where he attempts to undermine views that could offer an 
acceptable account of when the xs instantiate composition. The argument is as follows:  
P1. The only alternatives to Brutal Composition are nihilism, universalism, and 
moderate answers to the SCQ. 
P2. Nihilism is false. 
P3. Universalism is false. 
P4. All moderate answers to the SCQ are false.  
C.   Therefore, Brutal Composition is true. 
 
                                                        
51 Markosian 1998, p. 244 
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Markosian is quite thorough in his examination of the various answers to the SCQ. I will 
not discuss his arguments for P4, as I have already discussed sometimeser positions at 
length and agree that P4 is false. Instead, I will focus on his arguments for Premises 2 
and 3. 
 Markosian’s arguments against nihilism and universalism both rest on the same 
premise: accepting universalism or nihilism is inconsistent with his intuitions. Nihilism 
offends two of Markosian’s intuitions: (i) the intuition that people exist, and (ii) the 
intuition that things like chairs exist. Markosian offers no reason for holding (i); he 
simply claims, “We can’t have that.”52  I suppose that he finds the truth of (i) to be 
obvious given the difficulties with eliminating persons from one’s ontology. Since he 
finds both these alternatives unpalatable, Markosian concludes that nihilism cannot be 
true since it eliminates the self. While many people undoubtedly agree with Markosian 
on this point, his remark simply begs the question concerning the importance of 
personhood. However, even if I grant him this argument, it will not save his overall 
argument for Brutal Composition, as I show when addressing his arguments against 
Universalism.  
 Markosian also rejects nihilism because of (ii). He claims, “There simply are far 
more composite objects in the world than Nihilism allows. This seems to me to be a fatal 
objection to Nihilism, and I conclude, on the basis of this objection, that Nihilism is not 
the correct answer to SCQ.”53 Any argument of the form “It seems to me that P, therefore 
any view that entails not-P is false” is flimsy at best. While this argument might give one 
some reason to doubt the truth of nihilism, the argument is not strong enough to be a 
“fatal” objection to nihilism. Furthermore, the intuition that “there are as many 
composite objects in the worlds as I believe there to be” does not seem like a good 
                                                        
52 Ibid. p. 220 
53 Ibid. p. 221  
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candidate for a central intuition that motivates a philosophical view54. As far as I am 
concerned, any philosophical intuition is open questioning. If Markosian had to pick an 
intuition to serve as his central motivating intuition, then it seems he should have picked 
the intuition that people exist, since it is much more powerful intuition. If one tells a 
non-philosopher that tables, computers, and trees do not exist, that person will most 
likely be puzzled. However, if one tells that person that they do not exist, then that 
person will most likely strongly object. Therefore, I believe that Markosian’s argument 
would be stronger if he could show that these intuitions about the existence of persons 
entail our intuitions about objects as well.  
 Markosian’s argument against universalism relies on the same strategy as his 
argument against nihilism. However, it is important to notice that universalism, unlike 
nihilism is not open to the objection that people do not exist, since every mereological 
sum has a fusion. These fusions guarantee the existence of an object that corresponds to 
a person. So even if Markosian can argue that nihilism entails that people do not exist 
and that this price is too high to pay, he cannot make the same argument against 
universalism. Therefore, his arguments against both universalism and nihilism stand or 
fall with his appeal to the intuition that there are ordinary objects, but not bizarre 
objects. He claims that unlike nihilism, which makes for a world with too few objects, 
universalism makes for a world where there “are far more composite objects than 
common sense intuitions can allow.”55 I believe that this argument should be rejected for 
same sorts of reasons discussed above: these sorts of intuitions are not strong enough to 
counter the plausibility of universalism.  
Markosian’s reliance on intuitions connects to the particularist/generalist debate 
previously discussed. Markosian himself does not take a general stance on particularism 
                                                        
54 This seems to be the central motivating claim of both Korman and Markosian’s project. 
55 Markosian 1998, p.  228 
	
52 
 
 
or generalism with respect to philosophical methodology as a whole, but he claims  “my 
argument involves the claim that the overall theoretical position that best fits standard 
intuitions about composition and other metaphysical matters – including the intuition 
that there ought to be an answer to SCQ – is one that incorporates BC.”56 I don’t know 
what else he could mean by this except that he endorses particularism in this specific 
case. This methodological point, combined with his intuition-based arguments against 
universalism and nihilism, makes him a particularist, at least with respect to the 
metaphysics of material objects. I have already argued against particularist ontologies of 
material objects in my discussion of Korman, and those arguments apply equally here.  
 I have argued that Brutal Composition fails for two reasons: it cannot explain the 
necessity of CS, and the argument by elimination is unsound. Furthermore, there is the 
overall problem that Brutal Composition is the kind of view that would only appeal to 
people who probably already hold some form of it; it fails to put any pressure on 
philosophers that reject it or to provide convincing evidence for philosophers that are 
undecided.  
With the dismissal of the sometimeser views, nihilism remains the only plausible 
open option.57 However, given my commitment to mereological simples, an examination 
of the nature of these simples is required in order to present a coherent view. Doing so 
will reduce the number of objections to my view, since many of these objections target 
nihilist views that have not made the nature of the simples they are committed to clear. 
The following sections will address questions such as: (1) must simples be points, or can 
they have extension?, and (2) If simples can have extension, can they have qualitative 
variation in their intrinsic properties? 
 
                                                        
56 ibid. 237 
57 Of course, one could insist that universalism is a plausible option, but I do not think so and will 
not consider it here. 
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2.3: Three types of Nihilism 
In this section, I will briefly discuss the three major options that nihilists have for 
populating their ontology with simples. These three types of mereological nihilism can be 
categorized by the scale of their simples. There are other choices that the nihilist must 
make when creating their ontology, but each of these choices will be informed by the 
choice of scale. Following Jonathan Schaffer, I will organize these nihilist ontologies into 
three different groups: minimal nihilism, medial nihilism, and maximal nihilism.58 The 
minimal nihilist has an ontology that contains only the fundamental mereological 
simples; these objects are very small and something like the fundamental particles of 
physics. This is the sort of the view that is typically attributed to Pre-Socratic 
philosophers such as Democritus. They pictured the worlds as a swarm of tiny material 
simples. In contrast, the medial nihilist ontology contains simples that are larger than 
simples of the minimal nihilist, although they may also contain the minimal nihilist’s 
smaller simples as well. In order to have simples of significant scale, medial nihilists 
must include simples with extension in their ontology. These are objects that have spatial 
extension but no proper spatial parts. Finally, maximal nihilists have only one simple in 
their ontology: the world. Maximal nihilism, then, is equivalent to existence monism.59 
Spinoza famously champions this view in his Ethics.60 
 Minimal nihilism is not only minimal with respect to the size of its simples, but 
also with respect to its ontological commitments since it only requires the existence of 
tiny simples, whether they are spacetime points, tiny extended substances, or indivisible 
entities. Therefore, there are different types of minimal nihilism that depend on the 
choice of small-scale simple. In contrast, medial nihilism entails that extended simples 
                                                        
58 Schaffer 2007, p. 181 
59 This is in contrast with Schaffer’s priority monism, in which the world is fundamental, but 
grounds the many objects of our world. 
60 See Spinoza 1985, Ethics Part I, Propositions 1-15 for Spinoza’s argument for monism. 
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are possible (unlike minimal nihilism) since medial nihilism requires simples that have 
real scale, such as a table-shaped simple. This is a claim that is not without controversy 
(and will be discussed shortly). Maximal nihilism is committed not only to the existence 
of a single world-sized extended simple, but it is also committed to an ontology that is 
larger than medial nihilists’ ontology. Maximal nihilists have to deal with the problem of 
qualitative variation. Typically, qualitative variation in objects is explained by appealing 
to parthood. For example, a guitar is blue and green because it has a blue part and a 
green part. Since our world obviously has qualitative variation, then if maximal nihilism 
is true, the maximal nihilist must have some sort of metaphysical machinery for 
explaining the world-simple’s qualitative variation.  
The larger one’s simples grow in scale, the more ontological commitments one 
must make. This conclusion could be used to argue that minimal nihilism is the best of 
the three views. Perhaps this argument could be made, but I am not interested in settling 
the issue here. In the next section, I will discuss the various attempts to provide an 
analysis of the necessary and sufficient conditions for something being a material simple.  
2.4: The Pointy View 
Since nihilism is an ontology of mereological simples, any complete nihilist theory needs 
to answer the Simple Question:  
Simple Question: Under what conditions, if any, is a material objects a 
mereological simple?61 
 
Like the SCQ, one answer to the Simple Question is “always.” It then follows that if 
something is simple under any conditions, then an object like a computer would be a 
simple. However, a computer has parts. This means that the computer would be both 
simple and composite, and this is a clear contradiction.  The “never” answer to the 
Simple Question is also unhelpful since it amounts to the denial of the existence of 
                                                        
61 See Markosian 2006, p. 214 
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simples.62 Therefore, all of the interesting answers to the Simple Question fall into the 
“sometimes” category. In the remainder of the chapter, I will discuss several of these 
answers, beginning with the pointy-view.  
The Pointy View of Simples claims that simples are point-sized objects: 
The Pointy View of Simples (PV): necessarily, x is a simple if and only if x is 
a point-sized object.63 
 
PV is a natural companion for those who take mathematics and scientific research to be 
good evidence for ontology. Traditional physics has used the geometry of planes and 
points to model the fundamental particles of physics. On this model, certain subatomic 
particles occupy only one point in space (an electron, for example, is point-sized). These 
subatomic objects seem like good candidates for simples.  
 However, several philosophers object to PV. In his “Simples,” Ned Markosian 
argues that the Pointy View is committed to: (1) the claim that any spatially extended 
object contains infinitely many objects, and (2) the impossibility of a world where only 
one spatially extended simple object exists. The argument for (1) is as follows: 
 
P1. Suppose PV is true.  
P2. Suppose that there exists an extended spatially continuous object O.  
P3. If O is composed of simples, then O must be composed of pointy objects 
(given P1).  
P4. There are an infinite amount of pointy objects in any region of space.  
P5. So O is composed of an infinite amount of simples.  
C.   Therefore, O contains infinitely many objects.64 
 
The conclusion of this argument entails (2); the simple, lonely object has extension, and 
extension entails an infinite amount of objects.  However, given PV, this is impossible. 
                                                        
62 Although defenders of gunk, objects for which every part of the object is itself composed of two 
or more objects, is compatible with the never answer. I will discuss gunk further in chapter 5. 
63 See Markosian 1998 and McDaniel 2007a. Markosian further explains what it means to be a 
pointy object at p. 216 with the following definitions: (1) Object O occupies region R =df R is the 
set containing all and only those points that lie within O, and (2) x is a pointy object =df the 
region occupied by x contains exactly one point in space. This analysis can easily be extended to 
spacetime points.  
64 Markosian 1998, pp. 218-9 
	
56 
 
 
Markosian acknowledges that a defender of PV would most likely accept these 
consequences.  
I do not find this argument compelling because the theoretical cost of accepting 
(2) is quite low. In fact, defenders of PV could argue that their view tells us something 
interesting about the world: that extended simples are impossible. After all, I think that 
one of the reasons for pursuing an answer to the Simple Question is precisely to settle 
questions about the possibility of extended simples.  
 Simons also makes several arguments against PV. His first argument appeals to 
the laws of physics. According to our best physical theories, every particle has some non-
zero of quantity mass. If these particles were to be truly point sized, then their mass is 
instantiated at a region of space that has zero volume. Since the volumetric density of an 
object is its mass divided by its volume, then PV requires that a point sized object must 
have infinite density since the density of a point sized object will require dividing its 
mass by zero. Since this contradicts our best physical theories, then PV ought to be 
rejected. Simons notes that the physicist might simply write off point-sized particles with 
infinite density as a consequence of idealizing a physical theory. However, Simons claims 
that metaphysicians must be more responsible.65  
This objection could be supplemented by Braddon-Mitchell and Miller’s 
argument that our best physical theory requires quantum physics, and that quantum 
physics requires that Planck length (10-66cms) sized regions of space to be the smallest 
units of space that there are.66 Braddon-Mitchell and Miller argue that these Planck 
                                                        
65 See Simons 2004, p. 373 for the argument and the quote. 
66 According to Braddon-Mitchell and Miller, quantum physics requires the Planck length to be a 
spatial region that contains exactly one unit of entropy (entropy is the amount of disorder in a 
system, the amount of energy in Joules divided by the absolute temperature Kelvin). This means 
that for any Planck length, the ratio of energy to temperature is always 1:1. If is possible for 
activity to occur in a subregion of a Planck length, then there would be an increase in entropy. 
However, a Planck length with entropy greater than 1 violates quantum physics. Therefore, there 
can be no activity below the Planck length. Braddon-Mitchell and Miller are (self-admittedly) 
oversimplifying. However, I find the assumption that the possibility of activity in a region of space 
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lengths must be simple units of space because physics claims that these regions of space 
cannot be broken down into further regions of space. 67 It should be noted that this 
argument only entails that the rejection of PV is nomically necessary, not that point-
sized simples are metaphysically impossible. However, if PV is not metaphysically 
necessary, then it cannot be an answer to the Simple Question.  
However, the arguments made by Simons and Braddon-Mitchell and Miller rely 
on the truth of the current theory of quantum physics. Since scientific theories are often 
revised, their argument provides only modest support for the rejection of PV.  Therefore, 
one could argue that PV’s apparent incompatibility with quantum physics is not strong 
enough to outweigh the other theoretical benefits of PV and attempt to analyze away 
quantum physics’ apparent ontological commitment to the falsity of PV. As a result, 
Braddon-Mitchell and Miller’s appeal to quantum physics poses a problem for PV, their 
argument is not a decisive blow to PV. 
 In contrast with Braddon-Mitchell and Miller’s argument, McDaniel offers an a 
priori argument against PV. This argument attempts to show not just that PV is 
implausible, but that PV is inconsistent. The argument goes as follows: 
P1. Co-located point-sized objects are possible. 
P2. If co-located point-sized objects are possible, then mereologically complex 
point-sized objects are also possible.  
C.   Therefore, mereologically complex point-sized objects are possible.  
C2. Therefore, PV is false.68 
 
McDaniel offers three pieces of evidence in support of P1. His first piece of evidence is 
that some philosophers claim that they can conceive of co-located material objects (for 
example, as a solution to the problem of the statue and clay’s varying properties). If one 
does not endorse the possibility of co-located objects that are made of the same type of 
matter, McDaniel claims that one can conceive of the possibility that co-location can 
                                                                                                                                                                     
as a constraint on that region exists to be interesting. I am no expert on quantum physics, but this 
might be an issue worth looking into.  
67 Braddon-Mitchell and Miller 2006, pp. 223-4.  
68 See McDaniel 2007, p. 238-242 
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occur between two distinct types of matter. In other words, the co-location of material 
objects is possible if there can be two special kinds of matter that can interpenetrate 
while belonging to different ontological categories.  
His second piece of evidence is that quantum physics postulates particles, such as 
bosons, that are capable of co-location.69 Since speculative physics might make use of 
these particles, they should not be ruled out a priori. McDaniel’s third piece of evidence 
stems from his commitment to the Humean principle that there are no necessary 
connections between distinct existences. McDaniel argues that if one rejects the 
possibility of co-located objects, then one must reject this Humean principle.  
To show this, McDaniel considers a situation where two point particles are 
approaching each other at a rapid speed. Each of these point-sized particles is a distinct 
existence because a change in one particle’s intrinsic properties does not affect the 
properties of the other particle. For example, if one particle has negative charge and the 
other particle has positive charge, then a change in the quantity of charge in one particle 
will not affect the other particle. If co-located material objects are impossible, then the 
particles must swerve out of each other’s way, cease to move, cease to exist, or undergo 
some other event that prevents them from becoming co-located.70 This means that there 
is in fact a necessary connection between the two particles; the extrinsic relations 
between the two particles can affect the intrinsic properties of the particles, or even the 
existential status of the particles. Therefore, anyone who is committed to this Humean 
Principle should reject the claim that co-located material objects are impossible.71 
                                                        
69 Bosons are any sub-atomic particle whose spin is an integer; such as a photon that has a spin of 
+1. They are contrasted with fermions, particles that have a spin that is not an integer. Electrons 
are fermions since they have a spin of ½. According to the standard theory of particle physics, 
fermions cannot be in the same place at once (the Pauli Exclusion Principle), while bosons can be 
in the same place at once. 
70 McDaniel 2007a, pp. 240-1. 
71 Actually, this argument attacks any spatial view of simplicity that claims that point-sized objects 
are possible, such as the MaxCon view. 
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In response, philosophers that reject co-located objects could simply claim that it 
is analytic that material objects cannot be co-located.72 McDaniels is simply mistaken 
when he thinks that he is able to concieve of the case above. If this is so, then all material 
objects necessarily have the property of something like impenetrability. If this is the case, 
then the particles’ behavior is no longer governed by problematic brute necessities. 
However, anyone who takes this position will need to provide an analysis of why some 
philosophers believe that they can conceive of material objects that are co-located. In 
response, Robb suggests that when one conceives of co-located material objects, one is 
really conceiving of “phony matter,” an immaterial substance that affects our perceptual 
faculties in the same way that real matter does. Because phony matter is not real matter, 
there is no difficulty in conceiving of the possibility that phony matter can co-locate. 
Therefore, philosophers who claim that they can conceive of matter that co-locates are 
mistaken; they are in fact conceiving of phony matter.  
However, McDaniel thinks that this appeal to phony matter is unsuccessful. He 
believes that in order for Robb’s counter-argument to work, it must be the case that the 
phony matter in question is a duplicate of real matter. And since a particle of real matter 
has the property of belonging to the ontological category of real matter, then any 
duplicate of that particle will have that property as well. Therefore, the phony matter 
particle shares all of its intrinsic properties with the real matter particle, with the 
exception that the phony matter is not in the same ontological category as real matter 
ontological property. So it seems that there is reason to think that phony matter is in fact 
real matter. If this is true, then the defender of PV is still stuck with the problematic 
brute necessities that govern the particles’ motion. 
                                                        
72 McDaniel notes that Robb made this objection to him; see McDaniel 2007a, p.241 footnote 20 
for details. 
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 However, I think that McDaniel’s argument misses the point. Robb is not 
claiming that phony matter is an immaterial duplicate of real matter; that claim is a 
straightforward contradiction. Phony matter is only a duplicate of real matter in the 
sense that it produces the same sensory response. Robb’s objection is that there is no 
phenomenological difference between conceiving of a world made of matter and a world 
made of phony matter except for the stipulation that the matter is real in the first world. 
If there is no phenomenological difference, it might be the case that whenever one 
believes they are conceiving of a real-matter world with co-located material objects, one 
is mistaken. While this point does not show co-located real matter to be impossible, it 
allows anyone who rejects the possibility of co-located real matter to explain away the 
apparent conceivability of co-located real matter. In order for McDaniel to defeat this 
objection, he needs to find a way to make a conceptual distinction between the real 
matter world and the phony matter world that does not simply stipulate the difference 
between the two. Without such a difference, McDaniel and his objectors are simply 
butting heads over intuitions.  
As for my position, nothing hinges on whether McDaniel’s argument is correct, 
since my commitment to nihilism does not allow for mereologically complex point-sized 
objects. I believe that the evidence for nihilism far outweighs challenges from 
conceivability (this will be further discussed in Ch. 5), and therefore there is no reason to 
think PV false.  In fact, any ontology that has restricted composition can reject P2 of 
McDaniel’s argument as well. Views with restricted composition are usually motivated by 
a varying degree of appeal to common sense as a guide for what counts as a material 
object. Since common sense is either silent on the issue of complex, co-located point 
sized objects or common sense provides evidence against complex, co-located point sized 
objects, views with restricted composition have ample ground to resist the argument. 
Before moving on, it is worth noting that McDaniel believes that something being point 
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sized and not co-located is a sufficient condition for something being a simple; this 
contrasts Simons, Braddon-Mitchell, and Miller who argue against the possibility of 
point-sized objects altogether. 
There are several other answers to the Simple Question. Ned Markosian proposes 
a particularly interesting answer that has been controversial; he calls this view “the 
maximally continuous view of simples,” or “MaxCon.” In the next section, I will discuss 
MaxCon, the various arguments against it, and my own arguments against it. 
2.5: MaxCon 
Ned Markosian answers the Simple Question with his Maximally Continuous View 
(MaxCon) of simplicity. Intuitively, a maximally continuous simple is supposed to be 
located at a region of space that is completely filled with matter such that there are no 
empty regions within the object. Here is MaxCon stated more formally: 
The Maximally Continuous View of Simples (MaxCon): Necessarily, x is a 
  simple iff x is a maximally continuous object. 
 
Where maximally continuous is defined as: 
x is a maximally continuous object =df  x is a spatially continuous object and there 
is not a continuous region of space, R, such that (i) the region occupied by x is a  
proper subset of R, and (ii) every point in R falls within some object or other.73 
 
In other words, a simple must be a spatially continuous object that is not a proper part of 
any other object. In our world, macroscopic objects appear to be maximally continuous, 
even though they are not. In fact, seemingly continuous hunks of matter are mostly 
empty space. A true MaxCon simple would have no empty regions of space within it. 
Furthermore, unlike the very small simples of the Pointy View, MaxCon simples have no 
inherent restrictions on their extension or size because any region of space completely 
filled by matter is a MaxCon simple.  If MaxCon simples are possible, then they could 
range from very tiny macroscopic objects to large macroscopic ones. 
                                                        
73 Markosian 1998, pp. 221-2. 
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 2.5.1: Extension and Parthood 
The MaxCon view might strike one as immediately problematic since extension is 
typically understood to imply parthood. While a simple objection, it is a powerful one, so 
Markosian needs a strong argument to show that extension does not entail parthood. He 
asks us to imagine a solid sphere named Spero. Spero is an extended simple; it has no 
parts. One might argue that Spero is impossible for the simple reason that if something is 
a sphere, then it necessarily has parts. The argument goes like this: 
P1. If any object has some extension, then it has two halves. 
P2. If any object has two halves, then it has at least two proper parts. 
P3. Spero has some extension. 
C. Therefore, Spero has at least two proper parts. 
 
The argument is obviously valid. Since the possibility of Spero lacking extension is out of 
the question, premise 3 does not require examination. This leaves the defender of 
MaxCon with the choice of rejecting premise 1 or premise 2. Markosian rejects premise 1; 
he denies that extended objects must have things like halves (or presumably quarters, 
eighths, and so on.). Notice that denying premise 1 amounts to denying the Doctrine of 
Arbitrary Undetached Parts: 
DAUP: For every material object M, if R is the region of space occupied by M at 
time t, and if sub-R is any occupiable sub-region of R whatever, there exists a 
material object that occupies the region sub-R at t.74 
 
Markosian’s justification for this denial comes from two sources: (1) it solves Van 
Inwagen’s Descartes and Body-Minus Problem, and, more importantly, (2) it falls 
naturally out of his commitment to Brutal Composition. 75  Since the BCer already 
restricts composition in ways that cut out the problematic cases generated by DAUP, 
then Markosian need only appeal to the fact that not all objects have parts. Therefore, 
MaxCon implies the falsity of DAUP.  
                                                        
74 See Van Inwagen 1981. 
75 Recall 2.2.3  
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One might think that this is a dismissive move, since it does not explain why it 
seems like Spero has two halves. To make his use of BC more appealing, Markosian 
argues that there are two referents of “part” and that the confusion is a result of our 
ambiguous usage. Sometimes, we conceive of parts as “conceptual” parts. These are 
logical abstractions from the spatiotemporal region that the sphere occupies.76 So if one 
were to understand “parts” in the above argument to mean “conceptual parts,” then 
Markosian would agree that the argument is sound. Spero does have two conceptual 
halves. However, when one says that Spero has parts, one might be making the claim 
that the parts of Spero are metaphysically robust. In this case, one is saying something 
false; Spero is an extended simple and has no concrete proper parts. This argument can 
easily be re-tooled for any shape of extended simple that one desires. 
 Whether or not this argument succeeds turns on a deeper question: what are the 
metaphysical commitments of extension, if any? Markosian thinks that extension does 
not entail mereological structure while his imagined opponent does; neither of these 
claims has very much in way of support. In his "More Problems for MaxCon," Mark 
Steen argues that this comes down to simple head butting over intuitions. Markosian 
thinks that extension and mereology come apart, while others, such as McDaniel, do not. 
However, this is not only a case of conflicting intuitions. If it is true that extension entails 
parthood, then this claim is a brute necessity that adds to the cost of a theory. Therefore, 
                                                        
76 Presumably the region of space still has parts, just not the matter that fills it (Perhaps this 
explains the confusion; we are looking at the sphere shaped region, not the sphere itself). 
Braddon-Mitchell and Miller agree with Markosian. They argue that our concepts of extension 
and mereology come apart even though they do not usually do so (They refer Markosian’s 
conceptual parts as “Kantian” parts; see Braddon-Mitchell and Miller 2007, pp. 224). The view 
expressed in Paul’s Logical Parts (2002) argues that objects have logical parts, such as color 
properties, as well as spatial parts. These parts are of a different ontological kind. Since Paul’s 
view is much more fleshed out than the idea of conceptual parts that is presented here, it may be 
worth examining how her view could be used to supplement the stuff/thing ontology. However, 
Paul does still view the logical parts as objects. I take it that Markosian would resist this claim. 
More investigation is needed to see if this is a serious point of contention between the two views.  
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it seems that any philosopher who claims that extension entails parthood needs to make 
a strong case for the addition of this brute necessity claim. 
 McDaniel attempts to make such an argument by beginning with three principles 
that he believes to be uncontroversial. They are a modification of DAUP, the Portion-
Parts Principle, and the Supervenience of Constitution. 
PPP: Necessarily, for any material objects x and y, x is a part of y if and only if 
the matter that constitutes x is a portion of the matter that constitutes y. 
SoC: Necessarily, for any portion of matter that constitutes some object z, any 
qualitative duplicate of that portion of matter constitutes a qualitative duplicate 
of z. 
 
DAUPO: For every material object, M, if R is the region of space occupied by M, 
and if sub-R is any occupiable sub-region of R whatever, there is a portion of 
matter that exactly fills the region sub-R.77 
 
SoC (which Markosian argues is false) asserts that constitution is an intrinsic relation 
between the portions of matter that make a given object. For instance, if there is a solid 
sphere and the bottom half is duplicated, then the bottom half of the sphere and the 
duplicate hemisphere will have the same constitution relation, namely, being half a 
sphere. DAUPO is DAUP modified to be compatible with Markosian's distinction 
between stuff and things. McDaniel makes the following argument from these three 
claims. First he asks us to suppose there are two maximally continuous regions filled 
with homogenous matter. The first region is spherical, called ‘Sphere,’ and the second 
region is a hemisphere half the size of Sphere, called ‘Semi’. This means there are two 
objects that are MaxCon simples; the one occupying Sphere is ‘Ball’ and the one 
occupying Semi is ‘Drum’.  
                                                        
77 These three principles can be found in McDaniel 2003 on p. 270, 271, and 272 respectively. 
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Figure 1 
The argument goes as follows: 
P1. Given DAUPO, we know that the lower half of Ball is filled with matter.  
P2. Given SoC, some of the matter in Sphere is a qualitative duplicate of the 
matter in Drum, which means that there is a third object in Ball, call it ‘Bottom’. 
P3. Furthermore, given PPP, Bottom is a proper part of Ball. 
P4. But simples cannot have proper parts. 
P5. Therefore, MaxCon, SoC, or DAUPO is false. 
P6. SoC and DAUPO are not false. 
C. Therefore MaxCon is false.78  
 
Markosian replies to this argument by arguing that McDaniel is mistaken in claiming 
that the three principles form an inconsistent set. Markosian believes that DAUPO has 
nothing to do with this argument. Instead, he focuses on the inconsistency of holding 
both SoC and MaxCon. 
 Markosian responds to McDaniel by a entertaining the possibility of a Joe 
Montana statue that is also an extended simple.79 The matter of the right arm is a 
different kind of matter than the rest of the statue. However, since the Joe Montana 
shaped region of space is continuous and completely filled with matter, it is a simple 
(despite the qualitative heterogeneity). If a qualitative duplicate of the matter filling the 
                                                        
78 ibid. 271-272 
79 Markosian 2004b, p 336. 
  
Upper Hemisphere: 
Region Semi Occupied by Drum 
Lower Region Occupied by Bottom 
Region Sphere occupied by Ball 
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region Montana’s right arm is added to the example, then one might think that the statue 
of Joe Montana can no longer be simple. This is because the unattached arm matter is a 
MaxCon simple, and it is a qualitative duplicate of the arm matter of the Montana statue. 
Since one arm portion of matter is a simple and the other is not (because the maximally 
continuous region of space extends beyond it), then MaxCon cannot be true. Instead of 
accepting this conclusion, Markosian argues that SoC is false. He claims that the support 
for SoC comes from a commitment to the Supervenience of Composition; that the 
mereological structure of an object is an intrinsic feature of that object.  
Markosian believes that constitution behaves differently from composition 
because the composition relation and the constitution relation differ in the types of their 
relata. He needs to distinguish between composition and constitution in order to make 
sense of his stuff/thing ontology. Markosian understands composition as a many-one 
relation between things of the same ontological type (objects or things). For example, a 
diamond is composed of carbon atoms and both the diamond and the carbon atoms are 
of the same ontological type; they are both things.80 In contrast, Markosian explains 
constitution as a one-one relation between two different ontological types, stuff (matter) 
and things (objects).  
 By introducing the new ontological category of stuff, Markosian has incurred a 
large theoretical debt. In order for MaxCon to be a viable view, Markosian must show 
that the paying the price for stuff is worthwhile. One benefit of an ontology with stuff is 
that it might explain the puzzles of constitution. For example, Markosian could claim 
that the clay of a statue is stuff, while the statue is a thing. Since the clay and the statue 
fall into different ontological categories, then they can have diverging properties, such as 
‘squashable’ and so on. However, this analysis fails to capture similar puzzles of 
                                                        
80 One might say that composition could be a many-many relation, for example: “The carbon 
atoms compose diamonds.” However, I think there is nothing at stake here; composition has at 
least one “many” relata while constitution does not have any “many” relata. 
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constitution. Consider a sculpture that is made of old compact discs. Like the statue, the 
sculpture cannot survive a major reconfiguration of the compact disks. And like the clay, 
the compact discs can survive reconfiguration. However, it seems that compact discs 
must fall into the category of things.  
I doubt Markosian would deny that a single compact disk is a thing. Assuming 
that compact discs are things, then if some compact discs are made into a sculpture they 
must (1) be things, (2) cease to be things and become stuff, (3) or they must be things 
and stuff simultaneously. Since things fall into mereological relations, then the first 
option fails to solve the puzzle of constitution. The third option is out of the question 
since it collapses the ontological distinction between stuff and things. Therefore, 
Markosian’s stuff/thing theory must allow for entities to change ontological categories. 
Markosian could claim that this is a bizarre, but tolerable consequence of his view. 
However, if ontological categories are genuine categories that cut the world at the joints, 
then it seems that they must have their extensions necessarily. Otherwise, there would be 
nothing to prevent one entity from changing categories. But if an entity changes 
categories, then the categories themselves do not truly cut nature at the joints and are 
therefore not real ontological categories.  
Therefore, Markosian’s stuff/thing ontology already fails to solve puzzles of 
constitution. I think that this is already a strong reason for rejecting the stuff/thing 
ontology, since these sorts of ontologies are meant to solve problems like the puzzles of 
constitution. However, Markosian could argue that MaxCon is the best answer to the 
Simple Question and that the stuff/thing ontology provides the metaphysical support for 
MaxCon. In what follows, I will discuss the relationship between the stuff/thing ontology 
and MaxCon. 
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2.5.2: MaxCon and the Stuff/Thing Ontology 
In addition to McDaniel’s objection to MaxCon, one could also argue that it suffers from 
another serious problem: when two MaxCon simples come into contact, they are 
necessarily annihilated. For Markosian, contact is explained by the previously mentioned 
definition of maximal continuity. When there is no subregion between S1 and S2 that is 
not completely filled with matter, then S1 and S2 are in contact. Suppose that there are 
two maximally continuous regions of space R1 and R2 and that they each completely are 
filled with matter such that contain two MaxCon simples S1 and S2. If S1 and S2 move 
towards each other until they are in contact, then there will be a maximally continuous 
region of space R3 that is the size of the fusion of R1 and R2. R3 will be completely filled 
with matter due to the complete contact of S1 and S2. Since R3 is completely filled with 
matter, there must be a simple S3 located at R3. Since simples have no parts, S1 and S2 
must have been annihilated upon coming into contact. This example claims that nothing 
of S1 and S2 survives contact. This seems counter-intuitive since it allows for the ex 
nihilio creation and complete annihilation of objects. This is problematic for the same 
reasons discussed in section 2.2.1 above. Therefore, MaxCon should be rejected. 
 The stuff/thing ontology deals with this case by agreeing that the two objects S1 
and S2 are annihilated. However, the matter that constitutes S1 and S2 is not annihilated; 
it comes to constitute the new object S3. This conforms to two common intuitions about 
fusion. On the one hand, there is a sense in which fusion destroys the previous objects, 
and on the other hand there is a sense in which the things continue to exist; objects are 
destroyed upon fusion while matter is preserved. This ontological divide is at the heart of 
the disagreement between Markosian and McDaniel. 
 Instead of making this ontological distinction explicit, Markosian responds to 
McDaniel by claiming that he must reject SoC. I find this position somewhat mysterious 
given Markosian’s stuff/thing ontology. SoC makes no reference to objects, so he does 
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not need to worry about a qualitative duplicate of a portion of a simple being a part (as in 
the Montana example above). Remember, the conclusion of the Montana example was 
that the arm of Montana must be a simple since the arm portion is a qualitative duplicate 
of the un-attached arm simple (where un-attachment is the absence of maximal 
continuity with any region outside of the one occupied by the arm) even though the arm 
is maximally continuous with the rest of the statue’s matter. I think that this conclusion 
can easily be denied by rejecting the claim that the two simples in question are in the 
ontological category of things. One might claim this is ad hoc, but it seems warranted 
given that simples should not be expected to be exactly like objects, even if they 
superficially resemble them.  If MaxCon simples are of the ontological type of stuff and 
not things, then SoC simply does not apply to them. Therefore, an advocate of MaxCon 
does not have to reject SoC and can instead maintain that SoC is true with respect to the 
ontological type things, but not to the ontological type stuff. One might worry that it is 
impossible for stuff to not constitute anything. However, allowing for un-constituted 
stuff fits nicely with Markosian’s Brutal Composition view. For BC, some portions of 
matter are objects and that some portions are not. For example, water in a glass is not an 
object according to BC, even though a collection of water molecules is contained in the 
glass. Yet the water in the glass is still there. The stuff/thing ontology could explain this 
by claiming that there is water-stuff in the glass, but that the water-stuff does not 
constitute a thing.  
 Regardless, Markosian believes that he must reject SoC to save MaxCon. Mark 
Steen argues that this is not the case because McDaniel’s argument is invalid. According 
to SoC, there is a qualitative duplicate of the matter that makes up Drum in Ball; call it 
Bottom (See Figure 2.1). However, the second clause of premise 1 claims that Bottom is 
not a qualitative duplicate of matter, but that Bottom is an object. Since SoC yields 
qualitative portions of matter, Bottom is not an object. This means that the move from 
	
70 
 
 
premise 1 to premise 2 is unjustified. We know that the matter that constitutes Bottom is 
a portion of the matter that constitutes the Ball. However, PPP cannot be applied here 
since it applies to objects, not portions of matter. All PPP says is that when you have an 
object with parts x and y then x and y must have a similar constitution relation. This is 
simply not the case in the example, since SoC does not guarantee that portions of matter 
are also objects. Steen argues that McDaniel is missing something like the following 
claim, which Steen calls Qualitative Duplicate: 
QD: Any qualitative duplicate of an object is an object.81 
If this were added to the argument, then the move in premise 1 would be justified. SoC 
would give Bottom as a qualitative duplicate of the matter that constitutes Drum. Since 
Bottom is the qualitative duplicate of the matter that constitutes Drum and that Drum is 
also an object, then QD entails that Bottom is an object as well. By PPP, Bottom is a 
proper part of Ball. Since Sphere is a maximally continuous region filled with matter, 
Ball is a MaxCon simple. However, Ball cannot be a simple and have parts. Therefore, 
MaxCon must be false.  
 This argument, as Steen points out, simply begs the question against MaxCon.82 
Assuming that Bottom is an object because of its qualitative identity to Drum is simply 
assuming that Mereological Structure and Extension cannot be separated; this is 
precisely what the MaxCon view denies. Therefore, the two views come to an impasse, 
unless there is new argument for the truth or falsity of the necessary connection between 
extension and mereological structure (McDaniel points to the familiar Humean Principle 
in support of extended simples; this will be discussed shortly.).  
 
 
                                                        
81 Steen 2011, 134. 
82 ibid. p. 141. 
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2.5.3: The Argument From Spatial Intrinsics 
McDaniel presents another argument against MaxCon, the Argument from Spatial 
Intrinsics. This argument parallels the Argument from Temporary Intrinsics.83 It will be 
helpful to have the Argument from Temporary Intrinsics in order to see the parallel 
structure of McDaniel’s argument (Ch. 3., section 4 will discuss the former argument in 
depth). 
P1. Suppose Endurantism is true. 
P2. Suppose that Janice is sitting at t1 and standing at t2. 
P3. The property is sitting and is standing are intrinsic properties; they do not 
depend on anything besides Janice for instantiation. 
P4. Since the one and the same Janice is present at each moment that she exists, 
she eternally has the properties of sitting and standing. 
P5. However, since she has no temporal parts, these properties are inconsistent. 
C.   Therefore Endurantism is false. 
 
McDaniel’s argument from Spatial Intrinsics is as follows: 
P1ʹ. Suppose MaxCon is true. 
P2ʹ. Suppose there are two simples S1 and S2 and that the former is gold while the 
latter is blue. 
P3ʹ. If S1 and S2 are moved into contact, then they will be annihilated and a new 
simple, S3 will come into being.  
P4ʹ. Since the matter constituting the simples does not go out of existence, S3 
must be both blue and gold. 
P5ʹ. However, a simple thing cannot be both blue and gold unless it has parts.  
C.    Therefore, MaxCon is false.84 
 
McDaniel’s argument sparked a debate on what is now called the problem of qualitative 
heterogeneity; That is, is it possible for an extended simple to display qualitative 
variation with respect to some property (color, for example)?85 Prima facie, this seems 
impossible for the reason cited in P5ʹ above. Intuitively, objects with qualitative variation 
need parts to instantiate properties that might otherwise be contradictory. If the two 
objects in the argument were composite, then the color variation in their fusion is 
                                                        
83 See Lewis 1986, pp. 202-205. 
84 McDaniel 2003, pp. 273-4. 
85 See McDaniel 2007a, 2007b, and 2009 and Parsons 2000. 
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explained by one part of the fusion being gold and the other part of the fusion being blue. 
Since this analysis cannot be applied to simple things, then another account must be 
given.  
 McDaniel argues that there are two ways that someone with a stuff/thing 
ontology could avoid the conclusion of the argument. The first is to accept DAUPO. With 
DAUPO, the MaxCon theorist can analyze the qualitative variation of the gold-blue by 
appealing to the portions of matter constituting the simple. The claim that S3 is blue and 
gold would be analyzed as follows:  
There is a portion of matter (stuff) that constitutes S3 at R1 that is blue and a 
portion of matter (stuff) that constitutes S3 at R2 that is gold and the fusion of R1 
and R2 is a maximally continuous region completely filled with matter.86  
 
Since there is no mention of parts in this analysis, the analysis is not subject to the 
Argument from Spatial Intrinsics. Remember, McDaniel argued that the MaxCon 
theorist cannot accept DAUPO. However, I have discussed how accepting DAUPO is not, 
in fact, a problem for the MaxCon theorist. The claim that the MaxCon theorist cannot 
accept DAUPO suffers from the same misstep discussed earlier: DAUPO does not 
generate portions that are objects; it generates portions of matter. Therefore, it seems 
like MaxCon theorists can avoid the problem of spatial intrinsics by appealing to 
DAUPO.  
 However, there is a larger problem that has been lurking in the shadows of the 
stuff/thing ontology. So far, talk regarding ‘portions’ of stuff has been dangerously loose. 
I find it surprising that McDaniel even uses the term ‘portions’ in the first place since it 
gives the MaxCon theorist an easy escape from McDaniel’s argument. Perhaps he is 
trying to give the MaxCon theorist the benefit of the doubt with concepts that are neutral 
on the issue of mereology. However, it is a legitimate worry that there is no difference 
between talk of portions and parts that is not ad hoc. Talk of portions is either 
                                                        
86 Paraphrase of McDaniel 2003, p. 274. 
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ontologically committing or it is not. If it is ontologically committing, then it is in the 
ontological category of stuff or it is not. If it is in the ontological category of stuff, then it 
is simply disguised talk of parts. A blue-gold MaxCon simple would contain two smaller 
portions of stuff; this is a many-one relation that cannot be anything except composition. 
If portions are not stuff, then MaxCon theorist must posit a third ontological category 
unique to portions in order to account for the blue and gold qualities. However, this is 
completely ad hoc; the category of portions only exists to solve the problem of the blue-
gold simple. The MaxCon theorist must find some other way to talk about the blue-gold 
simple without invoking portions. For example, she could invoke Parsons's distributional 
properties, where the whole simple has a singular property with the specific blue-gold 
distribution.87 Therefore, the MaxCon theorist should not use portion talk to discuss 
MaxCon simples with qualitative heterogeneity, nor should objectors like McDaniel 
grant MaxCon theorists such talk. 
McDaniel has a final objection to the above analysis of qualitative heterogeneity; 
the analysis attributes intrinsic properties to stuff instead of things. He believes that this 
is problematic because “it seems that these properties are free-floating entities. They are 
neither had by the simple nor by parts of the simple; moreover, they are not parts of the 
simple. This is extremely odd.”88 In other words, The MaxCon theorist's analysis of S3’s 
qualitative variation holds that S3 looks blue and gold even though it does not have the 
properties of blue and gold.  
However, Markosian fully embraces the odd consequences of this analysis. He 
considers a situation where Romeo and Juliet are MaxCon simple people.89 This means 
that when they embrace for the first time, the thing Romeo and the thing Juliet will be 
                                                        
87 See Parsons 2000. The distributional properties view will be discussed in further detail in 
section 2.7 of this chapter.  
88 ibid. 274. 
89 Of course, this analysis applies mutatis mutandis to other cases. 
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annihilated and a new simple, call it RJ, will come into being. This may seem disastrous, 
but Markosian claims that the stuff that constituted Juliet will continue to exist (as well 
as for Romeo), and that this stuff will have all the same properties as Juliet herself. He 
writes: 
My reply is that Juliet need not worry. For while it is true that the thing that is 
Juliet will go out of existence, it is also true that the stuff that is Juliet will 
continue to exist. Not only that, but that stuff will continue to support all of the 
properties—being alive, consciousness, being a person, loving Romeo—that she 
cares about having. And it is also true that she—Juliet!—will continue to exist, to 
be alive, to be conscious, to be a person, and to love her Romeo just as much as 
ever. Being a thing that goes out of existence is not, as it turns out, the worst 
thing that can happen to a person.90 
 
This example partially addresses McDaniel’s worry about free-floating properties; the 
properties are clearly tied to the stuff that constitutes Juliet (and Romeo). However, this 
example also further mystifies the relation between stuff and things. In fact, one might 
worry that it makes the ontological category of things wholly redundant. If everything 
that matters about Juliet is instantiated in the stuff that constitutes her, then what work 
does the constituted thing do at all?  
At first, it seems that the stuff/thing ontology could be used to give an 
alternative, and perhaps better, analysis of seemingly coincident objects. The stuff/thing 
ontology can explain the puzzle of the statue and the clay’s differing modal and historical 
properties by analyzing the statue as a thing and the clay as stuff. Given that they are 
ontologically distinct, they cannot have inconsistent properties since they are not in the 
same ontological category. 91  The potential ability to deal with puzzles of material 
constitution shows some purpose for the ontological category of objects. However, it 
does nothing to address the strange circumstances of Juliet, and this casts doubt on its 
value as a solution for coincident objects. 
                                                        
90 Markosian 2004b, pp. 424-5. 
91 See Markosian’s 2015 “The Right Stuff” pp. 16-17. 
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 Steen argues for the redundancy of the object category by appealing to the Too 
Many Thinkers argument put forth by Olsen.92 Since the stuff that constitutes Juliet does 
not gain or lose intrinsic properties when it comes into contact with Romeo, the stuff 
must have had these properties all along. This means that the stuff that constitutes Juliet 
was thinking before it came into contact with Romeo and remains thinking after it came 
into contact with Romeo. Therefore, one of two outcomes must obtain: either (1) the 
region filled by Juliet and her stuff contains two thinkers (one of which perishes on 
contact) or (2) the thing Juliet does not think. The former outcome is somewhat absurd 
while the latter outcome is evidence for the redundancy of things as a robust ontological 
category. Markosian clearly does not think that the Juliet is killed, since he claims that 
Juliet will continue to exist in the passage quoted above.  
 At this point, one might think that the too many thinkers objection is misplaced. 
The reason that it seems like there are too many thinkers is because we have been 
interpreting the name ‘Juliet’ to refer to only the thing Juliet.  However, Markosian 
claims that this is not the case: “When I utter the word ‘I’ on this account, my utterance 
picks out both a thing and a portion of stuff. Each referent has the property of being a 
person.”93Markosian thinks that one can truly say that Juliet survives contact with 
Romeo since the name ‘Juliet’ refers to both the object-Juliet and the stuff-Juliet. 
However, as Steen argues, if each referent has the property of being a person, then there 
is a conscious, thinking Juliet thing. Since the thing Juliet is annihilated when it comes 
                                                        
92 Steen 146; Olson 1997 came up with this problem for opponents of animalism; he argued that 
accepting (a) below is by far the best solution. Here is a rough approximation of the argument: (1) 
Suppose you are sitting in a chair at region R1, (2) then there is a thinking animal at R1, (3) you 
are thinking in R1, (4) Therefore, you must (a) be identical with that animal, (b) accept that 
animals don’t think, or (c) accept that there is more than one thinker at R1. 
93 Markosian 2004b, p. 423. This remark is about personal pronouns but applies to names in the 
same manner. 
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into contact with Romeo, the thinking thing ceases to be; it is dead. Therefore, appealing 
to reference does not solve the too many thinkers problem.94  
 Markosian would most likely bite this bullet. He could say that simple people, 
after all, are quite strange entities. Normal people are composite things constituted by 
stuff. Since a human being’s stuff is constantly in flux, the human being can endure as a 
thing, but not as stuff; human stuff is not a human person. Simple people cannot endure 
in this way since they are destroyed upon contact with another MaxCon simple. This may 
seem counter-intuitive, but I think that Markosian does not have to bite this bullet. The 
problem with a simple person is that she constitutes an object; but why should we expect 
simples to behave exactly like composite objects? I see no reason why Markosian could 
not simply get rid of the claim that the Juliet stuff constitutes a Juliet thing. If simple 
Juliet is just stuff, then there is only one thinker: stuff-Juliet. The only reason one would 
have for believing that the stuff of Juliet constituting a thing is if one endorsed 
something like the following principle: 
Necessity of Stuff/Thing Constitution: If there is some stuff, then it 
necessarily constitutes a thing. 
 
However, this principle might be too strong for the stuff/thing theorists; I cannot think 
of any non-question begging reason why they should accept it. One might argue that 
when people are in question, stuff necessarily constitutes a person. However, this begs 
the question against the stuff/thing theorists. Why do persons have to be things, 
especially when they are simple? Perhaps all of the puzzles of personal identity are 
results of failing to recognize a distinction between stuff and things. As long as there is 
something for each of the properties required for personhood to attach to, then there 
seems to be no good reason to think that it is problematic for the properties to be 
attached to stuff. After all, Descartes and many others held a similar dualistic ontology 
                                                        
94 Steen 2011, p. 147. 
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(although dualistic ontologies pose other problems). Therefore, as long as there is a 
satisfactory account of property attribution to stuff, then Steen’s objection fails to gain 
traction against the stuff/thing ontology. 
 So far, the three-way debate between McDaniel, Markosian, and Steen has made 
certain assumptions about personhood: that it is an intrinsic property that can be 
attributed to material entities, whether they are stuff or things. However, there is an 
inherent danger in bringing people or thinkers into an already complicated argument 
about material objects. First, it complicates our set of intuitions about the various cases; 
the metaphysics of the inanimate are already complicated enough. Second, bringing 
people or thinkers into the debate requires importing views about the nature of 
personhood or thinking, and none of the philosophers in this debate are explicit about 
what views they hold. For instance, if one were a substance dualist, then any appeal to 
thinkers or persons as problems for simple objects makes no sense; the dualist would 
attribute this property to the mind, not the material body. One could also hold, like Van 
Inwagen, that personhood and thinking are material, but play by different rules than 
inanimate matter.95 These are only two of the many options available to resist the claim 
that the properties of personhood or thinking thing attach to objects or stuff. While these 
sorts of questions will have to ultimately be accounted for, I believe that this is a 
backwards approach that only further muddies already muddy waters. Therefore, I think 
one can rightly regard all of the above arguments about simple thinkers with suspicion. 
 Markosian deals with several other objections in his “The Right Stuff.”96 I will not 
examine these objections further since they all seem to reduce to head-butting over 
whether stuff is possible. Markosian claims that stuff is possible and that it has many of 
the attributes that things have. However, stuff is not identical to things. His opponents 
                                                        
95 See Van Inwagen 1990. 
96 Markosian 2015. 
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argue that because stuff seems so similar to things, then there is no good reason for 
claiming that they are separate ontological categories. The fact that stuff and things are 
so similar, yet ontologically distinct, invites the question of why this is the case. It seems 
that the stuff/thing theory can only explain material constitution and simples at the 
expense of the unexplained similarity yet different nature of stuff and things. 
Furthermore, an ontology with only stuff or things is more parsimoneous compared to 
the stuff/thing ontology. The stuff/thing ontology pays a heavy theoretical price. 
What, then, is the final status of the MaxCon view? I believe that none of the 
arguments against the MaxCon view have shown it to be outright logically inconsistent. 
However, MaxCon does require the stuff/thing ontology to avoid the objections leveled 
against it, and this is not a cheap ontological commitment. Additionally, there are further 
reasons to be suspicious of the  stuff/thing ontolog. By labeling his ontological categories 
as stuff/thing or matter/object dichotomies, Markosian invites confusion concerning 
stuff or matter. Part of the problem stems from the fact that in everyday language, the 
terms ‘stuff’ and ‘thing’ can be used interchangeably. Suppose that there is a pencil, a 
radio, and a watch battery on a table. One could utter, “there is some stuff on the table” 
or “there are some things on the table” to refer to the three objects on the table. Here are 
some other examples: (1) when entering an old attic “Wow! Look at all that stuff” 
compared to “Wow! Look at all these things!” or (2) “Did you hear the stuff he said to 
me?” vs. “Did you hear the things he said to me?” The only difference between these 
sentences is that ‘stuff’ is a collective noun while ‘thing’ is not.  
However, this difference does nothing to elucidate the difference between 
Markosian’s stuff and thing. Presumably, Markosian would agree with the statement that 
there are three things on the table. He could also agree with one interpretation of the 
statement about stuff, since stuff constitutes things. This interpretation of stuff does 
potentially have some everyday intuitional pull. For example, if one has a glass of water, 
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one might describe the glass as a thing, while describing the water as something other 
than thing (Markosian claims stuff). However, he cannot agree with the stuff statement 
about the pencil, radio, and watch battery when the statement references the pencil, 
radio, and watch battery explicitly: “There is some stuff on the table,” “What kind of 
stuff?”, “A pencil, a radio, and a watch battery.” According to the stuff/thing ontology, 
the first speaker in this conversation is saying something false. Given that the stuff/thing 
ontology is supposed to help preserve commonsense statements about material objects 
(and stuff), it is a blow to the theory that one of its terms of art does not always produce 
true statements even when it is used correctly.  
Obviously, Markosian is not tied to these everyday sorts of language use. He can 
simply choose a new term for the ontological type that he means, for example, stuff*. 
However, I think this sort of move significantly weakens the plausibility of his ontology. 
Unlike the nihilist or universalist, Markosian does not give us necessary or sufficient 
conditions for stuff; he relies on an intuitive understanding of the concept, and this 
intuitive understanding is tied closely to our everyday language usage of ‘stuff’. Since 
‘stuff’ is ambiguous between thing and non-thing (I think it would be wrong to attribute 
an ontological usage of stuff to the ordinary speaker), one might begin to suspect that 
there is no difference between the categories of stuff and thing at all.  
In conclusion, I think that if one has already accepted the stuff/thing ontology, 
then endorsing MaxCon is a natural extension of the view. On the other hand, I think 
that MaxCon is not enough of an independent motivation to take on that ontology. This 
is because a stuff/thing ontology is highly revisionary, while the proposed MaxCon 
analysis is much less so. It seems like a good philosophical principle that a non-
revisionary view’s plausibility should not depend on endorsing a revisionary view. 
Therefore, I would reject MaxCon as an answer to the Simple Question.  
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 Now that I have concluded my analysis of various answers to the Simple 
Question, I will discuss another interesting problem concerning the nature of simples. 
This problem only applies to views that allow for the possibility of extended mereological 
simples. If one supposes that these kinds of simples are in fact possible, then interesting 
questions arise about what kinds of properties these simples can have.  
2.6 The Natural Property View of Simplicity 
Natural properties provide another approach for answering the Simple Question. Since 
natural properties are often included in one’s ontology for other reasons (such as an 
account of qualities), natural properties are an elegant solution to the Simple Question. 
Simple objects are the objects that instantiate at least one perfectly natural property. 
McDaniel calls this answer the “Instance of a Fundamental Property” answer: 
The Instance of a Fundamental Property View of Simples (Instance): x 
is a simple if and only if x instantiates some perfectly natural property P.97 
 
The concept of perfectly natural properties is attributed to David Lewis. He claimed 
that naturalness comes in degrees, and that the perfectly natural properties carve 
nature at the joints; they are the fundamental properties of a world.98 For example, 
the property ‘being negatively charged’ is perfectly natural. This property can be used 
to explain a whole host of causal relationships not only at the subatomic level, but at 
the macroscopic level as well. The property of ‘being alive’ is a natural property, but 
not a perfect one. This property is natural since it has a somewhat clear extension 
that is independent of human usage. However, ‘being alive’ is plausibly explainable 
by collections of other, more natural properties, such as molecular, atomic, or 
subatomic properties. Finally, the property of ‘being a skyscraper’ is even less 
                                                        
97 McDaniel 2009, p. 242 
98 See Lewis 1983. One could also think of perfectly natural properties as intrinsic properties. 
However, one might believe that terms “perfectly natural properties” and “intrinsic properties” 
have different semantics. But for my purposes here, nothing rides on this distinction. Also see 
Dorr & Hawthorne 2013 for a recent discussion of how to understand natural properties and the 
problems with these views. 
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natural. It does not seem to be important to the natural world in the way that ‘having 
negative charge’ or ‘being alive’ are. Typically, properties that are not perfectly 
natural will either supervene on perfectly natural properties or reduce to perfectly 
natural properties. So the property ‘having negative charge’ supports the less natural 
properties of ‘being alive’ and ‘being a skyscraper.’  
One might object that it is possible for composite objects to have perfectly natural 
properties. For instance, a chlorine ion seems to have the property of -1 charge, but a 
chlorine ion is also composite object; it is made up of protons, neutrons, and electrons 
(and protons and neutrons are made up of quarks, etc.). Therefore, given Instance, the 
chlorine ion is a simple, which is impossible since a chlorine ion is composite. Notice 
that this objection is not a problem for the nihilist, since the nihilist rejects the existence 
of composite objects; only simples can instantiate perfectly natural properties. However, 
defeating this objection may be worthwhile for those who do not accept nihilism, so I will 
provide a rebuttal. This objection is misguided since it takes the property of -1 charge to 
be identical to the property of having a net charge of -1. While the property ‘having a net 
charge of -1’ is a natural property, it is not a perfectly natural property since it is the sum 
of the perfectly natural properties instantiated by the protons and electrons of the atom. 
So while composite objects can have properties that are natural to a high degree, they 
cannot have perfectly natural properties.  
This point can be generalized to any composite object that supposedly 
instantiates a perfectly natural property. Since the composite object has parts, then 
either (i) the composite object’s smallest parts have perfectly natural properties, (ii) the 
composite object has the perfectly natural property, and that propertiy is partially 
instantiated by the object’s parts, or (iii) the composite object has the perfectly natural 
property, but its parts have no other properties besides mereological and spatial 
properties. Option (ii) is absurd. How could a fundamental property such as -1 charge be 
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partially instantiated by an object’s parts? Suppose that there is a composite object x that 
has -1 charge and also has two halves y and z. If (ii) is true, then y and z either instantiate 
the property of –½ charge, or they instantiate the property of -1 charge. If the former is 
the case, then -1 charge is not a perfectly natural property since it depends on the 
property of –½ charge. If the latter is true, then x has a charge of -2. As for option (iii), I 
will assume that it is false for now, since I will provide a thorough argument against it in 
Chapter 5. Since options (ii) and (iii) are false, it must be the case that composite objects 
never instantiate perfectly natural properties. Therefore, any object that instantiates a 
perfectly natural property is a simple.  
However, one might deny Instance because one thinks that mental properties are 
perfectly natural properties and mental properties are instantiated by human beings.99 
McDaniel argues for this claim by appealing to the possibility of zombie worlds. A 
zombie world is a possible world where everyone in the actual world has a doppelganger 
that acts exactly as the people of the actual world do. However, the people of the zombie 
world have no mental properties; they are not conscious. If this is a real possibility, then 
it is possible for perfectly natural properties to be instantiated by composite objects. 
While this objection has some force, it also introduces the complicated debate over what 
mental properties are and how they are instantiated. Since there are many views on these 
issues that are compatible with Instance, this objection will only move those who already 
think that mental properties are instantiated by composite objects. 
As previously stated, nihilists can easily accept Instance without additional 
metaphysical commitments, since Instance is a problem only for ontologies that contain 
composite objects. In fact, I believe that Instance and nihilism complement each other. 
Nihilism already entails that all perfectly natural properties are instantiated by simples, 
so Instance is certainly a sufficient condition for something being simple. All the nihilist 
                                                        
99 See McDaniel 2007a, p. 249 
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needs to show is that Instance is a necessary condition for an object being simple. If 
Instance were not necessary, then it would be possible for a simple to either have no 
properties at all, or to have an intrinsic non-natural or non-fundamental property.  
I will discuss the second disjunct first. I have a hard time making sense of non-
natural properties that are instantiated by simples. For example, if a simple has the 
property of ‘net negative charge,’ it either has the perfectly natural property of ‘negative 
charge’ or it has several perfectly natural properties that supervene on or ground the 
property of ‘net negative charge’.100 In the first case, it is true that an electron that has 
the property of ‘-1 charge’ also has the property of ‘net -1 charge’. However, the net 
property is redundant; it does no work. In the second case, the electron must bear 
multiple perfectly natural properties, such as three of the property ‘-1 charge’ and two of 
the property ‘+1 charge’ in order to have the property ‘net -1 charge’.  
This is a flagrant violation of Occam’s razor. There is no reason to think that a 
simple with -1 charge instantiates multiple combinations of perfectly natural charge 
properties that add to a net of -1 charge. Therefore, claiming that a simple can have a 
property that is not perfectly natural entails that the property that is not perfectly natural 
will be superfluous, or that the simple must have a superfluous amount of perfectly 
natural properties. Furthermore, properties that are not perfectly natural are supposed 
to supervene on properties that are. If these non-natural properties are independent of 
the other intrinsic properties of a simple, then they are not grounded in the simple’s 
perfectly natural properties and are therefore free-floating ontological garbage; Occam’s 
razor demands their removal.  
                                                        
100 I suppose one could reject the superveneince/grounding claim. This has several 
disadvantages. First, since perfectly natural properties are discovered by science, rejecting the 
supreveneince/grounding of non-natural properties (net -1 charge) by natural properties (-1 
charge) runs against the scientific account of such properties. Second, this results in an ontology 
that incurs the theoretical cost of these non-natural properties, as well as lack of an explanation 
for why these properties seem to be related to natural properties, even though they are distinct.  
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If the first disjunct is true, “thin particulars” must be possible.101 Thin particulars 
are entities that have no properties but do have some sort of structure that is capable of 
instantiating properties. Thin particulars would not only have to be possible, but capable 
of existence without property instantiation. This is implausible for several reasons. First, 
a thin particular has no properties other than ‘being a thin particular’. For instance, a 
table without its properties is a thin particular. But a table without properties seems to 
be no table at all (this objection is similar to Lewis’s objection to endurantism; this will 
be discussed in Ch. 3). Second, since properties explain the qualities of the table such as 
its perceptual appearance, causal powers, and so on, there seems to be no purpose for 
these thin-particulars. They are ontologically superfluous, and Occam’s razor dictates 
they should be cut out.  
However, thin particulars might be suggested by the supersubstantivalist view.102 
If there are true empty regions of space (regions of space with no properties), then these 
regions are prime candidates for bare particulars.103 If this is the case, then the objection 
that bare particulars have no purpose fails since there must be bare spacetime points to 
account for the extrinsic relations between properties that are pinned to a given point of 
spacetime. In other words, if we want to make sense of the claim that one electron is a 
certain distance from another, then there must be spacetime in between the two 
electrons to account for the distance.  
                                                        
101 See Armstrong 1989 pp. 60-61 for the term “thin particulars.” He uses this term in his 
discussion of Locke’s account of properties. For example, a table has the properties of harness, 
browness, and so on. But we do usually think of the table as a collection of these properties. On 
one interpretation of Locke’s view (Armstrong argues that Locke may have postulated the thin 
particular as simply epistemologoical), the properties attach to the thin particular. 
102 Supersubstantivalists claim that spacetime is the only substance; objects are simply properties 
instantiated by regions of spacetime. 
103 It is my understanding that most physicists believe empty regions of space to be impossible. 
That is, any region of space has some energy fluctuation occurring within it even if that energy 
fluctuation averages to zero. See Greene 2003 p. 119-20 a minimum amount of energy, even if 
that energy is practically zero. However, there is no reason to think this is a necessary property of 
spacetime. 
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In response, one might argue that the property being a point of spacetime is a 
perfectly natural property. In fact, I believe this to be correct since spacetime points fit 
the previously discussed rough criteria for being a perfectly natural property: (i) they are 
fundamental in explanations of causal relations, (ii) they ground larger entities, such as 
spacetime regions, and (iii) there seem to be no further entities grounding spacetime 
points. Without any reason to treat the claim otherwise, I will proceed with the claim 
that being a spacetime point is a perfectly natural property. If my arguments above are 
correct, then it is necessary that all simples have at least one perfectly natural property: 
the property of belonging to an ontological category. Therefore, Instance provides both 
necessary and sufficient conditions for simplicity.  
Instance has several advantages over other answers to the Simple Question. First, 
Instance is compatible with any worlds that contain point-sized simples, spatially 
extended simples, or both. Second, Instance is also compatible with the 
supersubstantivalist view that takes spacetime to be the only material substance. A 
simple in a supersubstantivalist world is either a spacetime point that instantiates a 
perfectly natural property or the smallest spatially extended simple region of spacetime 
that instantiates a perfectly natural property. Finally, Instance accommodates the model 
of explanation (discussed previously) that uses the smallest facts about a world to ground 
the other facts of that world.104  In summary, Instance provides an elegant answer to the 
Simple Question and has the virtue of being compatible with many other metaphysical 
claims.  
2.7: Qualitatively Heterogeneous Extended Simples 
The problem of Qualitative Heterogeneity is roughly this: How can a spatially extended 
simple have qualitative variation with respect to its intrinsic properties? For instance, 
104 Of course, philosophers who take a top-down approach to metaphysics would not hold this 
intuition. 
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how could a simple sphere have a bumpy "half" and a smooth "half," or a simple statue 
have a gold "body" and blue "eyes"?105 This problem deserves attention for at least two 
reasons: (1) if extended simples are possible, then it seems to be conceivable that they 
can have qualitatively heterogeneous properties, and (2) if the world is one large 
extended simple, then it must be qualitatively heterogeneous and this is a metaphysical 
thesis worth exploring. Yet, as McDaniel's Argument from Spatial Intrinsics (previously 
discussed in 2.5) shows, there seems to be strong evidence for denying the possibility of 
heterogeneous extended simples. However, many philosophers have responded to the 
argument with analyses of qualitative heterogeneity that offer purported solutions to the 
problem. I have already discussed and rejected Markosian's stuff/thing ontological 
solution to the puzzle. In this section, I will discuss several other attempts to provide an 
analysis of a qualitatively heterogeneous simple, none of which I believe to be successful.  
There are several solutions to this puzzle, but two of the most interesting are 
McDaniel's trope view and Parsons' distributional properties view.106 It should be noted 
that both of these solutions require a set of metaphysical commitments that have wide 
ranging implications for other metaphysical issues. McDaniel's view relies on a 
background commitment to trope theory. Trope theory is typically used to solve the 
problem of seemingly universal properties: how can two or more distinct objects have 
identical properties? McDaniel uses tropes to account for the seeming identity of 
properties: "A trope is both a particular and a quality. On the trope-theoretic view, x and 
y are both F if and only if they each exemplify their own F-trope. Properties such as 
105 The quotation marks indicate words that would be paraphrased away once an analysis of 
qualitative heterogeneity is worked out. 
106 See Spencer 2010, p. 168-9. One strategy involves indexing color properties to regions, for 
example a red block is a block that has the property of-being-red-at-R. The second and third 
strategies are endurantist strategies that analyze claims of redness as relations instead of 
properties (these will be discussed further in chapter 3). The second strategy is to analyze the red 
block as a block that bears the is-Red relation to a region. The third endurantist strategy is to 
analyze the red block as a block that bears the having-at-a-region relation to redness. Since I 
reject endurantism, I will not consider these views here. 
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being F are maximal classes or maximal mereological fusions of perfectly resembling 
tropes."107 Using trope theory, the claim that “there is a green block” refers to a block that 
exemplifies a green-trope. The similarity between the green block and some other green 
thing, such as a green blade of grass, is grounded by each thing’s membership in a 
maximal class of green-tropes or their being part of the fusion of the green-trope class.  
Before I discuss how the trope view applies to an analysis of heterogeneous 
extended simples, I want to take stock of the various metaphysical commitments 
involved in this trope-theoretic analysis. Obviously, the view includes tropes in its 
ontology. The view also needs some sort of relation to connect these tropes to their 
objects. This relation could be some sort of instantiation relation, or simply identity. The 
trope-theoretic view also requires a primitive relation of maximal resemblance; in other 
words, there is no informative explanation of the shared characteristics of any two tropes 
other than they are in this resemblance relation. The trope-theoretic view also requires a 
view of composition that allows for fusions of tropes or an ontological commitment to 
natural classes. McDaniel endorses unrestricted mereological composition already, so he 
does not need to take on natural classes in order to motivate the trope theoretic view.  
 But how does this apply to extended heterogeneous simples? Consider a spatially 
extended simple that is square shaped; call it S. Suppose that S appears to have a green 
half and a purple half. Since S is simple, it does not have any halves. Since S has no 
halves, an analysis of S cannot use the standard strategy of attributing properties to 
parts. Instead, McDaniel says that tropes are instantiated by regions of space. Even 
though S is simple, S still occupies a region of space, R, and R includes two subregions, r1 
and r2. One of these hemispherical subregions instantiates a green-trope, while the other 
subregion instantiates a purple-trope. Therefore, S seems to have a green half because it 
overlaps the green-trope at r1. I find this analysis somewhat puzzling; it seems open to 
                                                        
107 McDaniel 2009, p. 327 
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the same objection to Markosian's analysis of the problem of qualitative heterogeneity: 
the tropes do not seem to be tied to the extended simple in any meaningful way. Instead, 
the tropes are instantiated by a subregion of the region occupied by S. This is the same 
account of property instantiation given by the supersubstantivalist. Retaining material 
objects that do not instantiate properties seems ontologicaly costly. One could hold onto 
these objects because of one’s commitment to extended simples. However, I believe it is 
more reasonable to simply give up the possiblity of such simples in exchange for the 
parsimony of supersubstantivalism. 
Alternatively, one could make the claim that the tropes stand in the constitution 
relation to the simple. However, there is no way to make sense of this claim without 
using mereology. If a simple is constituted by two tropes, then it is either identical to the 
tropes or the simple is a separate entity standing in a one-many relation to the tropes. 
The simple cannot be identical to the tropes since identity cannot hold between two 
different quantities. One could also claim that the constitution relation attaches tropes to 
extended simples in a way that preserves simplicity. However, this is an ad hoc strategy 
that introduces a mystery primitive relation that gives no further insight on the 
mechanics of qualitative heterogeneity.  
 Joshua Spencer argues against McDaniel’s trope view by appealing to the 
possibility of extended regions of space that have no proper subregions.108 Spencer 
argues that these regions of space are obviously incompatible with McDaniel's trope 
view. Suppose that the extended simple S occupies a simple region Rs instead of a 
composite region R. By supposition, S appears to have a green half and a purple half. 
However, since Rs does not contain any subregions, the green-trope and the purple-trope 
                                                        
108 Given that McDaniel is already committed to extended simples, the inclusion of extended 
regions of space in his ontology make for nice theoretical symmetry and consistency. An example 
of a simple region of space is the Planck length: (1.616229(38)×10−35 meters). The Planck length is 
an extended region of space where the laws of classical physics and relativity do not hold. 
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can only be exemplified at Rs. This, of course, is contradictory; Rs cannot exemplify two 
color-tropes at the same time.109 In order to evade this problem, McDaniel would have to 
either reject the possibility of extended simple regions of space and sacrifice theoretical 
consistency, or accept anti-Humean necessities that objects and properties can occupy 
spatial regions. One may be willing to pay that price, but his prior Humean commitments 
make this an unsavory instance of bullet biting. 
 Josh Parsons argues that a special kind of property, a distributional property, can 
allow for heterogeneous extended simples. In everyday conversation, we talk about 
distributions. We describe a chessboard as having a certain distribution of black and 
white squares. Typically, this is just shorthand for describing the variety of color 
properties and locations of those color properties instantiated by the board. However, 
Parsons claims that the chessboard only has one color property: the property of the 
board’s particular distribution of white and black squares.110 None of the board’s parts 
have this distributional property; the distributional property is not composed of or 
constituted by the individual squares’ color properties. Instead, the individual squares 
have their color properties because the board has a specific distributional property. 
Spencer argues that using Parsons' account of distributional properties as an 
analysis of qualitatively heterogeneous simples entails unwelcome brute facts about the 
world. Spencer begins by considering several heterogeneous simple statues that have red 
stains at various locations: the left foot, the right foot, the forehead, and the nose. 
Suppose that there is a factory that produces these statues. Here is my interpretation of 
the argument: 
P1. Assume that there are wholly distinct distributional color properties for every 
way that a given statue can be stained. 
                                                        
109 I have modified Spencer's argument somewhat in order to continue to use the simples from 
McDaniel's example; Spencer’s original argument involves statues instead of circles. 
110 See Parsons 2000, pp. 13-20. 
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P2. Suppose that the statues can be manufactured with any combination of stains 
on the right foot, the left foot, the forehead, and the nose. 
P3. There are 16 combinations of red stained statues. 
P4. Since distributional properties are wholly distinct, then it is necessary that a 
statue must have only one distributional property. 
C.   Therefore, there are exactly 16 necessary distributional properties.  
 
According to Parsons, distributional properties are wholly distinct from one another; 
there is no overlap in the each of the 16 properties even though they all involve the 
quality 'red'. Spencer claims that if one accepts the distributional properties view, then 
one must take the fact that there are exactly 16 ways the statues could turn out as a brute 
necessity. It may not be immediately clear why this is a problem, so it will be helpful to 
briefly examine Spencer’s argument in detail. 
 Spencer uses an argument from Ted Sider’s “Against Monism” as inspiration. 
Sider argues against substance monism (such as that defended by Schaffer) by showing 
that the monist cannot explain certain facts about the size or the structure of a 
statespace.111 Consider a possible world consisting of a screen with a 4x4 row of pixels. 
Each of these pixels can be turned on or off. Since there are sixteen pixels and each pixel 
has two states, then there are 216 possible configurations of the statespace. Sider argues 
that anyone who rejects monism has an explanation of this numerical fact. Sider says the 
explanation consists of the following facts: “(i) there are 16 pixels, each of which has two 
available fundamental states; (ii) the fundamental states of the system include only the 
states of the individual pixels; and (iii) the possibilities for the entire system are 
generated combinatorially from the entities in the system and the fundamental states 
those entities can inhabit.”112 If monism is true, then the fact that there are 216 possible 
                                                        
111 Sider is arguing against maximal monism, not priority monism. A statespace is the set of all the 
possible values that a system can have. For example, a statespace consisting of a binary gate (such 
as those used in computer processors) has 2 values: 0 or 1 (off or on). 
112 Sider 2007, 3. Note that this point generalizes to any number of binary entities within a 
statespace. For n objects with binary values, there will be 2n possible configurations of the 
statespace. 
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configurations of the statespace is a fact about the entire world, since the world is the 
only object in the monist’s ontology.  
The success of this argument hinges on metaphysical explanation. Anyone who 
rejects maximal monism can appeal to the various pixels and their states to explain the 
fact that there are 216 possible configurations, while the monist can only insist that the 
world has the primitive property of the statespace configuration. It is important to note 
that Sider’s argument requires the assumption that the best account of metaphysical 
explanation begins with the fundamental facts and uses these fundamental facts to 
generate general facts. In the above example, facts about the pixels ground facts about 
the statespace. The virtue of this approach is that a small number of fundamental facts 
can ground or explain a large number of general facts; this approach keeps the set of 
brute facts as small as possible. In contrast, the maximal monist must hold that both the 
general facts about a statespace and the smaller facts about that statespace are just facts 
about the world; there is no explanatory connection between them. Of course, one could 
always take the priority monist route and claim that general facts of the world are 
fundamental and that these facts ground the smaller facts.113 As a nihilist, I endorse 
Sider’s bottom-up model of explanation, so I will assume the model’s correctness. 
 In light of the above discussion, the similarities between Sider and Spencer’s 
argument should be apparent. Spencer’s factory can be described as the statespace of the 
system, and the four stains are the binary gates of the system. A system with four binary 
gates has 24 possible values, so the factory can produce 16 possible types of stained 
statues. A standard account of properties explains the 16 possible stained statues by 
grounding them in the four different locations where redness is instantiated.  The 
advocate of distributional properties must claim that there are 16 distinct distributional 
properties and that there is no similarity between a statue with the distributional 
                                                        
113 See Schaffer 2010. 
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property of having two stained feet and a statue with the distributional property of 
having a stained left foot.  
McDaniel argues that a distributional properties view must not only take the 
relation of resemblance as primitive, but also the additional relation of resemblance with 
respect to F.114  While one may balk at a primitive relation of resemblance, many 
philosophers find it necessary. For example, trope theorists are already committed to 
primitive resemblance between tropes, and counterpart theorists are committed to 
resemblance between counterparts. However, the distributional properties theorists 
cannot explain certain resemblance with sentences of the form x resembles y. Suppose 
there is a square that is blue and a circle that is a slightly darker shade of blue; these 
objects resemble each other with respect to color, but not to shape. The trope theorist 
can account for the similarity between x and y by claiming that each object instantiates a 
blue trope, and these blue tropes resemble each other while they x and y also instantiate 
shape tropes that do not resemble one another.  
However, the distributional properties theorist cannot say this since 
distributional properties are unique to the whole object; the square has the distributional 
property of being-square-shaped-and-having-blue-color-distribution. These 
distributional properties are not fine-grained enough to allow for similarity with respect 
to independent qualities. Therefore, distributional properties cannot account for the 
resemblance of two shapes with respect to colors. The only way that defenders of 
distributional properties could counter this objection is to advocate brutal similarity, and 
I have already argued against brutal-type views. 
  The defender of distributional properties is already in trouble. They also face a 
further problem: the fact that the four stain locations allows one to infer the 16 possible 
stain configurations. However, if the distributional properties view is true, then one’s 
                                                        
114 See McDaniel 2003, p. 329 
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knowledge of the four distributional properties should make this inference impossible, 
since knowledge of these distinct distributional properties does not allow the inference of 
the other 12 possible distributional properties.  
This can be made clear through a simple analogy. Suppose that the residents of 
some world w have only experienced two colors red and yellow until some time t. At t, a 
new color, orange, appears in w. Anyone who lived in w before t could not infer what 
orange would look like from their knowledge of the previous two colors even though 
orange is the combination of the two colors.115 This inability to make the inference results 
from the qualitative experience of color properties being distinct from one another. 
Similarly, defenders of distributional properties are committed to distributional 
properties being distinct from one another. In other words, knowledge of one 
distributional property does not allow the inference to another seemingly similar 
distributional property. Therefore, distributional properties should be rejected since they 
require a brutal relation of similarity and cannot support our ability to make certain 
inferences.  
Since the two most promising views for analyzing qualitative heterogeneity fail, 
the possibility of qualitatively heterogeneous simples is contingent on a forthcoming 
successful analysis. This makes for a strong case against heterogeneous extended 
simples. Spencer makes a final argument against that possibility of these simples: 
P1. If it is possible that there is a heterogeneous simple that occupies an extended 
composite region of space, then it is possible that there is a heterogeneous 
simple that occupies an extended atomic region of space. 
P2. It is not possible that there is a heterogeneous simple that occupies an 
extended atomic region of space. 
                                                        
115 Of course, they may infer that they could possible see other wavelengths of light with enhanced 
perceptual faculties. However, they still could not infer the qualitative nature of these 
wavelengths. 
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C.   So, it is not possible that there is a heterogeneous simple that occupies an 
extended composite region of space.116 
 
Any defender of qualitatively heterogeneous extended simples will hold that it is possible 
for there to be an extended simple cube that appears to be half blue and half green and 
that this cube occupies a composite region of space. Spencer defends P1 by appealing to 
the Humean idea of modal recombination. If atomic regions of space and composite 
regions of space are possible, then the properties of being composite or being atomic are 
intrinsic properties. Furthermore, given Humean recombination, it is possible that both 
types of regions co-exist at some world w.  
Now suppose that in w there is a cube shaped atomic region of space that 
completely overlaps the blue-green simple cube. If P2 is true, then the cube cannot 
maintain its qualitative heterogeneity and occupy this region of space. Spencer and I 
have already made the case for P2; it could only be true if there are contrasting tropes 
that attach to an extended simple or if there are distributional properties instantiated by 
extended simples. Since neither of these options is possible, then there can be no 
heterogeneous simples that occupy atomic extended regions of space. Now, if one 
attempts to move the cube into the extended region of atomic space, then one of two 
things must occur: (1) the cube fails to enter the space, or (2) the cube’s color becomes 
homogenous.  
Each of these options is absurd; there is no barrier or force between the two 
regions of space that could prevent the entry of the cube. Any claim to the contrary 
makes a necessary connection between movement and color properties; either color 
properties necessarily prevent movement into a region or they necessarily change when 
moved into a region. This is a clear Humean violation and unacceptable. In summary, 
                                                        
116 See Spencer 2008, p. 179. This argument hinges on the possibility of extended atomic regions 
of space. If one finds these atomic regions unacceptable, the argument is not sound. However, the 
case against qualitatively heterogeneous extended simples is still quite strong. 
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the possibility of a qualitatively heterogeneous simple occupying a composite region of 
space entails the possibility of a world with extended atomic regions of space. In this 
world, there must be anti-Humean necessities about movement and qualitative 
properties. Therefore, qualitatively heterogeneous simples are impossible. 
 In this chapter, I have surveyed the various answers to the SCQ and argued that 
nihilism is the most promising answer to this question. I have also discussed the Simple 
Question and its proposed answers. I have shown that many answers to the Simple 
Question are problematic for philosophers who endorse composite objects, but that the 
nihilist view is compatible with all answers to the Simple Question. This gives nihilism a 
considerable advantage over universalism. Furthermore, not only is nihilism compatible 
with every answer to the Simple Question, but it also entails that Instance provides the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for simplicity. The nihilist can answer the Simple 
Question without invoking extra claims of necessity or additional ontological 
commitments. For the nihilist, this is an even greater victory over the universalist.  
I have also argued that the most promising accounts of qualitatively 
heterogeneous extended simples are false. Furthermore, with the assumption of the 
possibility of extended atomic regions of space, Spencer’s reductio succeeds. Therefore I 
feel confident in rejecting the possibility of qualitatively heterogeneous extended 
simples. In chapter 3, I will show that this outcome is poses a serious problem for 
endurantists. 
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Chapter 3: Time and Persistence 
This chapter will focus on how objects persist through time. A discussion of persistence 
first requires a discussion of the existential status of the past, the present, and the future. 
I have used the Special Composition Question as a model for stating the two central 
questions that this chapter will aim to answer: 
The Special Temporal Question (STQ):  Under what conditions, if any, do 
past, present, and future times exist? 
 
The Special Persistence Question (SPQ): Under what conditions, if any, do 
objects persist through time? 
 
The STQ inquires about the metaphysical nature of time, while the SPQ inquires about 
how objects exist in time. Like the SCQ from Ch. 2, the STQ and the SPQ have three 
answers: “always”, “sometimes”, and “never”. I will first discuss the STQ and it answers. 
Later in the chapter, I will discuss the SPQ and its answers.  
Eternalism is the “always” answer to the STQ; it claims that all times equally 
exist. There are various sometimeser answers to the STQ: the moving spotlight view, the 
growing block view, and presentism to name a few. Presentism, the most popular 
alternative to eternalism, is the view that only the present instant of time exists. One 
could also be a temporal nihilist, a “never” answer to the STQ. The temporal nihilist 
would claim that no times exist whatsoever.117 Differentiating theories of time can be 
somewhat confusing since theories of time are closely related to theories of tensed 
propositions. Throughout the rest of this section, I will take care to separate the two 
issues from one another. However, it will become apparent that some of the various 
theories of time and tensed propositions are compatible with another, and this 
                                                        
117 McTaggart 1908 argues that time is an illusion. His arguments are widely considered invalid, 
and few if any contemporary philosophers would endorse temporal nihilism. However, many 
eastern religious and spiritual traditions have argued that time is an illusion, so temporal 
nihilism’s lack of current popularity does not justify an immediate rejection of the position. The 
issue bears further investigation, but I will not pursue it here. 
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compatibility makes it easy for one to lose track of whether the discussion is focused on 
answering the STQ or providing an analysis of tensed propositions. 
3.1: A & B Theories of Time and Tensed Propositions 
In his paper, “The Unreality of Time,” McTaggart identifies what he calls the A-series 
and B-series of time.118 The A-series is of a series of events that have temporal properties, 
which McTaggart calls A-properties, such as (where x and y are events): x is past, x is 
present, or x is future. Notice that the truth-value of an A-series proposition depends on 
the time that the proposition is evaluated at. For instance, if the proposition  “the concert 
is past” is evaluated before the concert has happened, then it is false; if the proposition is 
evaluated after the concert, then it is true.  
The B-series consists of a series of temporal relations, which McTaggart calls B-
relations, between times. Some examples of B-relations include: x is earlier than y, x is 
simultaneous with y, or x is later than y. Unlike the propositions of the A-series, the 
truth-value of propositions analyzed with B-relations does not change with respect to 
different times of evaluation. This is because the relations of the B-series have the same 
truth-value at any given time. For example, consider the B-relation Beethoven’s life was 
before Stravinsky’s life; this proposition is true at any time. It was true in 400 B.C.E, it 
was true during the life of Beethoven, it is true now, and will continue to be true in the 
future.119 
Before I further discuss the metaphysics of the A-theory and the B-theory, it will 
be helpful to understand how the A-theory and the B-theory analyze tensed propositions. 
The A-theory of time takes A-properties as primitive; the A-properties ground the B-
relations. Conversely, the B-theory takes B-relations as fundamental; the B-relations 
                                                        
118 ibid. 
119 If one thinks that future events are indeterminate, then one might worry that the proposition in 
question is not true until both Beethoven and Stravinsky have existed. If this were the case, then 
only B-relations that involve determinately existing relata would be true at any time.  
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ground the A-properties. These A-properties and B-relations are supposed to ground the 
semantics of tensed propositions. The main difference between A and B-theories of 
tensed propositions is that, in the words of Zimmerman, A-theorists “take tense 
seriously,” while B-theorists do not.120 The can be illustrated with an example. Consider 
the following sentence: 
(1) “Hungry Tyrannosaurs presently exist.” 
Is (1) true or false? This depends on how tense is incorporated into a proposition. The A-
theorist understands (1) to really be the proposition: 
(2) There presently exists an x such that x is a Tyrannosaurus and x is hungry. 
From the vantage point of the present time, (2) is false since there are no Tyrannosaurs 
at this time, hungry or otherwise. However, if the time of evaluation was during the 
Cretaceous period, then (2) is true since there were Tyrannosaurs that were undoubtedly 
hungry during the Cretaceous. In contrast, a B-theorist analyzes (1) as the following 
proposition:  
(3) At some time t, there exists an x such that x is a Tyrannosaurs and x is hungry. 
If t is a time during the Cretaceous, then (3) is true, no matter when it is evaluated. Since 
speakers do not typically say things like (3) the reference to some time t must either be a 
hidden feature of the semantic content of (1), or it must be placed in the conversational 
context of (1). The B-theorist that embraces this analysis makes the claim that the 
propositions we express with our utterances are all tenseless; tense is simply an illusion 
of our language. This is why the presently from (1) disappears in (3).  
In (3) the B-theorist uses a predicate like is located at t to account for the tense of 
(1) and reduce the tense of (1) to tenseless B-relations. However, since A-theorists take 
tense seriously, they must introduce a temporal operator to account for the “presently” of 
(2); this operator can be represented as Pr. With Pr, (2) can be analyzed as follows: 
                                                        
120 See Zimmerman 2005. 
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(4) Pr (there exists an x such that x is a Tyrannosaurus and x is hungry) 
Not only will A-theorists have to make use of Pr, but they will also have to use the 
operators Pt (past) and F (future) to account for past and future tensed statements. For 
example, the presentist analyzes the claim that “There was a hungry Tyrannosaurus” as 
follows: 
(5) Pt (there exists an x such that x is a Tyrannosaurus and x is hungry) 
Unlike (4), (5) is true even though both (4) and (5) the range over the same content. It is 
important to point out that (5) does not commit one to the existence of Tyrannosaurs; Pt 
restricts the existential claims inside the parentheses. With these temporal operators, 
tensed propositions do not have to reduce to propositions without tense. 
3.1.1: The Privileged Present and Presentism 
In order for tensed propositions to be evaluated, there must be some metaphysically 
privileged present moment. To see why this is the case, it will be helpful create an A-
theory function that evaluates the truth of tensed sentences; call this function TA. This 
function takes a proposition with a temporal operator as input and outputs a truth-value. 
The truth-value is determined by whether or not the tensed proposition refers to existing 
things or events. If TA takes (2) as an input, then the output is that (2) is false because the 
proposition does not match the present moment’s state of affairs. In order for TA to 
output proper truth-values, there must be something special about the present time that 
allows TA to pick it out from all the other times it could use as inputs. Therefore, A-
theory requires the following claim: 
Privileged Present (PP): the present time is somehow metaphysically 
privileged over past and future times.   
 
There are two types of views that accept PP: presentism and hybrid theories. Each of 
these views falls under the “sometimeser” category of answers to the STQ. Presentism is 
	
100 
 
 
the view that only the present time exists, and it is by far the most widely defended.121 
For the presentist, the present moment is privileged because it is the only existing time; 
past and future times simply do not exist. In this way, presentism is analogous to 
actualism, the claim that only the actual world exists. Just like the presentist denies the 
existence of any times other than the present, the actualist denies the existence of any 
possible worlds other than the actual world we inhabit. Both of these views claim that the 
only things that exist are the ones that we are able to perceive.  
There is a strong intuitive pull to the claim that we are justified in believing 
presentism or actualism because of our experience with the world. Presentism and 
actualism are both views about where and when things are located. More specifically, 
they claim that there is only one temporal or modal space; there is only one time and 
only one world. It is natural to extend this view to the other category of location: space. 
What would this sort of view be like? In order to refer to the present time, we use the 
indexicals “now” or “present” to pick out the time. The corresponding spatial indexical is 
“here,” so I will call this view hereism. The hereist claims that there is only one space, the 
space picked out by “here.” It follows that anything that is not “here” does not exist. 
Hereism runs into the immediate problem that very few people believe that spaces 
beyond the one they currently inhabit do not exist. In fact, this belief seems to be a form 
of solipsism, since existence depends on where one is located. Nothing outside of one’s 
current space exists. Whether hereism is a genuinely fruitful theory is beyond the scope 
of this dissertation. However, it is worth noticing that while many people find themselves 
with presentist and actualist intuitions, they do not find themselves with hereism 
intuitions. For the sake of a unifying theory, perhaps the presentist ought to defend 
actualism and hereism. Given the problems with hereism, this would make presentism 
                                                        
121 For defenses of presentism see Prior 1967 and 1968, Bourne 2006, Hinchliff 199, Zimmerman 
1996 and 1998, Markosian 2003, and Sullivan 2012. 
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much more unattractive. In fact, one might argue that since hereism is problematic and 
is also analogous to presentism, then presentism is just as problematic as hereism.  
 However, this argument cuts both ways. Eternalism (discussed below) is the 
claim that all times exists equally. Similarly, call the view that all spaces exist equally, 
everywhereism. Everywhereism is incredibly plausible. Therefore, whatever plausibility 
everywhereism has can transfer to eternalism. Eternalism itself is also a plausible view of 
time. However, the modal correspondent of everywhereism and eternalism is modal 
realism, the claim that all possible worlds exist equally. This claim is typically taken to be 
outrageous and absurd. So just as hereism cuts against the plausibility of actualism and 
presentism, modal realism may cut against the plausibility of everywhereism and 
eternalism. Therefore, without strong reasons to accept modal realism or hereism, both 
families of views have to deal with theoretical asymmetry.122  
While hereism might be used to create problems for the presentist, presentism is 
by no means a fruitless theory. It has the advantage of both qualitative and quantitative 
parsimony. However, presentism must also account for the truth of propositions 
concerning the past or the future. Prima facie, this is a problem for presentism; how can 
a proposition concerning the past be true if there is no past at all? This is the Truthmaker 
argument against presentism. In short, it is as follows: 
P1. Suppose presentism is true. 
P2. The truth of a proposition is grounded in the concrete world. 
P3. There are true propositions about the past. 
P4. If presentism is true, then past times do not exist. 
P5. If past times do not exist, then propositions about the past have no truth-
value. 
C.   Therefore, presentism is false.  
 
                                                        
122 Although I do not have the space to devote to it here, one might argue that the reasons given in 
support of presentism translate to reasons to support hereism (or reasons for eternalism support 
modal realism). If hereism (or modal realism) is absurd and the reasoning for it is similar to the 
reasoning for presentism (or eternalism), then the case for presentism (or eternalism) is 
undermined. 
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The standard presentist response is to deny P2 and simply claim that the truth-value 
about past and future propositions is primitive. While this answer provides an answer to 
the initial objection, it also incurs a large theoretical cost for presentism. This cost makes 
presentism an unattractive answer to the STQ. This is only one of the reasons that I 
reject presentism. Of course, the truthmaker argument and the various responses to it 
are more much complicated than my brief presentation. However, it is outside the scope 
of this project to provide an in-depth analysis of the objection and presentism in 
general.123 Therefore, I will simply assume that presentism is false for the remainder of 
this project. 
3.1.1: Hybrid Theories of Time 
The moving spotlight theory and the growing block theory are both hybrid theories of 
time. Hybrid theories of time accept PP, but deny presentism. In other words, they 
believe that the present is special, but that at least some other times exist beside the 
present time. I reject both of these views. In what follows, I will briefly discuss each of 
these views and provide some brief arguments against them. 
The moving spotlight view claims that all things and times eternally exist, but 
that the present is still somehow privileged over the past and the future. C.D Broad 
explains this view by likening the present moment to a moving spotlight (hence the 
name).124 Time is like dark yard that contains a spotlight. The spotlight momentarily 
illuminates certain regions of the yard in the same way that the present “illuminates” a 
region of the spacetime manifold. When the spotlight illuminates an object in the yard, a 
doghouse for instance, the doghouse is visible; with regards to visibility, the doghouse is 
privileged over the other things in the yard. Analogously, when a time is present, it 
becomes privileged over the other times of the manifold. 
                                                        
123 See Sider 2001, pp. 35-42 for an extensive overview of the Truthmaker arguments and 
responses to it. 
124 See Broad 1923, p. 59. Broad does not defend this view, but Smith 1993 does. Recently, 
Cameron 2015 has also defended this view. 
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 Broad argues that while this explanation by analogy may seem successful, it in 
fact offers no explanation of how exactly the present moment is privileged over other 
times. While Broad discusses several objections, the main problem with the moving 
spotlight theory is that it can only offer an explanation of what makes the present 
privileged by offering the aforementioned analogy or by taking the spotlight as a 
primitive feature of the theory. Any theory that can only explain itself only through 
analogies is suspect. However, the moving spotlight analogy is not even a successful 
analogy. As Broad notes, the moving spotlight in the analogy is an event that unfolds 
over time. The claim that the present moment sweeps over the spatiotemporal manifold 
is also an event. Broad believes this to be a paradox because “to talk of events changing 
seems almost unintelligible.”125 The moving spotlight theorist has two options: (1) they 
could bite the bullet and take the privileged present moment as a primitive, or (2) they 
could posit some sort of hypertime, a time that contains another time. This hypertime is 
where the event that is responsible for the privileged present resides. However, this leads 
to a vicious regress. If the present time of our spatiotemporal manifold is explained by an 
event in hypertime, then there must be a present moment in hypertime that allows for 
events to occur in hypertime. This means that there must be some further time, hyper-
hypertime that allows for the privileged present moment of hypertime, and so on. The 
moving spotlight theorists must pay a high ontological price for their choice of either a 
primitive privileged present or hypertime regression. Therefore, I reject the moving 
spotlight theory on the grounds that it is too costly. 
The growing block view claims that the world is a constantly growing 
spatiotemporal hunk made up of all past times and the present time.126 As each moment 
                                                        
125 ibid. p. 62 
126 This view is defended in Broad 1923, Ch.2, Tooley 1997, and Diekemper 2007. In Barnes and 
Cameron 2009, they defend a similar view, the “growing cloud of determinacy.” Unlike growing 
block theory, Barnes and Cameron argue that all future times and objects exist, but that it is 
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passes, the hunk becomes larger, or grows, as the present time t comes into existence. 
For the growing block theorist, the present is metaphysically privileged because it is the 
edge of the growing block; it is the place where times come into existence. There are 
many objections to the growing block theory of time. Instead of providing a 
comprehensive overview, I will briefly discuss an objection put forward by Trenton 
Merricks in his “Goodbye Growing Block.”127 Suppose that the Emperor Nero believes “I 
am presently at the Coliseum,” at some time t during his life. According to the growing 
block theorist, if t is the present moment, then Nero’s belief is true. If t is in the past, 
then Nero’s belief is false. However, Nero’s phenomenological experience of believing “I 
am presently in the Coliseum” is the same whether t is in the present or the past. Nero’s 
experience has nothing to do with whether his belief is true. This means any belief 
concerning the present moment has a high probability of being false. 
The growing block theorist could reply that Nero’s belief does not refer to the 
privileged present moment (the spotlight or growing block edge). Instead, his use of 
“presently” functions like and indexical. For example, the “here” of “I am here” is 
subjective and its reference is fixed by the context of its utterance, in this case, the time 
of utterance. Furthermore, it is a statement that can never be false.  Nero’s use of 
“presently” functions similarly to “here” and allows Nero’s belief to be true even if he is 
no longer present.  
However, Merricks argues that this response to his objection undermines the 
motivating factors for the growing block. The growing block theory is one that aims to 
capture our sense that the past is fixed while the future is open. For example, suppose 
that while Nero is at the Coliseum he comes believes that “It is presently indeterminate 
whether I will die tomorrow.” If Nero believes this at the objective present moment, then 
                                                                                                                                                                     
indeterminate which ones will exist when the present moment reaches them. In other words, the 
present moment narrows the pool of indeterminate objects to the determinate ones. 
127 Merricks 2006, pp. 2-7 
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his belief is true; his indexical use of the “presently” aligns with the edge of the growing 
block. However, once the objective present has moved past Nero, his belief is now false 
because the time “tomorrow” is no longer indeterminate. Just as before, Nero’s 
experience of believing the future to be indeterminate does not change, even though the 
truth-value of his belief does. Therefore, our beliefs about the indeterminate future, the 
beliefs that motivated the growing block theory in the first place, are almost all false. 
Therefore, the growing block theory should be rejected.  
3.1.2: The New B-Theory 
B-theorists usually reject Privileged Present. Their rejection of PP is almost always taken 
to imply eternalism, the view that all objects and times exist in the same manner. 
Eternalism is the “always” answer to the STQ. Eternalists not only claim that all times 
can be quantified over with the existential quantifier, but that all objects can as well. 
Both statements like (1) and “Brian is listening to music” are propositions with 
unrestricted existential quantification. Since the B-theorist rejects the existence of a 
privileged present, they also typically analyze tensed propositions as tenseless 
propositions in disguise (recall the Nero example above). While both A-theory and B-
theory naturally lend themselves to taking a stance on PP, this is not always the case. In 
what follows, I will show that the semantic claims of A-theory and B-theory do not entail 
taking a particular stance on PP.  
I will begin by describing what Zimmerman calls the “new B-theory” of time.128 
Recall that I have emphasized distinguishing between A and B-theories of time and how 
a theory analyses tensed propositions. Zimmerman does not make such a distinction. His 
use of “B-theory” combines a theory of time with a theory of tensed proposition analysis. 
For Zimmerman, the old B-theory is the conjunction of eternalism and the view that 
propositions are tenseless. The new B-theory is the conjunction of eternalism with the 
                                                        
128 Zimmerman 2005 
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view that propositions about tense cannot be reduced to tenseless propositions. At first, 
this seems counterintuitive; one might even make the argument that the new B-theory is 
inconsistent. One might think that if a proposition is irreducibly tensed, then the tensed 
aspect of the proposition must involve the privileged present, otherwise it would not be 
irreducibly tensed. However, eternalism denies the existence of the privileged present, so 
the new B-theory is false. 
The new B-theorist has two options to reconcile tensed propositions with 
eternalism. The first option is to analyze tensed propositions with a two-dimensional 
semantics theory. Like the old B-theorists, this involves taking the content of tensed 
propositions to be tenseless propositions. Unlike the old B-theorists, the new B-theorist 
does not take these tenseless propositions to be sufficient for capturing all of a tensed 
proposition’s semantic features. Even though the content of a B-theory proposition can 
secure the truth-value of the proposition, new B-theorists believe that tenseless 
propositions do not capture all of the semantic content of tensed propositions. New B-
theorists think that tense matters, but that is should be accounted for through an 
analysis of semantics. Zimmerman suggests several different two-dimensional semantic 
theories that capture the semantics of tense. Kaplan’s characters (Kaplan 1989, Perry’s 
belief-states (Perry 1979), and Stalnaker’s diagonal propositions (Stalnaker 1981) are all 
possible ways one that could analyze tensed propositions.  
It will be easiest to explain these ideas by showing how they each solve the 
problem of Perry’s messy shopper.129 Suppose I am at the store and I notice that 
someone has trailed sugar throughout the store. I think to myself, “Someone is the messy 
shopper.” At some point, I look down and realize that my bag of sugar has a hole in it, 
and sugar had streamed out while I walked around the store. Now, I think, “I am the 
messy shopper.” Both the thoughts “Someone is the messy shopper” and “I am the messy 
                                                        
129 See Perry 1979 
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shopper” are logically equivalent to ‘Brian is the messy shopper’ because they have the 
same extension. However, they cannot mean the same thing since I discover something 
new when I realize that I am the messy shopper.  
 For Kaplan, the meaning (what he calls character) of the indexical “I” is 
determined by the context of its occurrence. Once I look down at my cart, the new 
context changes the content of my thought, even though the thought still expresses the 
same proposition. On Perry’s account, when I realize that I am the messy shopper, I 
enter into a different belief state. When I thought someone was the messy shopper, I 
believed the proposition ‘Brian is the messy shopper’, even though my belief-state did 
not self-attribute that proposition to me. Once I look at my cart, my belief-state changes 
and I can self-attribute the proposition which will cause me to act differently (I might fix 
the hole in the bag). I now believe both that ‘Brian is the messy shopper’ and that ‘I am 
the messy shopper’. Finally, Stalnaker uses diagonal propositions to show the difference 
between the two thoughts. Stalnaker argues that when I think, “Someone is a messy 
shopper,” my thought could refer to the messy shopper (Brian) in the actual world (since 
names rigidly refer) or refer to whoever plays the Brian role in a possible world. When I 
learn that I am the messy shopper, I eliminate all the possible worlds where someone 
besides me is the messy shopper.  
While I don’t have time to provide a full account of how each of these approaches 
can be used to capture meaningful tensed langauge, I will quickly sketch out each 
position. Suppose the tensed sentence “It is raining now” expresses the proposition ‘It is 
raining on October 27, 1999’. Using Kaplan’s character, the tensed features of the 
sentence are part of the character of the sentence, which is determined by the context of 
the utterance. Using Perry’s belief-states, the tensed features of the sentence are 
explained by our belief-state toward the proposition; one is likely to get an umbrella or 
not go outdoors. And using Stalnaker’s diagonal propositions, the tensed features of the 
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sentence are explained by the worlds where it is raining at whatever plays the “now” role. 
The soft tense approach, analyzes tensed sentences as having two semantic aspects: an 
eternal proposition and a mode of presentation. This mode of presentation captures the 
tensed aspect of an utterance.  
However, one might worry that this two-dimensional approach does not yield 
irreducibly tensed propositions since the content of propositions is still an eternal 
proposition. The two-dimensional semantics makes tense out to be merely an extra 
feature of the proposition, like garnish on a dinner. In response to this, Lewis and Mellor 
propose that if one truly takes tense seriously, then the best way to capture tensed 
features of propositions is show that tense is an irreducibly perspectival feature of 
people’s utterances.130  
In “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se,” Lewis argues that in addition to de dicto and 
de re types of propositional attitudes, there is a third type of propositional attitude: the 
de se. De se attitudes towards propositions are ones of self-attribution, and de se 
attitudes can be used to explain the irreducibility of tensed sentences to eternal 
propositions. What does it mean to self-attribute? Lewis gives the following example: 
Consider the case of the two gods. They inhabit a certain possible world, and they 
know exactly which world it is. Therefore they know every proposition that is true 
at their world… Still I can imagine them to suffer ignorance: neither one knows 
which of the two he is. They are not exactly alike. One lives on top of the tallest 
mountain and throws down manna; the other lives on top of the coldest 
mountain and throws down thunderbolts. Neither one knows whether he lives on 
the tallest mountain or on the coldest mountain; nor whether he throw manna or 
thunderbolts.131 
 
Call the thunderbolt-throwing god Zeus and the manna-throwing god Thor. Zeus knows 
that Thor throws manna and that Zeus throws thunderbolts because Zeus knows all of 
the de dicto propositions that are true at his world. How, then, is it possible that Zeus 
                                                        
130 See Lewis 1979, 146–8 and Mellor 1998, 58–69. 
131 Lewis 1979, pp. 520-1  
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does not know whether he is Zeus or Thor? Suppose that Zeus and Thor both have the 
same perspective of their world, namely the perspective of perceiving all perspectives at 
once. If this is the case, then Zeus can perceive everything from his own perspective as 
well as everything from Thor’s perspective. Since these perspectives are equal, Zeus has 
no way to distinguish which one is his. Zeus needs a way to self-attribute the property 
‘thunder-bolt thrower’ to himself; Zeus needs to obtain the knowledge that he is the 
thunderbolt thrower. In other words, he needs to have a de se knowledge attitude 
towards the proposition ‘Zeus is the thunderbolt thrower.’132 
  The new B-theorist can use the de se attitude to analyze perspective. Tense is a de 
se attitude towards an eternal proposition. For instance, if I believe that “I am alive 
now,” then I have a de se attitude towards the tenseless proposition ‘Brian is alive on 
August 3, 2016’. This eternal proposition allows for the following truth condition: 
“I am alive now” is true iff ‘Brian is alive on August 3, 2016’ is true 
Just as in the case of the Gods, knowing the proposition ‘Brian is alive on August 3, 2016’ 
does not ensure that I believe “I am alive now.” Suppose that I have been given a drug 
that induces a very specific amnesia. While I remember that it is true that Brian is alive 
on August 3, 2016, I do not remember that I am Brian. It is still the case that my belief “I 
am alive now” is true because ‘Brian is alive on August 3, 2016’ is true.  However, the 
drug prevents me from self-attributing the proposition ‘Brian is alive on August 3, 2015’. 
                                                        
132 In Lewis 1978, pp. 514-16, he offers a more technical distinction between the de dicto and de se 
that involves how he understands propositions and properties. Lewis analyzes propositions and 
properties in terms of possible worlds. Propositions are sets of worlds, while properties are sets of 
individuals that have a property in a set of worlds. For example, “Water freezes at 32°F,” 
expresses a proposition that is equivalent to the set of possible worlds where water freezes at 
32°F. In contrast, “The ball is red” attributes to the ball membership in the set of all possible red 
things. Lewis is interested in how propositions and properties function as objects of intentional 
attitudes. Suppose that one believes the proposition ‘Water freezes at 32°F’. Lewis analyzes this as 
self-ascribing the property of being located in a world that is a member of the set of worlds where 
water freezes at 32°F. Since this belief is a self-locating belief, then propositions reduce to 
properties; in Lewis’s words “the de se subsumes the de dicto.” (p. 521) 
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I have de dicto knowledge about my location in time, but not de se knowledge of my 
location. It is de se knowledge that gives me my temporal perspective on the world. 
Therefore, if new B-theorists do not wish to embrace tense as a semantic feature of 
language, then they can understand tense to be part of the larger phenomena of the de se 
attitude.  
Before I conclude the section, there is one more potential combination of theories 
of tensed propositions and the metaphysics of time. Call this the new A-theory, a view 
that accepts Tenseless Propositions and PP. This view would accept some sort of 
metaphysically privileged present moment while maintaining that the fundamental 
semantic locutions are tenseless propositions. What would this view look like? Since our 
fundamental semantic locutions are tenseless, and this requires the existence of times, 
then the new A-theory requires a four-dimensional block universe. Like the standard B-
theory, all tensed propositions are tenseless propositions in disguise and they have the 
form x is F at t. Unlike the standard B-theory, the new A-theory accepts PP, the claim 
that there is a metaphysically privileged present moment. However, this privileged 
present moment is incompatible with tenseless propositions since these tenseless truth 
conditions cannot capture a metaphysically privileged moment. If one treats the present 
as a property of times, then the tenseless propositions attributing the present property to 
times would be ‘t is present’. However, since all times either are present, have been 
present, or will be present, then every time would have the property ‘is present. 
Therefore, there is no privileged present moment and the new-A theory is false.   
In this section I have discussed several views that endorse PP: the moving 
spotlight, the growing block, and presentism. I have also discussed three plausible 
combinations of semantic theories: A-theory, standard B-theory, and new B-theory. 
Given my eternalist commitments, I reject any metaphysics of time that embraces PP, 
and because of this I must reject A-theory as well. For the purposes of my project, 
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nothing rides on whether one is a B-theorist or new B-theorist. In interest of time, I will 
put the issue aside for the remainder of the project. 
3.2: Theories of Objects in Time 
Typically, when one is discussing the relationship between material objects and time, 
“persistence” is the preferred term of art.  For instance, Lewis says that “an object 
persists iff, somehow or other, it exists at various times.”133  I find this analysis a 
problematic characterization of persistence. First, it seems to rule out any presentist 
understanding of persistence.134 Lewis claims that things persist only if they exist at 
various times. However, presentists explicitly deny this; for presentists, things only exist 
at one time: the present. If there is only one time, then it is impossible for things to exist 
at various times. Therefore, Lewis’s analysis of persistence automatically disqualifies 
presentism from being a theory of objects in time, and this can be captured in the 
following argument: 
P1. Persistence occurs.  
P2. Objects persist by existing at multiple times. 
P3. Presentism is incompatible with persistence. 
C.    Therefore, presentism is false. 
 
However, rather than taking the impossibility of presentist persistence as evidence 
against presentism, the presentist could reject P2 and be an error-theorist about 
persistence and simply insist that all talk of persistence is false. The presentist could also 
offer an alternative analysis of the semantics of persistence. For the presentist, the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for persistence do not have anything to do with 
existing past or future objects. Instead, the necessary and sufficient conditions are 
temporally restricted quantified statements. This analysis might look like the following, 
where P is the primitive predicate ‘is present’: 
                                                        
133 Lewis 1986, p.202 
134 It should be noted that presentism is a theory of time while a presentist theory of persistence is 
a theory of objects in time. 
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Presentist Persistence: An object x persists iff ∃(x) P(x) ^ (Pt(∃(x) P(x)) v 
F(∃(x) P(x))) 
 
This analysis seems to at least capture the spirit of Lewis’s claim in that persistence is 
explained by existential quantification, even if the tense operators restrict existential 
quantification. If presentist persistence is an acceptable account of persistence, then P2 
is false the above argument fails. 
Second, even if it could be shown that presentist persistence is inadequate, the 
Lewis inspired P2 is still suspect because it characterizes persistence with temporal 
concepts. I have previously discussed the difference between the General Composition 
Question and the Special Composition Question. As I have previously argued, one can 
ask parallel questions about persistence: the General Persistence Question and the 
Special Persistence Question. Lewis’s analysis of persistence seems to be aimed at 
answering the General Persistence Question. Recall that as far as composition is 
concerned, there are no non-trivial answers to the GCQ, since any answer will make use 
of mereological concepts. Similarly, if the general question about how objects exist in 
time is framed in terms of persistence, then Lewis’s answer is a trivial one, since it makes 
use of temporal concepts.  
Instead of using the GPQ as the jumping off point for investigating objects in 
time, one could take persistence as primitive and instead ask the Special Persistence 
Question (Under what conditions do objects persist, if any?). However, as I argued in 
Ch.1, persistence does not have to be taken as a primitive since it can be explained by 
mereology. The problem of persistence, then, can be framed as the Special Temporal 
Composition Question: 
Special Temporal Composition Question: Under what conditions, if any, 
does diachronic composition occur?  
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Recall that the Special Composition Question has three general answers: always, 
sometimes, and never. Analogously, the Special Temporal Composition Question has the 
same three general answers and these answers are closely linked to the answers to the 
SCQ. Before I discuss these answers, it will be helpful to briefly discuss what it means for 
an object to be a temporal composite.  
Sider presents a rigorous definition of temporal parts in his Four 
Dimensionalism.135  Sider offers two definitions of temporal parts. The first definition is 
neutral between endurantism and perdurantism (more on this in a moment): 
Temporal Part: x is an instantaneous temporal part of y at instant t =df (1) x 
exists at, but only at, t; (2) x is part of y at t; and (3) x overlaps at t everything 
that is part of y at t. 
 
As a perdurantist, Sider prefers the following definition: 
Temporal Part*:  x is an instantaneous temporal part of y at instant t =df (1) x 
exists at, but only at, t, (2) x is a part of y; and (3) x overlaps every part of y that 
exists at t.136 
 
The conditions of TP and TP* are quite similar with the exception of TP*’s condition (2). 
Sider prefers parthood to be atemporal. An endurantist might find TP* objectionable 
since it follows that x being a part of y is true at any time. The endurantist could argue 
that they do not understand what it means for something to be an atemporal part of 
another thing. However, the endurantist can grant that things have parts at a given time; 
for the endurantist, this is just a more complicated way to talk about spatial parts. 
 For the standard perdurantists, temporal parts and mereological sums answer 
any metaphysical questions about objects in time and persistence. However, there is a 
                                                        
135 Mark Heller also gives an good analysis of temporal parts, however I prefer Sider’s. Heller’s 
analysis is as follows: It is now easy to understand the notion of a temporal part. Any proper part 
of a four-dimensional object is smaller than the whole object along at least one dimension. A 
proper temporal part is smaller along just one dimension, the temporal dimension. A temporal 
part of O is a spatiotemporal part of O that is the same spatial size as O for as long as that part 
exists, though it may be a smaller temporal size.” (1990, p. 11) 
136 ibid. 56 
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semantic question about the referents of our terms that involve objects in time. The first 
view is the worm theory. The worm theorist believes that our terms refer to an object’s 
mereological sum; these mereological sums are sometimes called “spacetime worms” in 
that they stretch out over time just like earthworms stretch out over space (hence “worm 
theory”). For instance, if one says, “My guitar’s strings need changing,” the phrase “my 
guitar” refers to the mereological sum of my guitar’s temporal parts, or the spacetime 
worm that is my guitar.  
The second view is Sider’s stage theory. Stage theory is the temporal analogue of 
Lewis’s counterpart theory.137 Counterpart theory analyzes modal claims with a primitive 
relation of similarity. It is true that I could have been President because there is a 
possible world where there exists someone who is President and is also sufficiently 
similar to me. Similarly, Sider claims that the proper referents of our everyday terms are 
not spacetime mereological sums, but the instantaneous stages that are parts of these 
sums (in other words, temporal parts). Stage theory claims that the referent of “my 
guitar” is the guitar-shaped object that exists at the instantaneous time of the utterance.  
 Both the worm theorist and the stage theorist have the same ontology. However, 
Sider adopts stage theory because he believes that stage theory provides a better solution 
to the paradoxes of coincidence than the worm theory. Paradoxes of coincidence are 
cases of problematic co-located objects. For example, consider the case of a woman who 
undergoes fission.  Suppose that Susannah undergoes fission at some time t, and splits 
into two people, Susan and Sue. If it is assumed that psychological continuity is the 
criterion for personal identity, then it follows that Susan and Sue are identical: 
P1. Susannah is identical to Sue. 
P2. Susannah is identical to Susan. 
C.  By transitivity, Sue is identical to Susan. 
                                                        
137 See Lewis 1986 
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Denying P1 or P2 requires rejecting psychological continuity as the criterion for survival. 
Denying the conclusion entails that Susannah perishes during fission, or that Susannah 
is identical to only one of Susan or Sue (or that identity is not transitive). The 
psychological continuity view is incredibly plausible, and many philosophers do not wish 
to relinquish it. Both worm theory and stage theory provide a means of dissolving the 
paradox. 
Since the worm theorist believes that our terms refer to mereological sums, 
‘Susannah’ refers to the mereological fusion of Susannah’s temporal parts. The worm 
theorist claims that Susan and Sue have existed all along as overlapping mereological 
sums. Beliefs that Susannah was a single individual before fission are simply mistaken. 
Worm theorists liken it to the case of overlapping roads. Suppose that Kim has never 
traveled out of her town and she believes that Main Street is one road. However, 
unbeknownst to her, “Main Street” is an overlapping segment of two roads that merge 
together as they enter the city limits and the roads diverge as they leave. Similarly, if one 
believes that Susannah is a single person, then one is making Kim’s mistake. In both Kim 
and Susannah’s cases, the referent of ‘Kim’ and ‘Susannah’, respectively, is either vague 
in that it does not specify which of the worms one is referring to, or the referent refers to 
the “supervaluation” of both of the worms.138  For the worm theorist, then, both P1 and 
P2 are false and the paradox dissolves. 
Sider argues that the worm theory goes against both the pre-philosophical 
intuition that Susannah is one person and the philosophical intuition that counting is 
done by identity.139 Sider dissolves the Susannah paradox of coincidence by claiming 
anytime the term “Susannah” is used, it refers to the Susannah stage at the moment of 
                                                        
138 See Lewis 1993 for more on supervaluation. 
139 Briefly, Sider argues Kim counts only one road segment in above example. Since the road 
segment is identical to itself and counting is done by identity, Kim counts only one road segment. 
Therefore, she refers to the one road segment when she thinks “Main Street”, not the two 
momentarily overlapping roads. Similarly, one refers to one Susannah stage since that stage is 
identical to itself. 
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use. This stage is not identical to any other stage except itself. Therefore, “Susannah” 
refers to only one thing at a given time, and the above intuitions are preserved. Since 
Susannah, Sue and Susan only refer to instantaneous stages, then the identity relation 
cannot hold between them. Instead, “Susannah will survive as Sue,” is analyzed as the 
claim that Susannah holds a temporal counterpart relation (primitive similarity) to Sue 
without being identical to Sue. It also follows that Susannah holds a temporal 
counterpart relation to Susan without being identical to Susan.140 Sider believes that 
since stage theory dissolves the paradox in a satisfactory manner and preserves 
important pre-philosophical and philosophical intuitions, stage theory is preferable to 
worm theory. 
3.2.1: Perdurantism 
With the explanation of temporal parts complete, I will return to discussing the answers 
to the STCQ. If temporal composition always occurs, then any mereological sum of 
temporal objects will count as further spatiotemporal object. Call this answer strong 
perdurantism: 
Strong Perdurantism: any conditions are necessary and sufficient for 
temporal composition to occur. 
 
Strong perdurantists’ ontologies accounts for all of the ordinary objects that we 
typically believe to persist: pianos, trees, dogs, and so on. It also contains many 
instantaneous temporal objects, such as Brian-at-t1, where t1 is a plane of the four 
dimensional manifold and Brian is a spatiotemporal object located at a subregion of 
t1. Since any conditions are necessary and sufficient for temporal composition, a 
strong perdurantist ontology entails that any four-dimensional mereological sum is 
                                                        
140 Sider bases the idea of temporal counterparts off of Lewis’s modal counterparts. The 
counterpart relation is a relation of similarity that underwrites our modal claim. For instance, it is 
true that I could have been a paleontologist because there exists a possible world where someone 
very similar to me is a paleontologist. On Sider’s view, the counterpart relation is a relation of 
continuity, where continuity is analyzed in terms of physical or psychological causation. 
Therefore, it is true that I was a teenager because I have a temporal counterpart that is a teenager. 
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an object. These sums are similar to the universalist’s bizarre objects (recall the the-
moon-plus-my-appendix object). Some examples of bizarre temporal objects include 
the following:  the object that is the life of Julius-Caesar+the object that is the life of 
Brian-Carlson, and the fusion of all object in the Neolithic period+this morning’s 
breakfast burrito during its 30 seconds in the microwave.  
Before moving on, it is worth exploring whether or not a presentist could accept 
Strong Perdurantism and therefore temporal parts. Each object in the presentist’s 
ontology has no extension in the temporal dimension; they are temporally simple. 
Therefore, presentist objects are objects that have extended spatial parts, but only one, 
simple temporal part. While one can properly call this a temporal part, it does not do any 
theoretical work and hardly seems grounds for attributing perdurance to the presentist.  
However, in Ch.3 of Four Dimensionalism, Sider argues that perdurantism is 
compatible not only with eternalism, but also with presentism. 141  This may seem 
counterintuitive since the presentist only accepts things that presently exist; this 
precludes the existence of past or future temporal parts. Sider argues that the presentist 
can use their tense operators to talk about temporal parts: 
x is an instantaneous temporal part of y =df (1) x is part of y; (2) x overlaps 
every part of y; (3) it is not the case that WILL (x exists); (4) it is not the case 
that WAS (x exists)142 
 
The temporal operators used in the definition above ensure that talk of existing past or 
future temporal parts is not ontologically committing, since any such claims will be false. 
The presentist can still talk about these past or future parts in the same way that they 
talk about any past or future objects. Given the above definition of instantaneous 
temporal part, Sider formulates Presentist Perdurance as follows: 
                                                        
141 Sider 2001, pp. 71-3. 
142 Sider 2001, p. 71 
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Presentist Perdurance: Necessarily, ALWAYS(every object has a temporal 
part)143 
Above, I said that calling presentism a perdurance theory because it entails presently 
existing temporal parts is a mistake since these temporal parts do no work. However, if a 
presentist adopted Presentist Perdurance, then the entailed presently existing temporal 
part, as well as the facts about past and future temporal parts, would do theoretical work. 
Perhaps this sort of view could use temporal parts in a theoretically robust manner. 
However, I believe this is incorrect. First, presentist perdurance is overly 
complicated. Presentism can already solve many of the problems that eternalist 
perdurance can without temporal parts. The presentist need not say that a candle 
changes from lit to unlit because (1) there exists a temporal part that overlaps an unlit 
candle, and (2) WAS(there exists a temporal part that overlaps a lit candle). For the 
presentist, treating the problem of change with present and past candles is much 
simpler; talk of temporal parts is not required. 
Second, it makes no sense to talk of temporal composition in a world that only 
has one instant of time. All composition in a presentist world can be explained by 
appealing to spatial composition. Since I analyze persistence through temporal 
composition and no temporal composition occurs, presentism has no use for temporal 
parts. Furthermore, in what follows, I will argue that the best analysis of endurantism 
uses the concept of temporal simplicity as the criterion for endurance. Recall the 
discussion of the various answers to the Simple Question in Ch.2. Given the framework I 
have provided, there is an analogue to the Simple Question, the Temporal Simple 
Question: under what conditions, if any, are objects temporally simple? That is, under 
what conditions do objects have no temporal parts? The pointy view claimed that an 
object is simple iff it is a point-sized object. Analogously, an object is temporally simple if 
                                                        
143 ibid.  
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it occupies a temporal point. Since the pointy view is at least sufficient for an object 
being simple, it follows that what Sider calls “instantaneous temporal parts” are in fact 
temporal simples. It follows that these instantaneous temporal parts are enduring 
entities since they are wholly present at each moment they exist. This is clearly 
incompatible with perdurantism. Therefore, because of its theory of time, presentists 
cannot be perdurantists. 
 Moving on, the next general type of answer to the STCQ is that of the 
sometimesers. Sometimesers find the bizarre persisting objects of the strong 
perdurantist unacceptable. I will label sometimeser answers to the STCQ as weak 
perdurantist answers since they still make use of temporal parts. Like sometimesers 
about composition, weak perdurantist answers can vary with respect to the conditions 
placed on temporal composition. For example, a weak perdurantist could claim that 
temporal composition is supported by causation:  
Weak Causal Perdurantism: diachronic composition occurs iff certain causal 
relations obtain between an object x at t1 and an object y at t2. 
 
These causal conditions would (presumably) disqualify the bizarre persisting objects 
mentioned above, since there is no causal link of the right sort between the fusion of the 
objects of the Neolithic period and the breakfast burrito.144 The weak perdurantist, then, 
accounts for persistence through spatiotemporal composition. For my purposes, strong 
and weak perdurantism are both plausible views. Nothing that I say in the rest of the 
dissertation will turn on accepting one or the other. For the remainder of this 
dissertation, then, I will refer to the combination of eternalism and perdurance as 
standard perdurantism.145  
 
 
                                                        
144 One could perhaps appeal to classes, sortals, or essences as well. 
145 This is in order to avoid confusion with the positive view that I will propose later. 
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3.2.2: Endurantism 
The final “never” answer is known as endurantism.  Before I discuss how the “never” 
answer clearly explains endurance, I will discuss some attempts at defining endurance. 
In the literature, many have struggled to provide a clear statement of endurantism. One 
could attempt to define it as the conjunction of the theory of eternalism with the denial 
of standard perdurantism. However, this definition provides no insight into the positive 
claims that endurantism represents. Many philosophers simply appeal to an intuitive 
definition: 
Intuitive Endurantism =def the view that an object persists by being wholly 
present at each moment that it exists.  
 
Prima facie, this looks like an outright contradiction. This can be shown with the 
following argument: 
P1. Suppose some object a is wholly present at t1 and t2. 
P2. If a is wholly present at t1, then a is not wholly present at t2. 
P3. Since a is wholly present at t1, it follows that a is not wholly present at t2 
C.   Therefore, a is not wholly present at t1 and t2. 
 
This above argument is too quick, since it hinges on the truth of P2, and it seems that P2 
begs the question against the endurantist. However, an analogous version of P2 can be 
supported by appealing to a similar argument about object’s location in spatial 
dimensions. Someone who defended a spatial analogue of endurantism would claim that 
objects are wholly located at each spatial region in which they exist. Consider some 
object aʹ that fills two non-overlapping spatial regions r1 and r2.   
P1ʹ. Suppose some object aʹ is wholly present at r1 and r2. 
P2ʹ. If aʹ is wholly located at r1, then aʹ is not wholly located at r2. 
P3ʹ. Since aʹ is wholly located at r1, it follows that aʹ is not wholly located at r2. 
Cʹ.   Therefore, aʹ is not wholly located at r1 and r2. 
 
P1ʹ supposes that spatially bi-located objects are possible. Furthermore, it supposes that 
the entirety of the object is located in both regions, not just parts of the object. This 
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seems impossible. Our experience with material objects does not provide evidence for 
the objects supposed by P1ʹ. Instead, our experience of the world supports P2ʹ. Some 
may believe that there are bi-located objects (such as a disassembled computer), but 
nobody would claim that the computer is wholly present at each region of space occupied 
by one of its parts. Thus, if endurantists commit to P2ʹ, then they must provide an 
account of their rejection of the analogous P2 that does not undermine their 
commitment to P2ʹ. The problem is further exacerbated by the fact that eternalists 
typically use ‘location’ to refer not just to spatial location, but temporal location as well.  
Endurantists might attempt to appeal to other uses of “wholly present” found in 
other areas of philosophy. For example, universals are supposed to be wholly present 
wherever they exist.146 For example, a green ball and a blade of green grass that are the 
same both instantiate the same universal. The green universal is “wholly present” in both 
the ball and the blade of grass. Regardless of what one thinks about universals, this use 
of “wholly present” will not help the endurantist. Defenders of universals use “wholly 
present” to indicate that objects are all instantiating or participating in the same 
universal entity. Enduring objects are not universal entities; they are finite concrete 
objects with multitudes of differing qualities.   
However, Hawthorne presents a bundle theory of universals that may provide 
endurantists with a solution.147 One of the consequences of his theory is that it is 
compatible with the existence of spatially distinct objects that instantiate the same 
qualities.148 If Hawthorne’s arguments can be applied to time as well as space, then both 
P2 and P2ʹ can be resisted. Consider two distinct red balls that instantiate an identical 
shade of red. Hawthorne claims that the balls have identical shades because they both 
                                                        
146 I am discussing universals as defended by Armstrong (see Armstrong 1989), not the universals 
of Plato (although these may coincide depending on one’s reading of Plato). 
147 See Hawthorne 1995 
148 Hawthorne uses this theory to respond to the problem of the indiscernible but distinct iron 
spheres discussed by Black in Black 1952 
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instantiate the same universal. In other words, the universal is wholly located in each 
ball at the same time. Therefore, the universal Redness is a counterexample to P2ʹ.  
Hawthorne further claims that objects are nothing more than bundles of 
universals (objects do not have “thin particulars” as discussed in 2.6). Since objects are 
just bundles of universals, it follows that objects can be wholly located in non-
overlapping regions of space at the same time. To illustrate this, Hawthorne uses an 
example of two water droplets that instantiate the exact same universals.149 In this case, 
while we normally count these as two objects, the bundle theory of universals tells us 
that they are, strictly speaking, one object that is wholly located at two non-overlapping 
spatial regions.  
Endurantists could attempt to use Hawthorne’s bundle theory of universals to 
explain how it is that objects can be wholly present at each time they exist. Suppose that 
a water droplet persists from t1 to t2. Given the endurantists’ commitment to eternalism, 
the water droplet has a certain spacetime location at t1 and a different spacetime location 
t2. So, just as in Hawthorne’s example, the only difference between the droplet at t1 and 
the droplet at t2 is their respective spatiotemporal location. Furthermore, since the 
droplets are bundles of universals, then they can be wholly present at both t1 and t2, even 
though t1 and t2 are non-overlapping times. The endurantists’ problem seems to be 
solved. 
However, the above account of enduring objects does not allow for the possibility 
of change. Suppose that the water droplet at t1 is frozen at t2. Endurantists claim that the 
droplet and the frozen droplet are the same droplet. But the droplet at t1 and the frozen 
droplet at t2 no longer share all their universals. The droplet at t1 has the universal ‘liquid’ 
while the frozen droplet at t2 does not. Conversely, the frozen droplet at t2 has the 
universal ‘solid’ while the droplet at t1 does not. Therefore, the droplet at t1 is no longer 
                                                        
149 See Hawthorne 1995, pp. 194-196 
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wholly present at t2, since not all of its universals are present at t2. Only parts of the 
droplet are wholly present at t2. Recall that intuitive endurantism claims that all of an 
object is wholly present at each moment it exists. Therefore, the bundle theory of 
universals does not offer an account of endurance that satisfies intuitive endurantism. 
Alternatively, the endurantist could also attempt to appeal to the concept of 
omnipresence, typically attributed to monotheistic characterizations of God. 
Omnipresent beings are beings that are wholly present at every time and location. While 
I will not delve into the literature on omnipresence, I want to briefly comment on several 
things. First, it is unclear to me that omnipresence is synonymous with “wholly present.” 
Omnipresence could be understood as the property of perceiving everything at once. If 
one insists that omnipresence must require the actual occupation of time and space, then 
omnipresence might be understood as a being that has a part at every time and location. 
Any sort of pantheistic deity would fulfill this sort of description. At any rate, the concept 
of ‘omnipresence’ is contentious. Appealing to a contentious concept to bolster 
endurantism’s underspecified terminology only hurts its case. Any endurantist appeal to 
other uses of “wholly present” is unlikely to shed further light on the phrase. Therefore, 
intuitive endurantism will not do. In what follows, I will consider various attempts to 
define endurantism with more philosophical rigor. 
Sider suggests that one might be able to define endurantism by claiming that an 
enduring objects is strongly wholly present throughout its lifetime: 
x is strongly wholly present throughout interval t =df everything that is at any 
time in t in part of x exists and is part of x at every time in t.150 
  
Endurantism could then be defined as follows: 
Endurantism =df an object persists iff it is strongly wholly present throughout 
interval t 
 
                                                        
150 Sider Ch. 3 2001 
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However, (1) entails mereological essentialism, since x is composed of all the things 
present throughout T and nothing else.151 If x gains or loses parts over that interval, then 
it is no longer strongly wholly present. This is equivalent to mereological essentialism. 
Since mereological essentialism is not a popular view, (1) should be rejected since it 
entails an unpalatable view of material objects. 
Miller argues that endurance can be defined by modifying a popular endurantist 
account of property attribution (this will be discussed in more depth below) called 
adverbialism. Briefly, adverbialism is a view about how enduring objects instantiate 
properties. It was developed to counter the Argument from Temporary Intrinsics (more 
on this in 3.4), an argument that purportedly shows that endurantism requires objects to 
instantiate conflicting properties at the same time. For example, an enduring ball is 
wholly present at every time it exists, so a ball that was painted red and is now painted 
blue has both those properties at each moment that it exists. This is obviously 
contradictory. The adverbialist attempts to ameliorate this problem by claiming that it is 
not true that the ball is timelessly blue and red, but that the ball is both red-t1ly and blue-
t2ly.152 On this view, it turns out that seemingly intrinsic properties such as blue and red 
are not intrinsic. Instead, they are somehow bound up with the time in which they are 
instantiated (I will discuss this further when talking about the problem of temporary 
intrinsics below.) 
 Miller’s strategy is to make an analogous move for parthood. Objects do not 
simply have parts; instead, they have parts that are bound up with the times in which 
those parts exist. Therefore proper part must be re-interpreted: 
x is a proper part of y =def  x is a proper part of y-tly or x is tly identical to y. 
                                                        
151 See Chisholm 1976. 
152 Defenders of which include Haslanger, S. (1989), Johnston, M. (1987), and Lowe, E.J. (1988) 
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For example, consider a persisting sphere S that is composed of an upper half A and a 
lower half B at t1. Over some interval t, the sphere loses A and is thus composed only of B 
at t2. The conventional problem is that if S’s parts are wholly present at every moment S 
exists, then the transitivity of identity is violated.153 The adverbialist mereology would 
claim that at t1, both A and B are parts of S-t1ly, while at t2 only B is part of S-t2ly. Miller’s 
formal statement of endurantism is quite complex and I do not have the space to go into 
all the details.  
However, I will briefly sketch out some objections. First, Miller’s understanding 
of endurantism commits endurantism to adverbialism. While many endurantists are 
adverbialists, any endurantist that rejects adverbialism cannot use Miller’s definition. 
Second, I reject the adverbialist strategy; I will argue against it in section 3.4. Finally, 
applying the adverbial analysis to parthood requires a complete revision of classical 
mereology. Classical mereology is a powerful theoretical framework that is quite 
complicated. In order to use his definition of endurantism, Miller would have to show 
that he could formulate an adverbial mereological theory that is equivalent to the 
strength and elegance of classical mereology. Even if he could do that, there is still the 
question of why one should give up classical mereology in favor of adverbial mereology. 
Classical mereology proceeds from extremely strong intuitions about parts and wholes, 
and these intuitions do not support adverbial mereology. It seems that the only reason 
Miller advocates adverbial mereology is to solve the problem of defining endurantism. 
He is simply pushing the bump under the rug to a new and more difficult location.  
Furthermore, I find this approach conceptually murky. After all, there are 
abstract geometric objects that have parts. Since these objects are abstract, a 
                                                        
153This is simplified presentation of the classical “Ship of Theseus” problem, where the planks of a 
warship are slowly replaced over time until none of the planks remain. 
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mereological analysis of these objects does not need to reference time.154 If one were to 
continue to endorse adverbial mereology, then one would have to accept both adverbial 
and classical mereology in order to make sense of concrete parts and wholes as well as 
geometric objects. At the very least Miller’s endurantism requires double the ideological 
machinery compared to any other view, and should therefore be rejected. 
 In “A Debate Reconsidered,” Olfra Magidor explores a view she calls “liberal 
endurantism.”155 This form of endurantism is liberal because it is committed to the claim 
that for any fully occupied region of spacetime, there is an object that occupies all of the 
points of that region and no other points. Liberalism ensures that for any material object, 
each proper part of that object will fill a unique region of spacetime. For example, 
suppose there is a circle shaped region in the middle of my desk. If we suppose that my 
desk fully occupies the region at which it is located, then there must be a circle shaped 
object x that fully occupies the circular region in my desk. Similarly, all enduring objects 
will be co-located with temporal parts. Magidor defines liberal endurantism as follows: 
Liberal Endurantism: for any object x and any time t at which it exists, there 
is an object y that is co-located with x at t and exists only at t, but y is never a 
temporal part of x.156 
 
Liberal endurantism preserves enduring objects while also allowing for instantaneous 
temporal objects. Magidor uses these instantaneous temporal objects to re-evaluate 
many of the popular arguments against endurantism. Recall Hawthorne’s example that if 
one has cars in one’s ontology, then one must also have incars (see Ch.2). The intuitive 
endurantist cannot explain this difference because when the car is pulling into the 
garage, there is no way of distinguishing whether the car might in fact be an incar. The 
standard perdurantist can allow for both cars and incars, since their view allows for a 
                                                        
154 If one does not like abstract objects, then geometric figures residing in a timeless world present 
the same challenge to adverbial mereology.  
155 Magidor, forthcoming 
156 ibid. p 5. 
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fusion of temporal parts that corresponds to the incar and a separate fusion of temporal 
parts that correspond to the car.  
Magidor argues that the liberal endurantist can make use of the same solution. 
Since there are instantaneous temporal objects for all occupied regions of the cars, there 
is an instantaneous temporal object that overlaps the car and corresponds to the incar. 
However, given liberal endurantism, there is also an enduring object, a car, which does 
not share any parts with the incar. Therefore, the liberal endurantist can allow for incars 
without giving them theoretical importance.  
While her arguments are quite interesting, I do not have the space for a full 
discussion here. However, I do have several broad criticisms of Magidor’s project that do 
not rely on the specifics of her view. First, what reason is there to have an ontology of 
enduring objects and objects composed of temporal parts? This is an ontology that seems 
needlessly complex since it posits two different ontological categories of material objects 
in order to explain endurantist intuitions that objects are wholly present at any given 
time. Furthermore, liberal endurantism entails problematic co-located objects. Unlike 
the worm theorist’s overlapping mereological sums, the liberal endurantist’s overlapping 
objects cannot be explained by appealing to overlap since overlap entails that the 
overlapping objects share parts. The liberal endurantist’s commitment to problematic 
co-location is another strike against the view. Therefore, I find co-location, and therefore 
Magidor’s liberal endurantism unpalatable and will not consider it as a viable definition 
of endurantism.  
 I believe Giordani and Costa provide the most promising definitions of 
endurantism in their, “From Times to Worlds and Back Again: A Transcendentalist 
Theory of Persistence.” They divide the endurantist view into two sub-views: Temporal 
Bare Uni-locationism and Temporal Multi-locationism. Bare location is defined as: 
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Bare location: for any region r fully occupied by an object x at t, x does not have 
a proper part occupying r at t.157  
 
An object is barely located if it is a mereological simple (recall the discussion of extended 
simples from Ch. 2). They then define Temporal Bare Uni-locationism as the following: 
Temporal Bare Uni-locationism: objects persist through time by being 
barely located at each instant of their persistence.158 
 
In other words, a persisting object x is simple at each instance of its persistence. The 
above view is contrasted with Temporal Multi-locationsim: 
Temporal Multi-locationism: objects persist through time by being exactly 
located at each instant of their persistence.159  
 
Giordani and Costa’s Temporal Bare Uni-locationism is roughly equivalent to my 
definition of endurantism. However they present Temporal Multi-locationism as a live 
possibility; this is incorrect because Temporal Multi-locationism is just Intuitive 
Endurantism in disguise. Giordani and Costa use the phrase “exactly located” in place of 
“wholly present.” Unpacking this term shows that Temporal Multi-locationism is 
identical to intuitive endurantism. Location is simply a two-place relation with an object 
and a region of spacetime as the relata. Giordani and Costa explain exact location as an 
object being “exactly located at a region when this region is its ‘shadow’ in the 
dimension.”160 By ‘shadow,’ I take it that they mean something like full occupation; the 
object completely fills the region in which the object resides. Enduring objects, then, are 
objects that are stretched out through a time period t and exactly occupy each instant t1 
to tn contained in t. In other words, an enduring object is one where the whole of it is 
present in the region it fills at a given time. Using ‘exact location’ in place of ‘wholly 
present’ does nothing to change the perplexity of such a view. One can ask the same 
                                                        
157 Giordini and Costa 2013, p. 212 
158 ibid. p. 213 
159 ibid. p. 213 
160 Giordani and Cost 2014 p. 211 
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question of the temporal multi locationist as of the intuitive endurantist: “How can an 
object be exactly located (wholly present) at each time it exists?” 
Temporal Bare-Locationism is more promising. If a temporally extended object x 
occupies a four-dimensional region, and x has no proper parts, then x must be a four-
dimensional simple with no spatial or temporal parts. Notice that this is equivalent to a 
nihilist-endurantist view. However, endurantists want more than this; they want objects 
to endure while retaining spatial parts. Therefore, the endurantist ought to embrace my 
distinction between temporal and spatial composition. With respect to temporal 
composition, endurantism parallels nihilism. The nihilist claims that all objects are 
spatially simple, while the endurantist claims that all objects are temporally simple. 
Therefore, endurantism is a “never” answer to the STCQ: 
Endurantism: no conditions are necessary and sufficient for temporal 
composition to occur. 
 
If it is true that objects persist and that temporal composition never occurs, then it 
follows that all objects are temporally extended simples. I believe that this is by far the 
clearest analysis of what it means for an object to endure. Extended simples can occupy a 
region without being wholly located at a given point of that region. In the same way, 
enduring objects are not wholly present at each moment; instead, they have no temporal 
part corresponding to each moment that they overlap. 
In this section, I presented what I believe to be the proper formulation of 
temporal parts, perdurantism, and endurantism. Furthermore, I have discussed the 
problems with formulating endurantism. This reveals two things about endurantism: (1) 
there are many interesting analyses of endurantism, but they all ultimately fail in capture 
the view or they make unsavory ontological commitments, and (2) the only viable 
understanding of endurantism is to understand it as a “never” answer to the STCQ that 
requires an ontology of objects that are spatially complex but temporally simple. In the 
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next sections, I will discuss two strong arguments against endurantism: the Argument 
from Vagueness and the Argument from Temporary Intrinsics.  
3.3: The Argument from Vagueness 
According to classical logic, all proppositions are true or false. However, some 
propositions appear to be vague; they have no apparent truth-value. For instance, the 
proposition that one must have x number of hair’s on one’s face in order to have a 
mustache is vague. For the purposes of this project, I will assume that vagueness to be a 
feature of semantic decision.161 For example, we as a community have not set any 
criterion for the amount of facial hair required for a mustache. In his On the Plurality of 
Worlds, Lewis argues for universalism by rejecting the possibility of vague composition. 
Sider uses the structure of Lewis’s argument to present a powerful argument for 
perdurantism that has played a key role in defending perdurantism. Both arguments are 
centered on the central claims that (1) if composition occurs, then it cannot be vague and 
(2) that propositions concerning composition are always true or false. Sider’s argument 
for perdurantism takes Lewis’s argument as a premise. First, I will discuss Lewis’s 
original argument as interpreted by Sider. Then, I will examine Sider’s argument for 
temporal parts. Finally, I will discuss how the four-dimensional nihilist can make use of 
these arguments. 
3.3.1: The Argument from Vagueness for Universalism 
In his formulation of the Argument from Vagueness for universalism, Sider uses several 
technical terms. A case is a class of objects such that the class may or may not compose a 
further object. These cases are pre-theoretical and should not be controversial; for 
instance, the subatomic particles that seem to compose my body are a case, and  those 
same subatomic particles scattered throughout the galaxy are also a case. A continuous 
                                                        
161 This view has its origins in Russell 1923. Evans 1978 argues against the possibility of vague 
objects. Fine 1975 and Lewis 192 and 1993 defend linguistic vagueness. Williamson 1994 argues 
for worldy vagueness as do Varnes and Williams 2011, Mericks 2001, Sorensen 2010 and Varzi 
2001. 
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series of cases begins with a seeming case of composition and ends with a seeming case 
of non-composition. The continuous series also has a finite number of cases that connect 
the case of composition to the case of non-composition. Each case in the series is 
extremely similar to the case before it and the case after it (in whatever respects matter 
for composition, such as: spatial proximity, qualitative homogeneity, causal powers, and 
so on). Finally, there is a sharp cut-off between a pair of cases where composition occurs 
in the first case, but does not occur in the second case. Here is Sider’s Argument from 
Vagueness: 
P1. Assume for reduction that not every class of objects has a fusion. 
P2. If not every class of objects has a fusion, then there must be a pair of cases 
connected by a continuous series such that in one, composition occurs, but in 
the other, composition does not occur. 
P3. In no continuous series is there a sharp cut-off in whether composition 
occurs. 
P4. In any case of composition, either composition definitely occurs, or 
composition definitely does not occur. 
C.   Therefore, every class of objects has a fusion.162  
 
From P2, there is a pair of cases connected by a continuous series such that in one, 
composition occurs, but in the other, composition does not occur. It follows that at some 
point in the series, the cases cease to compose objects. Given P4, any case in this series 
definitely composes an object or definitely does not compose an object. It follows, then, 
that the transition from a case of composition to a case of non-composition must be a 
sharp cut-off. However, this contradicts P3, which says there are no sharp cut-offs in the 
series. Therefore, the initial assumption that not every class has a fusion is false; every 
class has a fusion and universalism is true. 
An example will help make the argument clear. Consider the particles that 
seemed to compose my body and then were scattered across the universe. When these 
particles are in close proximity to one another they compose my body. When these 
                                                        
162 Sider 2001, 123-125 
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particles are scattered, they do not compose anything. Using these two cases at 
beginning and end points, a series of cases can be constructed that links these two cases 
together. Suppose that each case results in the particles moving .00001 nanometers away 
from each other (if this is too large, then you can make the number as small as you like). 
Since there must be a sharp cut-off located somewhere in the series, it must be the case 
that x number of .00001 nanometer movements will destroy my body. However, this is 
impossible, since there are no sharp cut-offs in the series. Therefore, the particles always 
compose an object (although they do not always compose my body). 
P2 is the least controversial, however one might object that not every pair of cases 
can be connected by a finite series of similar cases. For example, there is no series that 
connects a case of composition with finitely many objects in its class to a case of non-
composition with infinitely many objects in its class. This is perfectly acceptable, says 
Sider, since nobody thinks that the difference maker between composition and non-
composition is whether the class in question is finite or infinite. Even if this turns out to 
actually make a difference in some cases of composition, Sider only needs to have some 
pairs of cases where composition occurs and does not occur that are connected by a 
series in order for the argument to go through. 
P3 is somewhat more difficult to defend. One might worry about the denial of a 
sharp cut-off between cases; perhaps the adjacent cases of the sharp cut-off are different 
enough that the transition from composition to non-composition is warranted and not 
arbitrary. However, if this is the case, then Sider thinks that the cases have not been 
made similar enough. Once the proper pair of cases is focused on, the absence of a sharp 
cut-off will be apparent. Therefore, positing a sharp cut-off remains problematic. In the 
example, the transition from composition to non-composition happens after x number of 
movements of the particles. If there was a sharp cut-off between my body's existence and 
destruction, then the cut-off would make the macrophysical “autonomous” from the 
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microphysical, since nothing much has changed as far as the particles are concerned, but 
a macroscopic object has been annihilated. He is careful to distinguish autonomy from 
supervenience; even if there was an arbitrary sharp cut-off after x number of movements 
of the particles, then whether my body exists would supervene on how many movements 
the particles have made. Instead, autonomy is a problem because it is metaphysically 
arbitrary. Sider does not refer to the sorites of decomposition here, but his reasoning is 
similar.163 Given that we have already made many .00001 nanometer movements and the 
object has not had any change with respect to its being composite, why would one think 
that there would be any change at x+1 .00001 movements?  
One could also object to P3 by arguing that a sharp cut-off would be not be 
arbitrary if composition could be somehow be understood as precise topological 
restrictions on regions of space that contain objects, such as spatial continuity. Sider 
rejects this for two reasons: 1) it rules out scattered objects like solar systems and 
galaxies, and 2) since under classical physics all objects are discontinuous, these sorts of 
topological restrictions would rule out any macrophysical objects in worlds that obeyed 
the laws of classical physics. 
Sider’s defense of P4 is by far the most controversial, and it is also quite 
complicated. The denial of P4 amounts to the claim that composition is sometimes 
vague. In order to follow the defense of P4, Sider first defines composite objects (Sider 
calls these fusions) as follows.  
Fusion (F) : There is some object, x, such that (1) every member of a class C is 
part of x, and (2) every part of x shares a part in common with some member of 
C.164 
 
One might worry that the predicate ‘is a part of’ is vague. What would this vagueness 
amount to? Sider agrees with Lewis that all vagueness is semantic indecision, regardless 
                                                        
163 See Unger 1979 
164 ibid, 126. 
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of whether vagueness seems to be about language or seems to be about the world.165 On 
this view, when a sentence has an indeterminate truth-value due to vagueness, the 
vagueness is the result of a predicate in the sentence having multiple precisifications 
(candidate meanings). None of these precisifications are inherently better than the 
others, and because of a lack of human interest, there are no linguistic conventions for 
deciding which of the candidate meanings is the standard meaning. The typical example 
of this kind of vagueness is a sentence like: “The man over there is bald.” The predicate 
‘bald’ has many precisifications of the form ‘having no more than n hairs on one’s head’. 
Since there are many acceptable values for n and the linguistic community has explicitly 
chosen none of these values, then the predicate ‘is bald’ is vague. Furthermore, this view 
holds that all vagueness is explained in this way and vagueness is never found in the 
world. Therefore, Sider simply dismisses the idea that composition is ontologically 
vague. However, on the assumption that vagueness is semantic indecision, one could 
argue that the predicate ‘is a part of’ is vague. Rather than providing an argument for the 
non-vagueness of mereological predicates, Sider opts for a different strategy to defend 
P4 from the charge of vagueness. In order to do this, Sider first establishes what it means 
for something to be concrete. Concrete objects are defined as the class of all objects that 
are not abstract, such as: sets and classes, numbers, properties and relations, universals 
and tropes, possible worlds, and so on (this list need not be exhaustive; any other 
abstract entities that one has in one’s ontology can go on the list). Here is my 
interpretation of the argument against vague composition:  
P1. Suppose for reductio that it can be vague whether composition occurs. 
P2. Imagine a world w with a finite number of concrete objects.   
P3. Then there is a numerical sentence P that counts all of the objects in w using 
only first order logic and the ‘concrete’ predicate.166  
                                                        
165 Lewis 1986, 212-13 
166 For example: if there are two objects in the world, then  x y[Cx ^ Cy ^ x ≠ y ^  z(Cz → (z = 
x ∨ z = y))]. 
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P4. From P1, P is vague, since it is vague whether the objects in w compose a 
further object: the fusion of those objects.  
P5. Since P is vague, either the predicate ‘concrete’, or the logical terms are vague. 
P6. Neither the predicate ‘concrete’ nor the logical terms are vague. 
P7. Therefore, P is not vague. 
C.   Reject P1; It is never vague whether composition occurs.167 
 
P5 is supported by the assumption that vagueness is the result of semantic indecision. 
Since w has no vague objects, then it must be the case that the terms of the sentence 
have multiple precisifications. Most philosophers agree that the Boolean connectives do 
not have multiple precisifications. Furthermore, the predicate ‘concrete’ does not have 
multiple precisifications since it is stipulated to have no such things.  Therefore, either 
the identity symbol or the quantifiers have multiple precisifications. There is good 
reason to think that identity does not have multiple precisifications.168 Consider the 
universal quantifier; what would it mean for the universal quantifier to have multiple 
unrestricted precisifications? It would seem to mean that there is more than one 
“everything” for the quantifier to range over. Suppose we have two precisifications of the 
universal quantifier  1 and  2. In order for these to be genuine precisifications, there 
must be some x in  1’s extension that is not in  2’s extension. However, this means that 
 2 is just a restricted quantifier, since there is something in the domain that it does not 
quantify over. Sider only argues that the universal quantifier does not have multiple 
precisifications, but what he says should apply to the existential quantifier as well since it 
can be defined by using the universal quantifier.169 Since the quantifiers do not have 
multiple precisifications, then there can be no source of vagueness in P. This completes 
the reductio and secures P7.  
                                                        
167 Sider 2001: 126-130 
168 See Evans 1978 and Stalnaker 1988. 
169 ~∀(x)~P(x) = ∃(x), in other words, it is false that everything is not-P entails that there is at 
least one x that is P. 
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 At this point is should be noted that the Argument from Vagueness does not 
entail the truth of universalism. Rather, it entails that there is no true “sometimes” 
answer to the SCQ. The Argument from Vagueness for universalism can be easily 
modified to support the nihilist position as well: 
P1ʹ. Assume for reductio that not every class of objects has a fusion. 
P2ʹ. If it is false that no class of objects has a fusion (nihilism), then there must be 
a pair of cases connected by a continuous series such that in one, 
composition occurs, but in the other, composition does not occur. 
P3ʹ. In no continuous series is there a sharp cut-off in whether composition 
occurs. 
P4ʹ. In any case of composition, either composition definitely occurs, or 
composition definitely does not occur. 
Cʹ.   Therefore, no class of objects has a fusion. 
 
The arguments that Sider gives in support of P1-P4 can be used mutatis mutandis in 
support of P1ʹ to P4ʹ. Therefore, if Sider’s argument is sound, then the Argument 
from Vagueness for nihilism is sound as well. This means that the Argument from 
Vagueness does not only support universalism; the argument shows that any 
sometimeser answer to the SCQ is impossible. So in order for the Argument from 
Vagueness to succeed as an argument for universalism, it must be supplemented by 
additional arguments that nihilism is false.  
3.4.2: The Argument from Vagueness for Temporal Parts 
Sider’s ultimate goal is to use the Argument from Vagueness against endurantism. 
He uses the argument to show that any concrete object must be composed of 
temporal parts. In order to do this, Sider introduces some technical terms: 
f is an assignment iff f is a function that takes one or more times as arguments 
and assigns non-empty classes of objects that exist at those times as values. 
 
x is a diachronic fusion (D-fusion) of f iff for every time t in f’s domain, x is a 
fusion-at-t of f(t).  
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x is a minimal D-fusion of f iff x is a D-fusion of f that exists for only those 
times in f’s domain.170 
 
The function f is supposed to be metaphysically neutral; assignments do not have to 
have any ontological weight. Under the assumption that I am an object, then there is 
some function f1 that assigns me to various times in which I exist. For example, I 
have a diachronic fusion that spans the twenty-four hours of October 12, 2013.  In 
this case, function f1 takes every time of that day and assigns to that time the class of 
objects that compose me at that time. It should be noted that Sider is not claiming 
that these assignments are temporal parts. Rather, for every t in the domain of the 
assignment, there is a corresponding class of objects that compose me at that time. 
Whether these objects are temporal parts or not remains to be seen. 
While it is true that all minimal-D fusions are D-fusions, the converse is not 
true. In the example, the D-fusion described by f1 is not a minimal D-fusion, since I 
existed before and continue to exist after October 12. My minimal D-fusion would be 
the assignment f that takes all the times I exist as arguments and assigns all the 
objects that compose me at those times to those times. It should be noted that D-
fusions and minimal D-fusions do not have to be continuous. There is the D-fusion of 
me at 12 p.m. on November 11, 2013 and Genghis Khan’s nose at 9 p.m. on October 2, 
1205. Whether this is a genuine entity remains to be decided, but it is a D-fusion 
nonetheless. The endurantist would accept that there are D-fusions of assignments 
with only one time (such as my body at t1), but deny that an assignment that has 
multiple times is a D-fusion. For instance, if there is an object composed of Brian-at-
t1, Brian-at-t2, Brian-at-t3, and so on, then I would be composed of temporal parts; 
this is what the endurantist denies. 
                                                        
170 Sider 2001 
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 In order to create the Argument from Vagueness for temporal parts, Sider 
simply replaces the term “class of objects” with “assignments” and “fusion” with 
“minimal D-fusion”: 
P1ʹ. Assume for reductio that not every assignment has a minimal D-fusion. 
P2′. If not every assignment has a minimal D-fusion, then there must be a pair of 
cases connected by a ‘continuous series’ such that in one, minimal D-fusion 
occurs, but in the other, minimal D fusion does not occur. 
P3′. In no continuous series is there a sharp cut-off in whether minimal D-fusion 
occurs. 
P4′. In any case of minimal D-fusion, either minimal D-fusion definitely occurs, 
or minimal D-fusion definitely does not occur.   
C′.  Therefore, every assignment has a minimal D-fusion. 
 
Remember, the endurantist must hold that not every assignment has a minimal-D 
fusion. For instance, consider an apple that comes into existence, exists for ten seconds, 
and then is annihilated. There are infinitely many assignments of times to the apple over 
the 10-second interval, since time is not metrical. However, the endurantist says that 
there is only one assignment that is a real object: the assignment of the lifespan of the 
apple to the apple. The Argument from Vagueness aims to show that each of the infinite 
assignments is an object in its own right, and that these objects can compose larger 
temporal objects.  
Some of the previous terminology requires modification in order to account for 
the temporal elements in the new argument. The definitions of ‘case’ and ‘continuous 
series’ require some tweaking. Temporal cases differ from each other by whatever 
features one believes are relevant for differentiating minimal D-fusions: spatial relations, 
qualitative similarity, causal relations, and so on. The case at the beginning of the series 
and the case at the end of the series have the same assignment; that is, the same times 
are assigned the same classes of objects. As an example of an assignment f2 where 
minimal D-fusion occurs, consider the time for which my body exists; f2 pairs the times 
that I exist with the objects that compose me at each of those times. Now consider a 
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possible world where the particles that make up my body are scattered throughout the 
galaxy for the same interval of time. In this case, there seems to be no minimal D-fusion 
because the scattered particles do not compose anything. The intermediate cases consist 
of possible worlds focused on the same time interval. In each of these worlds, successive 
particles from my body are removed and scattered about the galaxy. At some world, one 
will no longer claim that my body continues to persist through time because I have been 
pulled apart enough to no longer be considered a minimal D-fusion. 
The defense of the argument’s premises requires little modification from the 
defense of the Argument from Vagueness for universalism. If one was satisfied with the 
defense of P2 and P3, then one should not take issue with P2′ and P3′. One could, 
however, resist P3′ by being a mereological essentialist. P4′ is supported by the same 
argument that defended P4, however, it is worth going through again. If one rejects P4′, 
then one thinks that it is vague whether an assignment has a minimal D-fusion. Sider 
gives four examples of vague minimal D-fusions, but one example will suffice.  Suppose 
that whether minimal D-fusions occur can be vague. Now consider a statue made up of 
some particles at some world w1, and suppose that it is vague (or indeterminate) as to 
when the statue comes into existence. If this is the case, then the statue determinately 
does not exist at some time t1, but does determinately exist at some time t2. However, 
during the interval between t1 and t2, it is indeterminate whether the statue exists.   
Now consider another world w2 that is much like w1, except that w2 contains a 
finite number of concrete objects. Also suppose that w2 has some particles at t1 and that 
these particles are duplicates of the particles in w1. At t1 the particles in both w1 and w2 
do not compose anything, and it is indeterminate whether they compose anything until 
t2. Suppose that the particles in w2 are annihilated right before t2. It then follows that 
whether or not the statue ever existed at w2 is vague since there is no time where the 
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statue determinately exists.171 Therefore, the number of concrete entities in w2 is vague.  
However, since w2 has a finite number of concrete objects, one could construct a 
numerical sentence (using only the ‘concrete’ predicate and first order logic) that would 
count the entities. Since numerical sentences cannot be vague, the assumption is false 
and whether minimal D-fusion occurs cannot be vague. Therefore, C’ is true; every 
assignment has a minimal D-fusion. If every assignment has a minimal D-fusion, then all 
material objects are composed of temporal parts. Recall the example of the apple that 
comes into existence, persists for a ten second-interval t, and then ceases to exist. Since 
there is a real object that corresponds to every assignment possible during t, then 
endurantism is false, since the lifespan of an object is made up of infinitely many 
minimal D-fusions. 
There are many ways one might attempt to resist the Argument from 
Vagueness.172 For instance, one could argue that the vagueness is found in the world. If 
this is correct, then the source of vague composition will not be found in the numerical 
sentence P.   Standard nihilism also allows for the rejection that everything is composed 
of temporal parts, since the standard nihilist believes that objects do not have spatial 
parts or temporal parts. The standard nihilist can simply modify the Argument from 
Vagueness for temporal parts to support nihilism about temporal parts. In conclusion, 
the Argument from Vagueness is a powerful argument against sometimesers views about 
composition or persistence. In the previous section, I argued that endurantism is a 
“never” answer to the STCQ. The Argument from Vagueness shows that the only tenable 
endurantist view is one that also endorses nihilism. The Argument from Vagueness 
                                                        
171 In w1, whether the statue exists between t1 and t2 is vague, but the statue determinately exists at 
some time. 
172 For a comprehensive overview of resisting the Argument from Vagueness, see Varzi 2005 and 
Korman 2010. Varzi argues that each of the options that allow one to resist the Argument from 
Vagueness undermine the endurantist’s claim that their view is the intuitive view of persistence, 
since they require embracing many counter-intuitive claims about material objects (p. 498). I am 
inclined to agree with Varzi on this point. 
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undermines any endurantist view that allows mereological sums located at a specific 
time, whether these sums are unrestricted or not. The first view advocates restrictions on 
persistence and composition, while the second two advocate restrictions on persistence 
and composition respectively. The Argument from Vagueness shows that these 
restrictions are impossible, and creates a significant problem for endurantists that are 
not nihilists. I believe that the Argument from Vagueness provides strong support for the 
rejection of endurantism. In the next section, I will discuss another famous argument 
against endurantism: the Argument from Temporary Intrinsics. 
 3.4: The Argument From Temporary Intrinsics 
One of the most controversial arguments in the perdurantist/endurantist debate is 
Lewis’s Argument from Temporary Intrinsics. Lewis begins with the claim that persisting 
objects have intrinsic properties, and that these properties change over time. He writes 
the following:  
“Persisting things change their intrinsic properties. For instance shape: when I sit, I have 
a bent shape; when I stand I have a straightened shape. Both shapes are temporary 
intrinsic properties; I have them only some of the time. How is such change possible?”173 
In this example, Lewis has both the properties of sitting and standing. Obviously, he 
cannot have these properties at the same time; this would be a straightforward violation 
of Leibniz’s Law. Unless one gives up the claim that Lewis at t1 and Lewis at t2 are 
identical, then there must be some way to avoid violating Leibniz’s Law. Lewis goes on to 
present three solutions to problem of temporary intrinsics. Each one of these solutions 
corresponds to presentism, endurantism, and perdurantism (I will not discuss Lewis’s 
remarks about presentism, since I have already rejected presentism):   
   
                                                        
173 Lewis, 1986 pp. 203-4 
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First solution (endurantism): contrary to what we might think, shapes are not 
genuine intrinsic properties. They are disguised relations, which an enduring thing 
may bear to times. One and the same enduring thing may bear the bent-shape 
relation to some times, and the straight- shape relation to others...  
       
Third solution (perdurantism): the different shapes, and the different temporary 
intrinsics generally, belong to different things. Endurance is to be rejected in favor 
of perdurance. We perdure; we are made up of temporal parts, and our temporary 
intrinsics are properties of these parts, wherein they differ one from another.174 
 
I will call Lewis’s endurantist solution relational endurantism. For the relational 
endurantist, a seemingly temporary intrinsic property, such as the property of being a 
square (S(x)), is in fact some sort of relation like S(x, t). I think it is worth pointing out 
that one might worry that Lewis’s choice of terms already undermines the relational 
endurantist’s position. Lewis assumes that it is natural to think that the various intrinsic 
qualities of objects are properties represented by a single-place predicate. He believes 
that the relational endurantist’s translation of property-talk to relation-talk is already a 
mark against relational endurantism.   
His support of this claim seems to rely on an appeal to our pre-theoretical 
intuitions (or at least our pre-metaphysics of persistence intuitions) about whether a 
shape is a property or a relation. Lewis’s statement above about relational endurantism, 
“contrary to what we might think,” reveals that he clearly believes that our intuitions 
support the perdurantist view that shapes are properties. Not only does the perdurantist 
answer confirm this intuition, but it also presents an easy solution to the problem of 
temporary intrinsics. The sitting Lewis at t1 is not identical to the standing Lewis at t2; 
they are temporal parts of the four-dimensional object Lewis. Notice that this assumes 
worm theory; according to stage view, Lewis at t1 and Lewis at t2 are still parts of a four-
dimensional mereological sum, but the sum is not Lewis.  Since parts of objects can have 
conflicting properties, there is no problem of temporary intrinsics for the perdurantist.  
                                                        
174 ibid. 2004 
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 Lewis’s argument seems straightforward; however, one might worry the 
argument relies on the unclear concept of an intrinsic property. Lewis himself never 
provides a proper explanation of the difference between the two types of properties. In 
“Rearrangement of Particles: Reply to Lowe,” Lewis briefly mentions that the relativizer 
will attempt to make a distinction between properties such as shape and properties such 
as unclehood. He then claims that the relativizer will ultimately treat both the properties 
in the same way: as relations.175  It seems reasonable to interpret these claims as 
indicating that intrinsic properties are something that an object has in virtue of itself, 
and extrinsic properties are ones that require the existence of some other object in order 
for their instantiation to occur. It seems reasonable to suppose that an object could have 
the property of being a square even though it is in an otherwise empty world. In contrast, 
a person in an otherwise empty world could not have the property of being an uncle. This 
is a rough definition. Many philosophers offer their own interpretations of Lewis’s 
intrinsic/extrinsic distinction. For instance Eddon defines an intrinsic property as the 
following: 
a property is intrinsic iff it never differs between duplicates. Two things are 
duplicates iff they share all their fundamental – or perfectly natural – properties, 
and their parts can be put into correspondence in such a way that corresponding 
parts have the same perfectly natural properties and stand in the same perfectly 
natural relations.176  
 
Botterell gives the following definition: 
a property P is an intrinsic property of an object x if (i) whenever x has P, x’s 
having P does not entail the existence of a wholly distinct object y, and (ii) y’s 
existence is not contingent on the existence of x. 7 So, for example, the property 
of being red is plausibly intrinsic, since whether or not an object is red does not 
entail the existence of any other object. The property of being married, on the 
other hand, is plausibly not intrinsic, since whether a person N is married does 
entail the existence of an object distinct from N, namely N’s spouse. If a property 
                                                        
175 Lewis 1999, p. 188. 
176 Eddon 2010, p. 607. 
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is non-intrinsic, I will also sometimes say that it is extrinsic, or relational, or 
derivative.177  
 
Eddon’s characterization of intrinsic properties relies on the existence of perfectly 
natural properties, while Botterell’s characterization relies on the previously discussed 
Humean principle of modal recombination (see Ch.2). I believe that regardless of which 
analysis one chooses, the concept of intrinsic properties is at the very least intelligible. 
What Lewis needs to show is that intrinsic properties provide the best account of the 
various qualities that objects have. Simply assuming that intrinsic properties exist entails 
that relational endurantism is false. Therefore, the perdurantist needs to show exactly 
what is so objectionable about properties being relations in disguise.  
There are several reasons one might object to properties as relations in disguise. 
First, it seems that properties are part of our best theory of the world given their 
widespread use throughout philosophy. Second, one might think that abstract entities, 
such as geometrical shapes, have shape properties independent of any times. Or perhaps 
one thinks that timeless worlds are possible; if endurantism is true, then these worlds 
would necessarily be empty or only contain bare particulars since there would be no 
times to serve as arguments for the endurantists’s quality relations. One might also 
simply say that times do not seem to have to do anything with qualities like shape or 
color. Unlike events, shapes and colors require no passage of time for their existence. Of 
course, the endurantist could stand their ground and reject each of these points. 
However, this position will most likely be met with an incredulous stare.  
In an attempt to avoid claiming that there are no properties at all, Sally 
Haslanger advocates what she calls the adverbialist solution to the problem of 
temporary intrinsics (I briefly discussed adverbialism on p. 26). Adverbialists attempt to 
use relations to disarm the problem of temporary intrinsics while still including 
                                                        
177 Botterell 2004, p. 6. 
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properties in their ontologies. There are two adverbial strategies: one that makes use of a 
three-place predicate, and one that uses a two-place predicate. The first sort of 
adverbialist accounts for temporary intrinsics with a three-place relation that takes 
objects, properties, and times as arguments. For example, the sentence “‘the guitar is 
blue right now” is the proposition g has at t the property blue, or H(g, t, B). As 
Haslanger says, properties and objects “are treated...as individuals are to other 
individuals.”178 The having relation operates in the same way as other three place 
relations. In the proposition ‘Jackie gives a bouquet to Beatrice’, the three place relation 
gives takes three individuals as arguments: Jackie, a bouquet, and Beatrice. In the same 
way, there are three individuals involved in the temporary intrinsic described above: a 
guitar, a time, and the property blue.  
Haslanger advocates the second adverbialist strategy of using a two-place having 
predicate. The difference between the three-place predicate and the two-place predicate 
is that two-place predicate takes property predicates and times as arguments instead of 
taking properties, times, and objects as arguments. For example, the aforementioned 
guitar being blue at t is no longer H(g, B, t), but H(B(g), t). The guitar is blue, and the 
blue guitar is related to a time. This second type of adverbialism emphasizes the fact that 
the blueness and the guitar are tied more closely to each other than to the time they are 
at. Haslanger claims that this second type of adverbialism avoids the counter-
intuitiveness of the first three-place relation by no longer treating properties and objects 
as individuals. Haslanger’s main worry about the first type of adverbialism is that 
properties should not be treated as entities in their own right. However, it is worth 
pointing out that unless one is a nominalist about properties, then one will have tropes 
or universals in one’s ontology, and these can be treated as individuals for the purposes 
of the having relation. In any case, I do not think there is much difference between these 
                                                        
178 Haslanger 1989a 
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two types of adverbialism. They both claim that temporary intrinsics are accounted for 
by a having relation that somehow involves times, properties, and objects. The 
adverbialist account’s inclusion of properties may mitigate some of the worries 
mentioned above. Abstract objects or objects in timeless worlds can simply instantiate 
properties. The having relation is only used when properties must be instantiated by 
objects in time.  
At this point, the lines between adverbialism and perdurantism may appear to be 
blurred. Both the adverbialist and perdurantist ontologies contain objects, properties, 
and times. There are two important differences: (1) the adverbialist has a primitive 
having relation, and (2) adverbialists do not have temporal parts in their ontology. Even 
though they may have an extra primitive relation, adverbialists think that it is a 
worthwhile tradeoff for rejecting temporal parts. 
While adverbial and relational endurantism seem to be able to both solve the 
problem of temporary intrinsics, each of their relations is somewhat mysterious. Lewis 
discusses this perplexity by attempting to understand how an endurantist would “draw” 
a shape.179 Lewis believes that the only way to make sense a relation like H(g,t,B) is to 
represent the guitar as a “shapeless blob” that exists in the intersection of two circles (a 
Venn diagram), one of which has times in its domain and the other which has properties 
in its domain. It then appears that the guitar has no color at all, and the problem of 
temporary intrinsics resurfaces. The two-place adverbialist does not escape this problem 
either. Even by predicating the color blue to the guitar before putting it in the relation, it 
still follows that the guitar has no color independent of a time. Haslanger is not troubled 
by this consequence, since she believes that there is nothing wrong with the guitar 
lacking a color in the abstract.  
                                                        
179 See Lewis 1988 p. 67. 
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Instead of just admitting that it is hard (or maybe impossible) to conceive of the 
guitar separate from the times it is related to, what the endurantist should do is appeal to 
mereological analysis of the four dimensional manifold. I have already argued that 
endurantism is best understood as the claim that persisting objects are temporally 
extended and qualitatively heterogeneous simples. The guitar can change from blue to 
red since it is qualitatively heterogeneous along the temporal dimension even though it 
lacks blue or red temporal parts. I believe that this clears up Lewis’s confusion about how 
to “draw” an enduring object with temporary intrinsics. Shortly, I will argue that taking 
enduring objects to be extended heterogeneous simples reveals a major problem for 
endurance theory. First, I will discuss some other endurantist arguments that attempt to 
undercut the problem of temporary intrinsics. 
 With worries about how to conceive of enduring objects set aside, adverbial 
endurantists and perdurantists seem to be at a standoff. For example, Wasserman says 
as much in his discussion of temporary intrinsics:  
And here we seem to have reached a genuine standoff. The endurantist takes 
being bent at as primitive and uses that notion to define being bent. 
The...perdurantist takes being bent as primitive and uses that notion to define 
being bent at. At this point it is unclear whether we have any substantial reason 
for favoring one account of persistence over the other.180 
 
In order to gain any advantage over the endurantists, perdurantists must not simply 
appeal to intuitions that bolster their claim that temporary intrinsics are best accounted 
for by monadic properties. The perdurantist needs a counterexample to the 
endurantists’s claim that quality instantiation must be a dyadic relation involving a time 
(or a three-placed relation involving a time). The most straightforward counterexample 
to this claim is asserting the possibility of a timeless world.181 Sider argues that the 
endurantist cannot use their indexical or adverbial relations to explain qualities of 
                                                        
180 Wasserman 2004 p. 5; he describes what I am calling relational endurantism in this passage. 
181 See Sider 2001 pp. 99-101 
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objects in timeless worlds since there are no times to participate in these relations. 
Therefore, the endurantist must deny the possibility of timeless worlds. I, for one, find 
the possibility of timeless worlds plausible. On the eternalist model, these are simply 
worlds that lack a fourth dimension. All of the objects that exist in our world could also 
exist in a timeless world, but these objects simply would not persist in the timeless 
world. Therefore, the burden of proof is on the endurantist to show that timeless worlds 
are impossible.  
However, I believe that this argument from timeless worlds can be taken a step 
further and actually provide support for the perdurantists claim that monadic properties 
account for the qualities of objects. The argument is as follows: 
P1. Suppose timeless worlds are possible. 
P2. At any timeless world w, intrinsic qualities of objects in w cannot be 
explained relationally. 
P3. Therefore, objects in w have intrinsic qualities by instantiating properties 
represented by monadic predicates. 
P4.   By Occam’s razor, if property instantiation can account for the qualities of 
objects in timeless worlds and worlds with time, then the property account is 
better than alternative accounts. 
C.   Therefore, the property account is better than alternative accounts. 
 
If this is argument is correct, then the endurantist’s relational approach cannot solve the 
problem of temporary intrinsics since the endurantist must still use timeless predictions 
to account for intrinsic qualities of objects in timeless worlds.  
The only way the endurantist could attempt to resist this argument is by rejecting 
P1. In order to reject P1, the endurantist needs to show that it is necessary that all worlds 
have at least one moment of time. In order to account for a seemingly timeless world, the 
endurantist could claim that the appearance of timelessness in w results from the fact 
that w has only one instantaneous time and therefore no passage of time. If a world has 
only one instantaneous moment of time, then time cannot flow. 
	
149 
 
 
The perdurantist has several ways to counter this objection. The perdurantist 
could argue that positing worlds with only one instantaneous time is ad hoc since any 
instantaneous time would serve no metaphysical purpose in the world other than to 
support and endurantist account of intrinsic qualities. In other words, a timeless world 
and a world that has only one instantaneous moment of time can be described in exactly 
the same way since there is nothing at these worlds. 
The perdurantist could also argue that worlds with only instantaneous time are 
flat-out impossible: either worlds are timeless, or worlds have an extended temporal 
dimension, even if it is quite small. Recall that for the eternalist, the world is a four-
dimensional block with three spatial dimensions and one temporal dimension.  
P1. Given eternalism, all times have the same metaphysical status 
P2. Assume that there is some world w that has only one instantaneous time t1.  
P3. Suppose that another time t2 is added to this world.  
P4. Since time is not metrical, then for any two times t1 and t2, there are an 
infinite amount of times between t1 and t2.   
P5. If follows that the w now has infinitely many times.  
P6. Given P1, there is nothing special about t2, but t2 necessarily brings into 
existence infinite times. 
C.   This is absurd; worlds with only one instant of time are impossible. 
 
This argument roughly follows the sorites paradox discussed in ch. 1 (p. 2). For any 
world with a temporal extension n, one could add more time to n and the world would 
increase its temporal extension by the exact amount added. But in the case of worlds 
with only one instantaneous time, the addition of another instantaneous time results in 
an explosion of times. If the endurantist maintains that worlds with one instant of time 
are possible, then not only must they accept that their relational account of intrinsic 
properties is ad hoc at these worlds, but they must also accept the paradoxical 
consequences of worlds with only one instant of time. The perdurantist who accepts 
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timeless worlds has neither of these problems.182 Therefore, I think that while the 
Argument from Temporary Intrinsics does not so far show that endurantism is outright 
contradictory, the argument does show that the endurantist has to pay an excessively 
high price in order to defend against it.  
I believe that the endurantist’s position, relational or adverbial, becomes even 
less defensible when their view is understood as the claim that enduring objects are 
objects that are spatially complex but temporally simple. With this in mind, I will re-
examine adverbialism. I will discuss Haslanger’s adverbialism, but everything I will say 
targets three-placed adverbialists as well. Adverbialists are committed to a four-
dimensional manifold of spacetime. They are also committed to matter that fills this 
manifold.183 An object has spatial extension if and only if its matter occupies a region 
that extends in the spatial dimensions, and an object persists if and only if its matter 
occupies a region that extends in the temporal dimension. This simply follows from the 
endurantists’s eternalist commitments.  
Recall Haslanger’s adverbialist analysis of a guitar that is temporarily blue: 
H(B(g), t). This analysis is supposed to evade the problem of temporary intrinsics. 
However, given the spatiotemporal manifold previously described, this having relation is 
just the location or occupation relation in disguise. Given the eternalist framework, all 
temporal relations reduce to geometric relations between points in a manifold. It does 
not matter whether this relation is called the having relation or the location relation; the 
eternalist structure of spacetime does not allow for any other type of relation between 
matter and spacetime. When the adverbialist analysis of temporary intrinsics is 
understood as really being about location, then the adverbialist analysis falls apart. The 
                                                        
182 One might object that the perdurantist must claim that it is necessary for any world with at 
least one time, another time must exist at that world. I myself do not take this to be an 
objectionable necessity. 
183 Endurantists could not be supersubstantivalists since this would mean that all objects are 
made of spacetime, and the spacetime manifold has parts. 
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adverbialist analysis only tells us that the guitar is blue and located at one region while 
also not blue and located at another region. It should be obvious that this is not a 
solution to the problem of temporary intrinsics; it is just a description of the original 
problem!  
Since the adverbialist rejects temporal parts, then it follows that the blue guitar 
must have no parts located in the temporal dimension; the guitar is simple with respect 
to the temporal dimension. Now, it can be seen that the problem of temporary intrinsics 
really has nothing to do with time at all.  The problem of temporary intrinsics is just the 
problem of qualitative heterogeneity as discussed in 2.7: can extended simple objects 
have qualitative variation? Just like the defender of qualitatively heterogeneous spatially 
extended simples, the endurantist would have to apply a distributional properties 
analysis or a stuff/thing analysis to explain an enduring object’s qualitative heterogeneity 
along its temporal dimension. I have already argued that these analyses fail, and since 
time is treated as just another geometric dimension, my previous arguments in 2.7 apply 
equally to any endurantist appeal to distributional properties or a stuff/thing ontology.  
In conclusion, much of the debate around the problem of temporary intrinsics is 
due to a lack of clarity concerning the nature of enduring entities and the relations that 
account for their qualities. Once these things are brought into focus, I have shown that 
even if one grants the possibility of endurantism, it still pays a much higher metaphysical 
price than perdurantism. Furthermore, I have shown that endurantism is committed to 
objects that are both simple and qualitatively heterogeneous along their temporal 
dimension. Since qualitatively heterogeneous extended simples are impossible, 
endurantism is false.  
In this chapter, I have summarized and discussed the main theories of time and 
objects in time. I have presented brief arguments against presentism, the moving 
spotlight theory, and the growing block theory. These arguments support the eternalist 
	
152 
 
 
feature of my 4D-nihilism. More importantly, I have argued that perdurantism’s main 
rival, endurantism, is false. I have discussed the difficulties in defining endurantism and 
how these problems make the view suspect. I have shown that the only philosophically 
secure statement of endurantism is that it is the view that persisting objects are 
temporally simple but spatially complex. However, both the Argument from Vagueness 
and the problem of temporary intrinsics show that there can be no objects that are 
temporally simple and spatially complex. Since my 4D-nihilism is a perdurantist view, 
eliminating endurantism strengthens the case for 4D-nihilism. In the next chapter, I will 
formally present 4D-nihilism and discuss both the strengths of the view and problems 
that it can solve. 
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Chapter 4: Nihilist Perdurantism 
This chapter will bring together the positive arguments from the previous two chapters 
and present my answer to the Total Mereological Composition Question: Nihilist 
Perdurantism. Roughly, this is the view that every material object is spatially simple but 
temporally composite. After formulating Nihilist Perdurantism, I will discuss its various 
applications and benefits to problems of composition and persistence. 
4.1: What is Nihilist Perdurantism? 
I call my view Nihilist Perdurantism: 
NP =df objects are extended through spacetime and are temporally composite, 
but spatially simple.  
 
The view I am proposing is radical; I deny the intuitive features and maintain the 
unintuitive features of standard perdurantism. Like traditional compositional nihilism, 
NP entails that there are no leaves, guitars, or desks. Only objects without spatial parts, 
such as the fundamental entities described by physics, really exist. However, these 
objects are not one-dimensional because they have temporal parts that extend through 
the temporal dimension. This view might seem bizarre. Almost all philosophers as well 
as non-philosophers accept the existence of spatial parts, while only some philosophers 
accept the existence of temporal parts in addition to spatial parts. Bizarre or not, I will 
show that NP provides the superior solution to the puzzle of change. 
I will argue that in addition to providing the best solution to the puzzle of change 
and the problem of the rotating disk (these solutions are discussed in the following 
sections), my view also makes another important contribution to the issues of time and 
persistence: it frames each of the solutions to the puzzle of change in terms of spatial and 
temporal parthood. Using this framework, it follows that there are four possible 
combinations of commitment to, or rejection, of both types of parts. Standard 
perdurantism commits to spatial and temporal parts. Standard endurantism commits to 
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spatial parts, but not temporal parts (this framework provides a clear definition of 
endurantism, a view that has faced definitional difficulties; I will discuss these 
difficulties later in the paper). A third view, nihilism (or eliminativism), rejects both 
spatial parts and temporal parts. Until now, NP, the fourth combination of parthood 
commitments has been ignored. This provides a framework for understanding the 
relationships between the various views of spatial and temporal parthood.  
  
Spatial Parts Exist 
 
 
Spatial Parts do not 
Exist 
 
Temporal Parts 
Exist 
 
 
Perdurantism 
 
NP 
 
Temporal Parts do 
not Exist 
 
 
Endurantism, 
Presentism 
 
Nihilism184 
 
Figure 2 
With the exception of NP, each view in the above chart has received a thorough 
treatment in the literature.  
NP takes inspiration from mereological nihilism (or eliminativism), a view 
championed at various times by Merricks 2001, Sider 2013, Unger 1979, and Van 
Inwagen 1990b. Mereological nihilists claim that all material objects are mereologically 
simple. Mereological Simples are defined as follows: 
Mereological Simple: x is a mereological simple iff it is not the case that there 
exists any y such that y is a proper spatial or temporal part of x. 
 
For the rest of the dissertation, I will assume that in addition to having no proper spatial 
                                                        
184 While any view about temporal parthood and spatial parthood can be classified in this chart, 
this chart uses the standard names for each view. 
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or temporal parts, simples are point-sized objects. 185 If all objects are mereological 
simples, then, strictly speaking, there are no maple leaves or guitars because their 
existence requires the existence of spatial parts.  
For the nihilist, the sentence “The leaf is red” seems to be false since there are no 
leaves.  Does this mean that the nihilist must attribute massive error to ordinary 
language speakers? It does not. Instead, the nihilist provides alternate truth conditions 
for sentences about objects (Van Inwagen calls this “paraphrase”; see his 1990b, Ch. 11). 
These truth conditions use plural quantification. The plural existential (∃xs) and 
universal (∀xs) quantifier both behave like the familiar singular existential and universal 
quantifier, except that they range over plural variables, the xs, instead of a singular 
variable, x. Plural quantification is used to translate what Van Inwagen calls “plural 
referring expressions.”  
Briefly setting aside the nihilist ontology, everyday expressions such as “the 
Carlsons”, “the members of the department”, and “the stegosaurus” are all plural 
referring expressions.186 Plural quantification can be used to translate sentences such as 
“The stegosaurus are extinct” as follows: for some xs (for all y, y is one of the xs iff y is a 
stegosaurus) and the xs are extinct.187 By combining plural quantification with predicates 
that take the form ‘are arranged x wise’, nihilists can provide truth conditions for 
sentences like “The leaf is red”: for some xs, the xs are arranged leafwise and the xs are 
                                                        
185 One could claim that things like guitar-sized simples are possible. These simples would have no 
proper parts, but still have spatial extension. See Markosian 1998b for a discussion of possible 
extended simples and Williams 2006 for a discussion of actual extended simples. See McDaniel 
2007 for an overview of other views on simplicity. 
186 Van Inwagen assumes a Fregean perspective and claims that these to be referring descriptions, 
not simply definite description (see Van Inwagen 1990b, p. 23). This is in contrast to the 
Russellian approach that eliminates reference from definite description. Whatever the correct 
analysis of these sentences is irrelevant to plural quantification. The plausibility of referring 
plural definite descriptions in English is evidence for the plausibility of plural quantification. 
187 Van Inwagen uses the phrase “is one of” as a primitive relation that functions like the ‘∈’ of set 
theory see 1990b p. 26. 
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red.188 Since NP rejects the existence of objects with spatial parts, it also uses plural 
quantification to analyze talk that seems ontologically committed to objects with parts. 
The objects in the NP ontology are not mereological simples. They are objects 
that have temporal parts, but not spatial parts. These objects do, however, play a similar 
role as to that of the nihilist’s mereological simples. To illustrate this, consider a cubic 
three-dimensional model that has two spatial dimensions and one temporal dimension. 
An instantaneous moment of the model populated with my objects has the same 
representation as an instantaneous moment of the model populated with mereological 
simples. In both models there are, strictly speaking, no objects such as composite objects 
such as trees or guitars.  
However, when one views the whole of each model, then the differences are 
immediate: the nihilist model still has an array of points strewn about the cube, while the 
NP model has an array of lines running parallel to the temporal axis of the cube. In order 
to distinguish between these line and mereological simples, I will refer to the line objects 
as four dimensional nihilist objects, or NP objects, for the remainder of the dissertation. 
These NP objects provide the foundation for my solutions to the two puzzles presented in 
the following sections: (1) the puzzle of change, and (2) the puzzle of the rotating disk 
4.2: The Puzzle of Change 
This section will discuss Hinchliff’s puzzle of change (briefly discussed in Ch.1) and the 
difference between the solutions presented by the standard perdurantist and the 4D-
nihilist. I will argue that the 4-D nihilist has a better solution to the puzzle than the 
standard perdurantist. Mark Hinchliff believes that change is puzzling because our 
concept of change implies four conflicting intuitions. For some object x that changes: (1) 
One and the same object instantiates P at time t1 and does not instantiate P at time t2, (2) 
Change involves properties, not relations, (3) Change happens to the whole object, not a 
                                                        
188 It is important to note that leafwise contains not quantification. It merely describes a 
configuration of mereological simples. 
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temporal part of the object, (4) one and the same object persists through the change.189 
Standard Perdurantist reject (3) while endurantists reject (2). These types of change can 
be formulated as follows: 
Perdurantist Change: for all objects x, x changes iff x has some temporal parts 
y and z such that y is P and z is not-P. 
 
Endurantist Change: for all objects x, x changes iff x bears a certain relation to 
P at a time t1 and does not bear a relation to P at t2. 
 
I have already identified endurantist change as the problem of temporary intrinsics and 
argued against it in section 3.4 and will not pursue the issue further here. As for 
perdurantist change, Hinchliff objects to this analysis because it violates the intuition 
that one and the same object persists through the change. For the perdurantist, a whole 
object does not have a temporary property P; it only has a temporal part that instantiates 
P. This account of change is said to be “static.” Temporal parts either have properties or 
they do not; perdurantist change does not seem to capture the fluidity that we normally 
associate with changing things, such as the growing flame of a match being struck. The 
perdurantist analyzes our perceived fluidity of change as a consequence of our perceiving 
a rapid succession of temporal parts with varying properties.  
Hinchliff objects to this static model of change. He argues that change is 
something that happens to the candle and that one can observe this change happening to 
the one-and-the-same candle. Supposedly, when one imagines a candle changing as it 
melts from the heat of its flame, one sees the change as happening to the original solid 
wax candle; the candle flows smoothly from solid to liquid. Hinchliff claims that our 
experience yields the intuition that the candle both has the property of being solid and 
the property of being liquid. The perdurantist cannot say that the candle is both solid 
                                                        
189 Hinchliff 1996, p. 119 
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and liquid since only parts of the candle are solid or liquid; the spacetime worm that 
makes up the candle is neither solid nor liquid.190 
 I think that Hinchliff is mistaken to lean so heavily on intuition 3. There are 
everyday events that are counterexamples to (3). For instance, we are all familiar with 
how movie projectors work. A rapid succession of still images is shown on a screen, and 
this rapid succession gives the illusion of movement. This seems to be very much like the 
static model of change that the perdurantist proposes. Hinchliff’s claim that intuition (3) 
is backed by our experience with change is somewhat undermined by our experience of 
static images producing the illusion of change. While the static account of change is still 
counter-intuitive, our experience of static change suggests that the static change view 
may not be as radical as it first seems. 
I find the perdurantist explanation of the fluidity of change to be satisfying since 
it is able to do all the work that our typical talk of change does. However, this 
explanation of the phenomenology of change will not satisfy all. Since endurantism is 
false, I will argue that either perdurantism or NP must explain change, and that NP gives 
a better account of change than standard perdurantism. 
Before I give an account of NP change, I want to discuss the objection that the 
puzzle of change is a non-issue for any sort of nihilist. This objection might go something 
like the following: “Nihilism automatically rules out the possibility of change, since it 
claims that the world is made up of unchanging simples. Since the NP ontology only has 
unchanging spatial simples, then there is no need for an account of change.”  
                                                        
190 Sider’s stage theory does not offer any solutions to the puzzle of change either. For the stage 
theorist, the candle is the instantaneous temporal part picked out by a specific time. So the melted 
candle is an instantaneous temporal part that has a solid candle as a temporal counterpart. If one 
agrees with Hinchliff, then stage theory is just as problematic than worm theory. The stage 
theorist’s instantaneous temporal part that is picked out by “candle” only was solid in virtue of the 
fact that it is in a counterpart relation. For the stage theorist, then, change is governed by 
relations, not the properties that violate intuition (2).  
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Perhaps the elimination of change from one’s theory is desirable. However, I 
claim that spatially simple objects can change, and that NP must account for this. What 
it is for a spatially simple object to change over time depends on which account of 
mereological simplicity that one defends, as there are many views on the nature of 
simples (See Ch. 2). However, most of these views are compatible with the possibility, if 
not the actuality, of changing simples. For example, it seems plausible that there is a 
possible world where some spatially simple particle, say an electron, could lose its 
property of -1 charge. The NP accounts for this by attributing the property of -1 charge to 
some of the electron’s temporal parts and not to the others. As for an actual example of 
change in spatially simple objects, many physicists advocate a superstring theory where 
the tiniest objects are strings that vibrate in certain ways that correlate with fundamental 
properties. Supposing that these strings are spatially simple, it follows that they can 
change their properties simply by changing their vibrational pattern. Therefore, spatially 
simple objects that change properties are plausible and any ontology that contains these 
simples must provide an account of change.  
Both the standard perdurantist and 4D-nihilist give the same account of a 
spatially simple object that changes: the object changes iff it has a temporal that is P at 
one time and a temporal part that is not P at another time. It might seem that 4D-
nihilism fares no better than the standard perdurantism when it comes to Hinchliff’s 
objection that change is static. However, I believe that the intuitive pull of the claim that 
change is fluid is only gripping when one considers macroscopic, composite objects. This 
can be illustrated by previous example of the melting candle. For the standard 
perdurantist, the candle is a composite objects that has both spatial and temporal parts. 
The change from the candle being solid to being liquid is analyzed as our successive 
viewing of the candle’s temporal parts that are solid, the candle’s temporal parts that 
increasingly soften, and the candle’s temporal parts that are completely liquid. The 
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temporal parts of the candle compose the whole of the candle, yet the candle itself does 
not wholly instantiate solidity or liquidity. This description of change is incompatible 
with (3), since the candle does not change; the candle is a succession of temporal parts 
with varying properties.  
However, the NP analysis of the appearance of a changing guitar is quite 
different. Given NP, “candle” refers to the spacetime worm simples-arranged-guitar-
wise. Therefore, there can be no intuition that one and the same object changes, since 
there is no single object that occupies the candle shaped region. The change of the 
candle’s states is due the different positions of the NP objects across spacetime that 
results in different relations between the temporal parts of the NP objects. The 4D-
nihilist claims that our perception of the changing things is just the re-arrangement of 
NP simples. All change is explained by either the addition of NP simples to regions 
occupied by simples-arranged-x-wise, the removal of NP objects from simples-
arranged-x-wise, or the re-structuring of simples-arranged-x-wise. As these simples 
occupy new locations, any properties instantiated by the simples come into different 
relations with the other properties instantiated by the simples. These relations are 
responsible for what we perceive as macroscopic change. 
 One might be tempted to claim that this arrangement is what changes, and 
therefore, the NP is no better off than the perdurantist. However, remember that the NP 
does not quantify over arrangements; talk of “an arrangement” is of the form simples-
arranged-x-wise and is expressed with plural quantification instead. Therefore, talk of 
an arrangement of simples does not refer to any existing thing. Just as we are mistaken 
in our claims that there are composite objects, we are mistaken in our claims that there 
are quantifiable entities that correspond to arrangements. 
Macroscopic change, then, is just NP objects coming into new relations with each 
other. Now, Hinchliff might object that this violates intuition (2), that change involves 
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properties and not relations. However, the relations he has in mind are not the relations 
of nihilism, but the endurantists’s relations between objects, properties, and times. NP 
change does not use these types of relations; instead, it uses the properties of the NP 
objects to support seemingly higher-order properties either through supervenience or 
reduction. Therefore, when it comes to macroscopic change, none of Hinchliff's 
intuitions are violated. 
However, change at the level of the NP simples themselves does not evade 
intuition (3), since this type of change is analyzed as the simple themselves having 
various temporal parts that instantiate different properties. Therefore, according to 
Hinchliff, the 4D-nihilist has not successfully defused the problem of change. In 
response, I suggest that our intuitions about changing objects that have no proper spatial 
parts are muddled at best and non-existent at worst. In general, I hold that our intuitions 
about material objects are not a priori, and that intuitions about change are definitely a 
posteriori. This means that our intuitions about change are dependent on our 
perceptions of seemingly existing macroscopic, changing objects. If this is correct, then 
the objector must claim that since we have no intuitions about changing NP objects due 
to our lack of perceptual experience with them, then our intuitions about changing NP 
objects are a priori.  
I strongly doubt that we have any a priori intuitions about changing objects. 
Most of our experience with changing things is perceptual in nature; certainly our 
experiences with change used to motivate the puzzle of change our perceptual. Perhaps 
there is a sense of change in other a priori matters that could be a possible source for 
intuitions of change. One could say that when we first imagine a square, and then 
imagine a line dividing the square from corner to corner, our imagined square has 
changed into two triangles. However, this is not a real case of change. The square does 
not change into two triangles; we are simply noticing that there are at least two triangles 
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that overlap the square. Any change of this sort is just loose talk for moving our attention 
from one property of the geometric figure to another. Therefore, unless there are 
counterexamples forthcoming, I will cautiously reject the possibility of any sort of a 
priori intuitions concerning change. The objection that one can apply Hinchliff’s 
intuitions to NP objects fails; our intuitions about change are unreliable and cannot be 
applied to changing simples.   
In conclusion, there is no way that standard perdurantism can avoid denying 
intuition (3) of the puzzle of change. However, NP avoids disarms the puzzle of change 
by showing that macroscopic change is the product of rearrangement. Furthermore, I 
have argued that while changing NP objects do change as a result of their temporal parts, 
Hinchliff’s intuitions do not gain any traction on them.  Therefore, in comparison with 
standard perdurantism, the NP presents a superior response to the puzzle of change. 
Furthermore, since endurantism and presentism are false, then NP presents the best 
response to the puzzle of change.  
4.3 Genidentity and The Puzzle of the Rotating Disk 
If universalism is true, then any mereological sum is a four-dimensional object that 
stretches out over time and space. Intuitively, there is a difference between persisting 
objects, such as a tree, and objects such as the fusion of Aristotle’s beard with Donald 
Trump’s toupee. The temporal parts of the first sort of object bear a special relation to 
each other; they are connected to each other in the way that the temporal parts of the 
beard-toupee are not. First, both the tree and the beard-toupee are spacetime worms, yet 
the tree worm is completely continuous while the beard-toupee worm is discontinuous. 
Second, it seems that the tree’s earlier temporal parts are responsible for the existence of 
the tree’s later temporal parts. In contrast, the temporal parts of Aristotle’s beard do not 
seem to be responsible for the existence of Trump’s toupee. This suggests that the tree’s 
temporal parts bear a special relation to each other, unlike the temporal parts of the 
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beard-toupee. Sider dubs the relation that holds between the temporal parts of the stone 
the “genidentity” relation.191  
Genidentity: Some x and y stand in the genidentity relation iff they are parts of 
some continuing portion of matter.192 
 
But what makes a portion of matter continuous with another portion of matter? 
Typically, causal relations or the laws of nature are employed to analyze continuity 
between portions of matter.193 However, this analysis of continuity is open to a powerful 
counterexample: the homogeneous rotating disk. This counterexample, first attributed to 
lectures given by Kripke (but discussed by many others), concerns the possibility of disks 
made up of a homogenous matter.194 One disk, call it S, is stationary, while the other 
disk, call it R, is rotating. The argument from the rotating disks claims that standard 
perdurantism must use genidentity to analyze the difference between the two disks and 
also that genidentity cannot analyze the difference in motion; therefore, perdurantism is 
false. Before I discuss the argument in detail, it will be helpful to first explain how the 
genidentity relation is used to analyze the motion of a heterogeneous rotating disk.  
Suppose that there is a Ferris wheel with an orange seat at the top of the Ferris 
wheel. As the Ferris wheel rotates 180 degrees, the orange seat travels along the 
circumference of the wheel until it reaches the bottom of the wheel. Viewed atemporally, 
there is some instantaneous temporal part x of the orange seat at each point along the 
circumference of the wheel during the temporal interval of rotation, and these parts are 
paired with a unique time t. The genidentity relation will hold between any combinations 
                                                        
191 Sider 2001, p. 225. 
192 ibid. 
193 For example, Russell 1914 and Armstrong 1980 
194 See The arguments of Kripke and Armstrong are discussed in Lewis (1999 , 1986b , p. xiii n. 5); 
Noonan (1988); Robinson (1989); Shoemaker (1979); and Zimmerman (1998a , 1999).  
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of these temporal parts. If x is the temporal part of the seat located at the top point of the 
wheel at time t1 and y is the temporal part of the seat located at the bottom point of the 
wheel at time t2, then x is genidentical to y. This is because the matter that makes up the 
orange seat travels from the top of the wheel to the bottom of the wheel. If the third 
spatial dimension is eliminated for simplicity, then the path of the seat through the two 
spatial dimensions and the one temporal dimension will be helical; as the seat travels 
downward along the circumference of the circle, it also moves forward in the temporal 
dimension. Now suppose that there is a blue seat on the Ferris wheel that is located 
opposite of the orange seat. The matter that composes the blue seat can never be 
genidentical to the matter that composes the orange seat since these seats will never 
share any temporal parts. In other words, the helixes of the blue and orange seat will 
twine around each other without ever overlapping. 
Unlike a heterogeneous disk such as the Ferris wheel, a rotating homogeneous 
disk composed of temporal parts has genidentical temporal parts that do overlap. To 
understand why this is a problem for the perdurantist,  let us return to the homogeneous 
disks R (Fig. 3 and Fig.5) and S (Fig. 4 and Fig. 6). Suppose that R has temporal part x 
at t1, and that x is located in the upper hemisphere of R. R also has a temporal part y at 
t2, and y overlaps the bottom hemisphere of R.  
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After R has rotated 180 degrees over the interval t1 to t2, the genidentity relation should 
hold between x and y for the same reasons that the genidentity relation holds between 
the temporal part of the orange seat x and the temporal part of the orange seat y. Since 
the disk is in motion, the matter of R’s temporal part x is responsible for R’s temporal 
part y. In other words, there is a helical path from x to y. Therefore, it seems that the 
genidentity relation that holds between x and y can account for the rotation of R. 
However, the temporal parts of the disk do not stand in a unique genidentity relation. R 
also has a temporal part w at t1 that is located at the bottom hemisphere of R:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4  
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The genidentity relation also holds between w and y since there is a continuous portion 
of matter between w and y over the interval t1 to t2. However, given the rotation of the 
disk, the genidentity relation should only hold between x and y; because of the disk’s 
rotation, the matter of w should be on the top hemisphere of R by t2. Intuitively, since 
the disk is rotating x is responsible for y and w is not responsible for y. The presence of 
two genidentity relations when there should only be one is not just a problem caused by 
conflicting intuitions. First, there are not just two candidate genidentity relations, but 
also an infinite number of candidate genidentity relations that could be responsible for y. 
This is because any hemispherical shaped part of R has a continuous spacetime path to y. 
Therefore, standard perdurantism requires that every hemispherical region of R is 
somehow responsible for y’s existence. This is clearly absurd. If R was just a rotating 
hemisphere, then x would be the only candidate for genidentity with y. Since genidentity 
is an intrinsic relation, it should depend on nothing but the existence of the hemisphere 
to obtain. However, when another hemisphere is added and R becomes a sphere, this 
unique genidentity relation disappears and is replaced by an infinite number of 
genidentity relations. 
 The same problem occurs for the stationary disk S; there are both helical and 
straight fusions of temporal parts (along with the infinite other spacetime paths) that are 
continuous with the bottom hemisphere of S. Both R and S have an identical set of 
genidentity relations, therefore genidentity cannot account for the difference in motion 
between R and S. The standard perdurantist must attempt to find some way to privilege 
one of the many genidentity relations over the other. 
One might try to address the problem of the disks by appealing to an analysis of 
causation. As previously stated, both Russell and Armstrong think that genidentity is 
simply a nomic causal relation. The genidentity relation obtains when one stage of an 
object nomically causes another stage. However, as Zimmerman points out, a nomic 
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analysis of the rotating disks fails when the disks are located in the same possible 
world.195 Since the disks are made of the same homogenous matter, the same laws govern 
the discs. However, these laws cannot differentiate between the helical spacetime worms 
and straight spacetime worms located in each disk since natural laws do not take into 
account all of the mereological objects in a standard perdurantist’s ontology. Therefore, 
the perdurantist cannot appeal to nomic causation to solve the problem of the rotating 
disks.  
Alternatively, the perdurantist could appeal to a singularist or immanent view of 
causation.196 An immanent causation relation is not like the scientific causation relations 
between events or things. Roughly, some object or event x immanently causes y when the 
causation relation in question obtains independently from any laws of nature. For 
instance, many religions believe that a godhead caused the creation the universe ex 
nihilo. This means that the godhead causes the laws of nature themselves to come into 
existence. Therefore, the godhead must have immanently caused the creation of the 
universe. If this type of causation is included in the perdurantists metaphysics, then the 
problem of the rotating disk can be solved. Despite our intuitions that the rotating and 
stationary disks are subject to the same nomic causal relation that explains genidentity, 
two different immanent causal relations in fact govern the disks. These different causal 
relations allow for the assertion that there is only one unique genidentity relation for 
each disk. 
There are several problems with this solution. First, unless one has other reasons 
to accept the existence of immanent causation, then appealing to immanent causation to 
solve the problem of the disks is ad hoc. As the above example shows, immanent 
causation is typically used to explain the interaction between the divine and the natural 
                                                        
195 Zimmerman 1998a 
196 Zimmerman 1997 and Anscombe 1971 
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world. While this may appeal to some perdurantists, most would most likely wish to 
either remain neutral on or deny the possibility of a godhead.  
Second, even if one accepts immanent causation, it is not without cost; it requires 
the rejection of Humean Supervenience. Humean Supervenience is the claim that all 
there is to a world (possible or actual) are the local qualities that are instantiated in a 
possible world. For example, both things like an electron located at point p in world w or 
a red ball in region r of w are local qualities of w. As for laws of nature, a Humean 
Supervenience analysis of natural laws claims that laws just supervene on the local 
qualities of a world.197 Lewis claims that the laws of nature are really just a system of 
propositions that best describe and predict the local qualities of a world; these laws are 
not exhaustive or infallible.198 Returning to the problem at hand, recall that since the 
disks have identical local qualities with respect to their matter, Humean Supervenience 
requires that they are governed by the same best system of laws. Since the best system of 
laws will use the same predictions for things with identical qualities, then the disks will 
be analyzed with the same laws. While these laws can tell us about how it came to be that 
R is rotating, they still cannot distinguish between the many candidates for the 
genidentity relation needed to distinguish the disks. Therefore, Humean supervenience 
cannot solve the problem of the rotating disk. If one is not willing to accept immanent 
causation, then appeals to laws of nature fail.  
Many philosophers, such as Sider (and myself), are strongly committed to 
Humean Supervenience and would only relinquish it under enormous philosophical 
pressure. Furthermore, Sider believes that “non-Humean accounts of lawhood and 
                                                        
197 See Lewis 1986 Philosophical Papers introduction ix-xii 
198 It is important to note that Lewis does not make the claim that Humean Supervenience is true 
of all possible worlds. Instead, he argues that it obtains in the “inner sphere” of possible worlds 
that contain only the same type of local qualities contained in our world. Worlds in the “outer 
sphere” might have non-Humean characteristics with “alien properties”; immanent causation is 
one such example of an alien property. 
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causation are shrouded in mystery and obscurity.”199 Because of this, Sider attempts to 
find a solution that preserves Humean Supervenience while also solving the problem of 
the rotating disks. It seems that the only way to do this is to claim that the rotating disks 
are possible, but that they are constrained to the outer sphere of possible worlds where 
Humean Supervenience is not present. This means that while the rotating disks are not 
possible in our world, they are possible in outer sphere worlds that have things like 
immanent causation. However, this conflicts with the intuition that these rotating disks 
are possible in inner sphere worlds like ours. In response to this, one could claim that 
there is no way to distinguish between inner and outer sphere worlds. If this is the case, 
then Sider could simply hold that the disks are in fact constrained to outer sphere 
worlds. However, this solution cuts both ways, as one could simply claim that the disks 
are just as likely to be in the inner sphere of worlds. Furthermore, there is nothing alien 
about such disks. While large homogenous entities might not exist in the actual world, 
there is little reason to think that they could not exist in a world that has laws of nature 
that are similar, but not identical, to the actual world. 
Sider attempts to secure the possibility of actual rotating and stationary 
homogeneous disks by arguing that the best analysis of the genidentity relation is one 
that involves the best possible laws of dynamics and motion.200 This means that an 
analysis of genidentity is not contained to just the facts about the stages of an object, but 
to all the other local qualities of a world. Using this account of genidentity, Sider can say 
that R’s temporal part x stands into the genidentity relation to the temporal part y if x is 
continuous with y and the best laws of dynamics require that the spacetime worm x and 
y are part of has a helical shape. 
                                                        
199 See Sider 2001, p.234. Teller 2002 argues that these non-Humean relations are not strange 
since we already are committed to some non-Humean relations such as spatiotemporal relations. 
200 See Sider 2001, p.231 for a formal presentation of this account. 
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However, this analysis of genidentity runs into two problems: (1) a world that 
contains only S and R does not have enough local qualities to construct the best laws of 
dynamics, and (2) persistence is an external relation since it depends on qualities that 
are extrinsic to the persisting object. Sider admits that there is nothing to done about (1) 
or (2) except to bite the bullet. Furthermore, if one is already committed to the best 
system theory of laws, then one is used to ruling out intuitively possible worlds (such as 
empty worlds that have no local qualities) and analyzing seemingly intrinsic relations as 
extrinsic relations instead. Regardless, having to bite this bullet is a blow to the 
perdurantist view. Furthermore, it is even a larger blow to Sider, since some of his 
arguments for standard perdurantism are arguments that force presentists or 
endurantists to deny the possibility of certain possible worlds.  
In summary, the possibility of a stationary homogeneous disk and a rotating 
homogeneous disk leaves the perdurantist with a dilemma: accept some sort non-
Humean account of immanent causation, or bite the bullet and claim that the disks 
cannot be located in any Humean world like ours.201 However, I will argue that the 4D-
nihilist does not face this dilemma, which provides reason to favor it over the standard 
perdurantist view.  
The rotating disks are supposed to be an objection to perdurantism full stop. 
However, this objection does not target perdurantism per say; instead, it only targets 
perdurantist views that also are committed to universalism about composition. Since the 
disks are mereological sums of their various instantaneous stages, then for any interval t, 
there will be an infinite number of paths that the disk’s spacetime parts could take. 
However, the NP’s ontology only contains objects that are spatially simple. Since these 
simples do not have any proper spatial parts, a NP spacetime worm will only have one 
                                                        
201 One might have other reasons for denying immanent causation besides the Humean reasons 
discussed by Sider. However, the literature on causation is vast, and I will not pursue the topic 
further here. 
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path through spacetime. For the NP theorist, both the rotating disk and the stationary 
disks must be either disks-arranged-simplewise or four-dimensional objects that are 
spatially extended while having no proper spatial parts.  
If the disks are just simples arranged disk-wise, then the problem is immediately 
resolved. To keep things simple, assume that the objects of the simples-arranged-
diskwise are point-sized with respect to their spatial dimensions. These spacetime 
worms are lines that run through space. Any point along the same line is genidentical to 
any other point on that line. As the simples-arranged-diskwise rotates, these lines will 
form a helical pattern. However, since the temporal parts of one NP worm never fuse 
with the temporal parts of another NP worm, then there are no straight-line-shaped 
objects within the simples-arranged-diskwise. Similarly, there will be no helical objects 
in the stationary simples-arranged-diskwise since none of the worms are in motion. 
Therefore, NP preserves a robust genidentity relation differentiates between the two 
simples-arranged-diskwise 202 
However, under the assumption that extended simples are possible, then one 
could object that NP can provide no analysis of the difference between an spatially 
extended and spatially simple NP object. It should be noted that this problem is not the 
same as the problem of genidentity, although it is similar. Since extended simples have 
no parts, there cannot be multiple candidates for the genidentity relation between 
temporal parts. However, an advocate of extended simples must still explain the 
difference between a rotating and stationary simple. The NP might attempt to use a 
Sider-style extrinsic theory of motion that relies on the best system of laws along with all 
of the local qualities of a world. However, this would leave the NP no better off than 
Sider; worlds where only the rotating and stationary simple exists are not rich enough to 
create the best system of laws.  
                                                        
202 In the case that simples are not made of matter at all, then the genidentity never obtains. 
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 The best NP solution to this problem is far less complicated than Sider’s solution. 
The difference between a rotating extended simple and a stationary extended simple is 
due to a difference in their natural properties. The rotating extended simple has the 
property of possessing a certain amount of kinetic energy, while being located at the 
same spatial region over its period or rotation. Conversely, the stationary simple lacks 
any property of kinetic energy, while remaining located in the same spatial region.203 
One might object that this analysis fails to capture to explain motion in a world with only 
two rotating extended simples. For instance, one simple could be rotating in one 
direction and have a certain amount of kinetic energy while the other simple could be 
rotating in the opposite direction and have the same amount of kinetic energy. This 
simply requires making the difference in properties a difference in velocity rather than 
just energy. While velocity is most likely not a fundamental property in our world, it 
seems plausible that velocity is a fundamental property at a world with extended simples.  
 In conclusion, the NP has an elegant solution to the problem of the rotating disk. 
If the rotating disks are in fact simples-arranged-disk-wise, then the helical paths of the 
temporal parts of the arranged simples explain their rotation. If the rotating disks are in 
fact spatially extended and spatially simple NP objects, then the NP simply needs to 
appeal to whatever property is responsible for motion of any kind in a given world. 
Unlike the standard perdurantist, the 4D-nihilist can remain committed to Humean 
Supervenience while also not ruling out the existence of plausible possible worlds, such 
as a world where only the two disks exist. Furthermore, rotational motion in extended 
simples can be accounted for with the same fundamental property strategy. Therefore, 
NP can solve a problem that standard perdurantism has no easy answer to. 
 
                                                        
203 Some might object that having an amount of kinetic energy is not a natural property, but a 
property that supervenes on quantum properties. While this is the case in our world, world with 
extended simples cannot be subject to quantum properties. 
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In this chapter, I have proposed NP, a new ontology of material objects that provides 
answers to both the Special Composition Question and The Special Temporal 
Composition Question. I have argued that NP is superior to its rival, standard 
perdurantism, in that it provides superior solutions to the puzzle of change and the 
puzzle of the rotating disk. In the final chapter, I will examine some objections to NP and 
my response to these objections.  
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Chapter 5: Objections to Nihilist Perdurantism 
In the final chapter, I will address two objections to NP. The first objection threatens NP 
specifically by focusing on NP’s prima facie inconsistency with regards to temporal and 
spatial parts. The second objection targets mereological nihilism in general by claiming 
that atomless gunk (objects whose proper parts necessarily have proper parts) is possible 
and that this possibility undermines the case for nihilism. However, I will argue that the 
evidence for the possibility of gunk is not convincing, and that NP remains a plausible 
ontology of material objects. 
5.1: Objections Specific to Nihilist Perdurantism 
I have argued that when it comes to the puzzle of change, NP is superior to 
perdurantism, endurantism, and presentism. However, there remains a serious 
objection to NP that focuses on NP’s seemingly incongruent claim that temporal 
parts can exist without spatial parts. One might object that NP has a needlessly 
complex ontology. For example, consider ball that has a red hemisphere and a blue 
hemisphere. While one might timelessly talk about the blue hemisphere of the ball, 
perdurantists claim that this kind of talk has a tacit reference to the present time of 
the utterance. Since the blue-hemisphere-part of the ball is temporally indexed, then 
it is a temporal part. Unlike perdurantism, it seems that NP requires the existence of 
ontologically distinct spatial parts and temporal parts. If this were true, then the NP 
theorist would have to endorse two ontologically primitive types of parts compared to 
the perdurantist’s one type of part. Therefore, it seems that considerations of 
theoretical parsimony favor perdurantism.   
However, NP does not require distinct spatial and temporal parts. I will 
illustrate this with a geometric analogy. Consider a cube c and square plane p that is 
part of the cube. The plane has parts along its x and y axis, yet it has no parts along 
its z-axis since it has not extension along this axis. Therefore, with respect to the z-
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axis, the plane is simple.204 In the same way, a NP object has no extension in any of 
the three spatial dimensions and is therefore simple with respect to these 
dimensions. However, it does extend in the temporal dimension and is therefore 
composite with respect to that dimension.205 Therefore, NP does not require two 
distinct ontological categories of temporal part and spatial part. 
However, there is another related objection that poses a larger problem for 
NP. NP allows for composition to occur along the temporal dimension, but not along 
the spatial dimensions. One might argue that this is at best an ontologically costly 
distinction, since it lacks the parsimony of a view that allows for composition to occur 
across all dimensions.206 Furthermore, one could also push harder and claim that the 
NP’s asymmetry with respect to composition is ad hoc; there is no reason for positing 
restricted composition other than to postulate a new view. However, NP is not ad hoc 
because the relationship between temporal parts is not the same as the relationship 
between spatial parts.207 Therefore, in order for NP to be viable, I need to show that 
there is a real difference between a NP object’s relation to its temporal parts and a NP 
object’s relation to other NP objects. 
There is such a difference, and it has to do with how the parts of NP objects 
are in contact with one another. Our everyday concept of contact applies to what we 
believe to be composite objects. For example, it seems that the chair is in contact 
with the floor or the water is in contact with the glass. Call this spatial contact: 
Spatial Contact =def x and y stand in the contact relation iff (1) there is no 
empty region R between x and y and (2) there is no interceding object z 
                                                        
204 Technically the plane has an improper part along the z-axis, since x is an improper part of y iff 
x is a proper part of y or x = y.  
205 If it turns out that extended simples are possible, then a NP object might extend into the three 
spatial dimensions. However, it would still have no parts with respect to these dimensions. 
206 Perhaps NP’s compositional asymmetry is a pricey ontological cost, but an investigation of this 
point requires an all-encompassing examination of NP costs and benefits and thus goes beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
207 This objection could be leveled against the endurantist as well, since the endurantist maintains 
that objects are spatially composite but temporally simple. 
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between x and y. 
 
The second conjunct of the right hand side of the biconditional denies the transitivity of 
contact. For instance, if x is in contact with z and z is in contact with y, then it does not 
follow that x and y are in contact. 
However, our best physical theories offer models of material objects that conflict 
with the common sense idea of contact. Science tells us that when the world is viewed 
microscopically, we find that there are no material objects in true contact. Electrons form 
the boundaries of every atom. The outermost electrons of one atom repel all of the 
outermost electrons of other atoms. If contact requires that there be no space between 
two objects, then these electrons can never come into contact, since their electrical fields 
will determine the boundaries between atoms while also maintaining space between 
those boundaries. Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that material objects never 
come into contact with one another; they are simply aggregates of subatomic particles. If 
this is correct, then the intuition that contact is possible is in trouble.  
In response, one could argue that the truth conditions for objects being in contact 
with another should be revised. Instead of objects being in contact with one another 
when there is no space between the objects in questions, objects are now in contact with 
one another when they are as close as they can be to each other given the laws of physics. 
On this definition of contact, two atoms that are pushed together will cease to move once 
their respective electrical fields meet. 
Scientific Contact =def x and y stand in the contact relation iff x and y are as 
close together as they can be given the physical laws of the world where x and y 
reside. 
 
Scientific Contact has some appeal, but it is also problematic; I will discuss the problems 
with it momentarily.  
So far, I have only discussed contact with respect to the spatial dimensions. 
However, under the supposition of eternalism and perdurantism, there is also another 
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kind of contact: temporal contact. After all, it seems that the temporal parts of an object 
are as close together as they can possible be. Call this kind of contact spacetime contact: 
Spacetime Contact =def x and y stand in the contact relation iff there is no 
empty spacetime between x and y and there is no interceding object z between x 
and y. 
 
If spacetime contact is true, then only temporal parts of mereological simples can be in 
contact. For the sake of argument, I will suppose that subatomic particles, such as 
electrons, are mereologically simple. Assuming that nihilism is false, a maple leaf is 
made up of subatomic particles. Given our laws of physics, these particles are all 
surrounded by empty regions of spacetime.208 Therefore, if the maple leave is considered 
from the three spatial dimensions, then its parts are not in contact. However, the 
subatomic particles of the leaf are in contact with their respective temporal parts. For 
any of the leaf’s electrons, a temporal part of electron e1 at time t1 will be in contact with 
the immediately successive temporal part e2 at time t2. There is no empty region of 
spacetime between e1 and e2. Even though spacetime contact makes almost all utterances 
about contact false, it is derived from the same intuitions as the original contact. It 
simply expands contact to include the temporal dimension as well.  
 At this point, one might object that spacetime contact is inferior to scientific 
contact. After all, scientific contact seems to preserve our intuitions about contact. 
Certainly, it seems to make our talk about contact true. For instance, if scientific contact 
is true, then one can still truly say that the handle of a coffee mug is in contact with the 
cylinder of the mug. This may be an advantage for scientific contact, since one might 
believe that a theory that preserves the truth of our talk is preferable to one that does not 
(see Ch. 1, pp. 13-14). Since I am not as invested in preserving the truth of ordinary talk, I 
                                                        
208 This might not be quite true. Electrons and protons certainly never come into contact. 
However, it may be that the protons and neutrons (or other particles) that form the nucleus of an 
atom are in contact. Therefore, if composition depends on contact, then the NP theorist would 
have to admit that some objects have spatial parts, namely the nuclei of atoms. This is a 
somewhat strange consequence of adopting the definition, but I am willing to accept it.  
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will put this consideration aside.  
Furthermore, scientific contact remains revisionary; I doubt that most of us have 
the electromagnetic forces that repulse atoms from each other in mind when we describe 
something with the contact relation. If true, then Scientific Contact requires our concept 
of ‘contact’, as well as other related relations, to change. Perhaps this is unproblematic 
since science regularly revises our concepts. However, scientific contact is not an 
empirical hypothesis, but philosophical analysis that conflicts with common sense. 
Therefore, scientific contact, does not have the theoretical advantage of preserving our 
intuitions about contact. 
There is another problem with scientific contact; it allows for cases where objects are 
closer together than they should be. Suppose that there are two electron stages e1 and e2 
that exist at the same time t. If these stages are in contact at t, then there will still be 
some distance between them due to physical law that negative charges repel. Now 
suppose that there are two electron stages e3 and e4 that are successive temporal parts of 
a single electron. It seems that e3 and e4 are in contact as well; they are as close together 
as they can be. But if scientific contact is true, then e1 and e2 are as close as possible given 
the restrictions of the physical laws. However, since e3 and e4 are closer than e1 and e2, 
then e3 and e4 are closer than is possible given the physical laws. Since the physical laws 
specify contact, and the physical laws require that some distance be maintained between 
two electrons stages, then it follows that e3 and e4 cannot be in contact. However, if the 
concept of contact is supposed to capture two objects being as close together as they can, 
then e3 and e4 are a paradigmatic case of contact since there is nothing between them. 
Therefore, since scientific contact cannot capture a plausible case of contact, then it 
should be rejected in favor of spacetime contact.  
With the adoption of spacetime contact, I can answer the above objection to NP. NP’s 
compositional asymmetry is not objectionably arbitrary since there is a strict division 
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between cases of composition and cases of non-composition: whether or not temporal 
contact occurs. Now NP can be redefined in terms of spacetime contact: 
NP* =def x and y compose z iff x and y are in spacetime contact with one another.  
This new formulation of NP guarantees that all composite entities will have no three 
dimensional proper parts. Throughout the rest of the paper, all mentions of NP will refer 
to NP*. As mentioned before, this is a technically a restricted composition view. 
However, it does not suffer from the myriad difficulties associated with those other 
views, such as problems of vagueness and decomposition.  
NP does not suffer from the problem of decomposition because the removal of a 
temporal part from a NP object either definitely destroys it or does not definitely destroy 
it. Suppose there is some NP object x that persists over interval t1 to t2 and some 
temporal party y that is located between t1 and t2. If y is removed, then x will cease to be 
a single line through spacetime; it will become two lines through spacetime. But if y is 
located at exactly at t1 or t2 (i.e. the endpoints of x’s line), then the removal of y does not 
destroy x; x’s duration merely decreases. As for vagueness, since spacetime contact 
definitely occurs or definitely does not occur, NP does not allow for vague composition 
and is therefore immune to the argument from vagueness (see Sider 2001 Ch. 4, section 
9 for more on the argument from vagueness). 
5.2: Gunk and Nihilism 
A material object is gunky if and only if every proper part of the object has proper parts 
as well. In other words, gunky substances never decompose into a finite amount of 
proper parts. The possibility of gunky objects is typically used as a counterexample to 
nihilism. The argument is quite straightforward: 
P1. Nihilism is true iff nihilism is necessary. 
P2. If Gunk is possible, then nihilism is not necessary. 
P3. Gunk is possible. 
C.   Therefore, nihilism is false. 
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This argument hinges on whether gunk is possible.  If it is possible, then it not only 
threatens standard nihilism, but NP as well. Before I discuss the argument for P3, I will 
briefly comment on P1. The truth of P1 rests on the claim that any metaphysical claim 
must be a necessary claim. If metaphysical claims are not necessary, then many of the a 
priori arguments used in support of these claims are no longer valid. For example, if 
nihilism is not necessary, then arguments such as the argument from vagueness or the 
sorites paradox provide no evidence for this contingent nihilism.  Even so, one might try 
to argue that there are good reasons for accepting minimal nihilism in the actual world 
for various reasons. Perhaps minimal nihilism gives the best account of our scientific 
theories. However, I think that sacrificing the a priori arguments for nihilism greatly 
undermines the plausibility of the view. Therefore, I will not consider contingent 
nihilism as a live option.  
 Since contingent nihilism is no longer an option, it seems that the nihilist must 
deny the possibility of gunk altogether. This may seem like a difficult path to take. 
However, the above argument is not as strong as it appears. The nihilist can use a 
possibility argument to conclude that nihilism is in fact necessary: 
P1ʹ. Nihilism is true iff nihilism is necessary. 
P2ʹ. If nihilism is possible, then nihilism is necessary 
P3ʹ. Nihilism is possible. 
Cʹ.   Therefore, nihilism is true.209 
 
Obviously, the proponents of the possibility of gunk will deny P2ʹ. However, just as the 
nihilist must argue for the impossibility of gunk, the gunk theorist must argue for the 
impossibility of nihilism. Therefore, the possibility argument for gunk does not gain 
traction; it reduces the debate to simply butting heads about the possibility of a nihilist 
world or a gunky world. In order to avoid this outcome, Sider pursues an alternative 
strategy that relies on a reductionist theory of necessary claims. Roughly, Sider describes 
                                                        
209 See Sider 2013 p. 35 and Effingham 2010 
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this view as the view that to “be a necessary proposition is to be a proposition that is i) 
true, and ii) of an appropriate type, where the appropriate types are given by a list…”210 
The list of necessary propositions contains statements that fall into the categories of 
analytic propositions, mathematical propositions, metaphysical propositions, and so on.  
Sider thinks that this reduction of necessity is the best alternative to modal 
realism. Whether or not this is the correct view of necessity, it does have the interesting 
consequence that the possibility of gunk or nihilism is irrelevant. Since gunk theory and 
nihilism are both propositions of metaphysics, then what is relevant is whether or not 
the actual world is nihilistic or gunky. Given the preponderance of arguments for 
nihilism, Sider concludes that nihilism must be necessary. However, since I wish to 
remain neutral on the issue of the proper analysis of necessity, I will not embrace Sider’s 
defense of the impossibility of gunk. 
Putting Sider’s above strategy aside, I will have to show that contrary to what 
many think, gunk is in fact impossible. What, then, is the evidence for the possibility of 
gunk? For starters, many philosophers think that gunk is conceivable. For example, in 
Sider 1993, he makes the following in response to Van Inwagen’s arguments for nihilism: 
“I find the possibility of gunk so compelling that I am willing to reject any theory that 
rules it out.”211 Kris McDaniel further elaborates on this point:  
I don’t know how to prove the possibility of the existence of gunk save by pointing 
out that gunk seems to be robustly conceivable: we have mathematical models 
that we can interpret as representing the parthood structure and shape of gunky 
objects, namely the regular open sets that represent certain regions of Euclidean 
space: the shapes of these regions are represented by the distance relations 
defined on the members of these open sets, and the parthood relations are 
represented by the subset relation. Conceivability provides evidence for 
possibility.212  
 
                                                        
210 Sider 2013 p. 37 
211 Sider 1993, p. 288; he is responding to Van Inwagen 1990. Note that Sider does not hold this 
view anymore.  
212 McDaniel, 2006 
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Dean Zimmerman argues that the only way that material objects can come into real 
contact is if they are made up of gunky matter. Since Zimmerman believes that it is 
possible for material objects to be in true contact, he concludes that gunk must be 
possible as well.213 Schaffer provides additional reasons for the conceivability of gunk: 
For instance, it is conceivable that everything is both extended and divisible. This 
generates a Zeno sequence of divisions without limit. Likewise Pascal’s 
hypothesis is conceivable, on which there is an endless nested sequence of 
microcosms, in which every physical “simple” of the universe houses a miniature 
replica universe, every “simple” of this mini-universe houses its own mini-
universe, and so on without limit…Further, there are gunky models of classical 
mereology (see Simons 1987, 41). So to the extent that the models of classical 
mereology represent metaphysical possibilities, it follows that gunk is 
metaphysically possible…Finally—and perhaps most tellingly—gunk is 
scientifically serious.214 
 
The support for the conceivability of gunk can be classified into four categories: (1) prima 
facie conceivability, (2) thought experiments such as the nested universe hypothesis, (3) 
formal considerations such as the fact that gunk can be modeled with mereology, and (4) 
empirical considerations.  
 I will deal with (3) first. It is a mistake to think that a formal model is evidence 
for metaphysical possibility. For instance, classical mereology entails universalism, but 
few find this compelling enough to reject nihilism. Furthermore, one can develop 
whatever formal system one likes without thinking of metaphysical commitments. For 
instance, some logics allow for one and the same thing to be both P and not-P, or for the 
possibility of vague truth-values. However, I do not find this compelling evidence to no 
longer believe in contradictions or accept that truth is vague. The mere creation of a 
formal system that entails certain metaphysical claims is not good evidence for the 
claims’ truth. Therefore, consideration (3) offers little support, if any, to the gunk 
                                                        
213 See Zimmerman 1996. Zimmerman’s argument is interesting, but it requires the existence of 
composite objects in order to work. He argues that any non-gunky account of topology cannot 
capture the possibility of extended material substances coming into contact.  Since I reject 
composite objects, I will not discuss the argument any further here. 
214 Schaffer 2010, p. 61 
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theorist’s case. 
As seen in the passages above, consideration (1) is the most commonly cited 
evidence for the possibility of gunk. However, the claim that gunk is conceivable and 
therefore possible is somewhat of an odd defense of gunk, even disregarding the fact that 
the nihilist can claim equal evidence from conceivability. This is because the above 
claims fail to make a distinction between metaphysical possibility and epistemic 
possibility. Suppose that I believe that a winged horse, Pegasus, could fly in the actual 
world (perhaps a mad scientist breeds a winged horse). It seems possible to me until I 
learn about the physics of flight and the biology of flying creatures. In order to fly, 
Pegasus would need enormous wings. However, these wings would not be strong enough 
for flight given the limited muscular attachment points on Pegasus’s body (among other 
factors). Given the natural laws of our world, it is nomically impossible for Pegasus to fly. 
I can prima facie conceive of Pegasus, but once I find out the facts, I can no longer do so. 
This point generalizes to many types of metaphysical claims. For instance, it 
seems to me that the nihilist should grant that universalism is prima facie conceivable 
while maintaining that universalism is false. The nihilist just holds that universalism is 
epistemically possible, not metaphysically possible. If this is the case, then the nihilist 
can simply claim that one can prima facie conceive of gunk because it is epistemically 
possible as long as one hasn’t examined the arguments, but that gunk is in fact 
impossible once on has done so. Obviously, the nihilist will have to provide arguments 
for the impossibility of gunk, but the mere conceivability of gunk does not provide much 
support for taking its metaphysical possibility seriously.  
5.2.1: Emergence Nihilism 
I believe, however, that I can do better and show that gunk is not actually conceivable. To 
do so, I will examine several thought experiments that seem to support the possibility of 
gunk. The first thought experiment is that of the world of infinite descent. First, I will 
	
184 
 
 
borrow a helpful concept described in Williams 2006:  
Illusions: If scenario w is conceivable, then either it is possible, or there is some 
genuinely possible world w′ that is generating the illusion that w is possible.215 
 
Williams argues that if one is presented with some conceivable phenomenon that seems 
to entail a genuine possibility, and one does not think that the possibility is genuine, then 
there must be an alternative possible world that does not entail the possibility in 
question while also fully accounting for what one has conceived. In general, when one 
takes oneself to be conceiving a genuine possibility, one is vastly under-specifying the 
features of the world where that possibility occurs. In fact, one is only focused on an 
incredibly tiny number of features of that world, leaving the rest of the world’s features 
ambiguous. Therefore, it seems likely that when one attempts to conceive of gunk, one is 
the victim of an illusion. If this is the case, then there must be some w causing the 
illusion.  
Williams suggests that the world in question is a world where nihilism is true. 
However, Williams advocates what he calls emergence nihilism. Like standard nihilists, 
emergence nihilists are committed to a world that contains only mereological simples. 
Emergence nihilists differ from standard nihilists in that they allow for the co-location of 
mereological simples.216 This allows for possible worlds where there are not only very 
small, but also simples that are macroscopic. For instance, standard nihilism claims that 
what appears to be a coffee mug is merely a collection of mereological simples arranged 
coffee-mug-wise. Emergent nihilism accepts these simples, but also claims that there are 
simples that correspond with the appearance everyday objects, like coffee mugs.  
These extended simples co-locate with a plethora of other simples. For example, 
an extended mug simple is co-located with each extended simple that appears to be one 
of the mugs parts. For instance, there is a handle-shaped simple and a cylinder-shaped 
                                                        
215 Williams 2006, p. 503 
216 Ibid, p. 504 
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simple that co-locate with the mug shaped simple, and the handle shaped simple is co-
located with an upper-handle-shaped simple and a lower-handle-shaped simple and so 
on. Therefore, when one conceives of a seemingly gunky world, one is actually conceiving 
of a world that contains co-located simples of various sizes. In this world, for any 
mereological simple x, there will be at least two simples y and z that are co-located with 
x. Therefore, when one conceives of a world of infinite descent, one is really thinking of a 
world that is co-located mereological simples all the way down. Like a seemingly gunky 
world, this world will contain an infinite amount of material layers. However, instead of 
each of these layers standing in various composition relations to one another (as in a 
gunky world), a given layer L of mereological simples is co-located with the layers above 
and below L. This is a world where there is no bottom layer and nothing is a proper part 
of anything.   
While emergence nihilism does provide an illusory world that explains the 
seeming conceivability of gunk, the view is not without problems. Tallant points out that 
nihilism is a view that locates the fundamental objects in a world at the bottommost 
layer. However, emergence nihilism has not bottommost layer; it is co-located simples all 
the way down. Therefore, attaching any fundamental properties to these simples is 
objectionably arbitrary.217 Not only does emergence nihilism face this objection, but it is 
also committed to several controversial claims: (1) the possibility of qualitatively 
heterogeneous simples and (2) the possibility of co-locating material objects. I have 
already argued against the possibility of qualitatively heterogeneous simples in Ch. 2 and 
I have no desire to endorse the possibility of co-locating material objects. Co-location is 
not only mysterious, but also an ad hoc solution employed to solve puzzles of 
coincidence. One of the main strengths of nihilism is that it deflates puzzles of 
                                                        
217 Tallant 2013. Interestingly enough, Tallant thinks that gunk is possible, despite the fact that 
this argument applies to any gunky world as well. This argument against gunky worlds will be 
further discussed towards the end of this section. 
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coincidence. Invoking co-location to address gunk is just as ad hoc as invoking co-
location to address puzzles of coincidence. Furthermore, while emergence nihilism is 
technically a form of nihilism, it is not nihilist in spirit since it fills the world with 
unnecessary metaphysical clutter. Therefore, given the serious difficulties facing 
emergence nihilism, the view should be rejected. However, this does not mean that 
William’s general approach is unfruitful; I simply need to find a world that accounts for 
the illusion of gunk and does not require the acceptance of controversial metaphysical 
claims. 
5.3: Though Experiment Arguments for Gunk 
In order to show that gunky worlds are illusory, I will unpack the idea of a world of 
infinite descent. By doing so, I will show that worlds of infinite descent do not offer any 
evidence for the possibility of gunk. When asked to conceive of a world of infinite 
descent, one will most likely imagine a situation where one divides a hunk of matter, 
zooms in on one of the divided pieces, and divides this piece again, and so on.  
For example, consider a world w that seems to be gunky. In this world, a wizard 
gives Maria a knife that can divide anything in half; the knife also shrinks itself as well as 
Maria whenever she cuts something in order to allow her to cut smaller hunks of matter. 
The wizard then sets Maria to the task of cutting a piece of wood in half, and then cutting 
the resulting halves in half until she reaches the bottom. Maria is quite discouraged by 
the task since she believes herself to be in a gunky world and that she will never reach the 
bottom. Now suppose that she is incorrect; she is not in a gunky world, but instead in a 
world made up of mereological simples. When Maria cuts the piece of wood in front of 
her, the simples arranged wood-wise are separated into smaller groups of simples 
arranged wood-wise. Since this world is not gunky, Maria should eventually reach a 
point where she can no longer cut anything (perhaps the simples are point sized, or 
perhaps the simples are indivisible; see Ch. 2).  
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Now suppose that the wizard lied to Maria. At first, Maria cuts the wood until she 
can no longer cut it. Then, she shrinks down to the microphysical level and proceeds to 
cut until she can no longer do so. However, instead of shrinking Maria again to allow her 
to continue cutting, the wizard adds more simples to the pieces of wood that Maria just 
cut; he gives Maria the illusion that she is shrinking. As long as the wizard continues, 
Maria can cut the wood forever and never reach the final layer. From this scenario, it is 
obvious that Maria’ experience is phenomenologically identical to the experience she 
would have if she were in a gunky world and cutting gunky matter. Maria has no way to 
know whether she is in a world with gunk or not; she finds herself in a skeptical scenario. 
Therefore, since the possibility (and therefore necessity) of nihilism is supported by a 
large number of arguments and the possibility of gunk is not, then given the nihilists 
explanation for the illusion of gunk, it is more plausible that worlds of seemingly infinite 
descent do not support the possibility of gunk. In order to resist this claim, gunk 
theorists need to find some way to overcome the skeptical argument above. I have 
already argued that they cannot do this through any sort of thought experiment that 
appeals to the experience of a gunky world. Therefore, gunk theorists need to find non-
experiential evidence to support the intuition that gunk is in fact conceivable. However, I 
cannot think of what this evidence would like. A more promising strategy is to find 
evidence for the possibility of gunk that does not rely on conceivability.   
Zimmerman’s argues that gunk is possible because gunky matter is the only type 
of matter than can come into true contact.218 His argument is long, so I will just give a 
short description of it here. In brief, Zimmerman believes that material objects can come 
into contact with each other. In order to come into contact, material objects must be 
impenetrable. In order to be impenetrable, objects must have either completely open or 
completely closed surfaces. Finally, in order to have completely closed or open surfaces, 
                                                        
218 See Zimmerman 1996. 
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objects must be gunky. However, nihilism easily sidesteps this argument, since 
Zimmerman uses the mereological concept of ‘part’ to define open and closed objects. 
Therefore, the nihilist can easily ignore the argument. 
 Schaffer argues for the possibility of gunk by appealing to the possibility of nested 
worlds.219 The argument from nested worlds is similar to the argument from worlds of 
infinite descent. However, it does not rely on phenomenological experience. So what is a 
nested world? A nested world is some world w that appears to have mereological 
simples. However, these simples are in fact small worlds contained by the simples. Each 
of these small worlds appear to have mereological simples that are in fact smaller worlds, 
and so on. This series of nested world continues infinitely downward.  
Before continuing with the argument, some terminology is needed. It will be 
helpful to describe nested worlds as having world layers. For any nested world w, the 
upper limit of w is the first world layer. If one zooms in on what appear to be the 
fundamental objects of the first world layer, one will find a nested replica of the first 
layer residing each seemingly fundamental objects; this is w’s second layer. For any 
world layer in w, there will be another world layer below it. The seemingly simple objects 
with replica universes also need to be defined. In addition to containing replicas of the 
first world layer, these objects instantiate the fundamental properties of the world layer 
they reside in. These objects functions as simples by instantiating the fundamental 
properties of a world layer but are not true simples. I will refer them as faux-simples: 
Faux-simple: x is a faux-simple iff x instantiates a fundamental property in the 
world layer where it resides and x also contains a replica of the world layer x 
resides in within itself. 
 
With these definitions in hand, Schaffer’s argument from nested worlds is easily 
explained: nested worlds made up of infinitely descending world layers that each contain 
                                                        
219 Schaffer attributes the nested world hypothesis to Pascal. 
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faux-simples are possible, therefore they are gunky.220 Of course, if gunk is possible, then 
nihilism is false. 
 Since Schaffer’s argument rests on the possibility of nested worlds, I must show 
that these nested worlds are in fact impossible. In order to do so, I need to further 
investigate the metaphysics of nested worlds. Suppose that there is some world w that is 
much like our world, except that it is a nested world. To keep thing simple, also assume 
particles such as electrons are faux-simples in this world; the electrons appear to be the 
smallest bits of reality, but they actually contain a whole other universe inside 
themselves. Also assume that the universes contained in the electrons are very similar to 
the top layer of w; they contain, trees, people, airplanes and so on. They also have 
electrons that are faux-simples. There are several questions that need to be answered 
about w: (1) how is it that objects like the trees, people, and airplanes contained in some 
faux-simple f do not ever fall out from f into the top layer of w? And (2) how is it that a 
faux-simple electron can have a fundamental property like -1 charge if it has infinitely 
many layered universes as parts?  
There are several possible answers to (1). It is not enough to say that the faux 
simple f is a fusion of its parts, since fusions can gain or lose parts. One might attempt to 
answer (1) by claiming that it is a brute fact that objects in f do not ever fall out into the 
top layer. This is the same as denying that the axioms of composition apply to all 
concrete objects equally. This alone is troubling, since it seems there is no reason for 
denying the universality of mereology. Furthermore, this solution is ad hoc; the axioms 
of mereology are violated for no other reason than to provide an explanation for a 
questionable possibility.  On top of this, these brute facts increase the price of a theory. 
Therefore, this brute fact approach is not a promising solution. 
Instead, one could include some sort of entity in their ontology that protects the 
                                                        
220 See Schaffer 2010, p. 61. 
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objects inside f from falling outside of f; call this entity a world-barrier (I will discuss 
world-barriers more fully in 5.3). World barriers are not unique to nested worlds. For 
instance, if one is a modal realist and denies trans-world composition, then world-
barriers are required for the separation of concrete possible worlds. These world-barriers 
prevent the things in one possible world from slipping into another possible world. It 
might seem that the fact that nested worlds require world-barriers is no real difficulty. 
However, the world-barriers required by modal realism cannot get the job done since 
separate world from other worlds; they are interworld-barriers.  
Therefore, if modal realists wish to countenance the possibility of nested worlds, 
then they must not only accept interworld-barriers, but intraworld-barriers as well. 
These intraworld-barriers separate the things contained in the f from the things not in f.  
However, the intraworld-barrier solution is no better off than the brute fact solution 
above; ideological primitives have simply been swapped for ontological primitives. Each 
of the answers just discussed can only answer (1) in an unsatisfying and theoretically 
costly manner. Therefore, any advocate of modal realism should deny the possibility of 
nested worlds. Furthermore, intraworld-barriers are even less plausible for actualists 
who deny modal realism. Unlike modal realists, actualists have no need for interworld-
barriers, which makes the plausibility of intraworld-barriers even more suspicious. If my 
arguments are correct, then nested worlds are impossible. The argument is simple: 
P1. Composition occurs at nested worlds. 
P2. Given the axioms of mereology, there are fusions of objects within a faux-
simple f and objects outside of f. 
P3. Therefore, there are fusions of objects within and without f. 
P4. But there are no such fusions. 
C.   Contradiction; nested worlds are impossible. 
 
I have already argued for the truth of P2-P4. P1 simply falls out of the fact that nested 
worlds are gunky; any gunky object is a mereological fusion. Therefore, the problem 
posed by (1) above is enough to demonstrate the impossibility of nested worlds. 
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Question (2) above is motivated by the principle that the properties of a 
composite object are grounded in that object’s parts. For example, an atom of Hydrogen 
has a net charge of zero in virtue of it being composed of a proton with +1 charge and an 
electron with -1 charge (and these particles have their charge in virtue of the quantum 
particles, and so on.) However, in a nested world, a faux-simple electron does not have 
its charge in virtue of its parts, since it contains a plenitude of universes within it. This 
means that certain objects in a nested world, such as electrons and protons, have no 
ground for their properties. Now, any world where the macrophysical is grounded in the 
microphysical will have objects with ungrounded properties at the bottom layer of the 
world. For instance, why do the molecules in a nested world have a net charge in virtue 
of its parts while the electrons do not? The defender of nested worlds might respond by 
denying that objects have their properties in virtue of their parts. However, this move 
will only avoid being an ad hoc solution to (2) if it is applied to all composite objects. If 
all composite objects do not have their properties in virtue of their parts, then it is 
puzzling as to why the parts have properties at all. For instance, if a molecule has its net 
charge of 0 independently of its parts, then it is always a coincidence that the molecule 
has parts with charges that cancel each other out. While one could simply bite the bullet 
here, I think this bizarre consequence is a strong reason to reject the claim that 
properties of composite objects do not have their properties in virtue of their parts.221 
Advocates of nested worlds must pay yet another theoretical price for the possibility of 
nested worlds.  
 If my arguments are correct, then the last hope for the possibility of gunk rests on 
empirical arguments. Schaffer believes that empirical considerations provide strong 
                                                        
221 Of course, one could object that consciousness is an example of a property instantiated by a 
composite objects that does rely on the object’s parts. However, the metaphysics of consciousness 
are tangled enough as is, and invoking consciousness here muddles the issue beyond all hope for 
clarity. 
	
192 
 
 
evidence that supports the possibility of gunk. In Schaffer 2003, he writes: 
We now have no evidence that there will be a final theory, no evidence that such a 
theory will postulate anything that could serve as a mereological simple, and no 
evidence that such a theoretical postulate will correspond to an ontological 
simple as opposed to a boringly decomposable composite. Evidence for 
fundamentality is lacking thrice over.222 
 
Schaffer’s argument seems to be that since there is no good reason to think there will be 
a final theory of physics, then there is no evidence for mereological simples. However, his 
argument misses the mark. If physics is silent on the issue of mereological simples, then 
it remains a philosophical issue to decide whether such simples provide a plausible 
theory of our world. In fact, Schaffer should respond to the lack of empirical evidence by 
claiming that his view is compatible with either gunky matter or mereological simples 
and therefore cannot violate any future scientific theories. However, it seems to me that 
the micro-fundamentalist can simply respond by claiming that perhaps our best physical 
theories will include the claim that the world cannot be fundamental, in which case 
priority monism is false. At this point, I imagine Schaffer will simply insist that this is 
highly unlikely. But this is no different than the nihilist insisting that our physical 
theories requiring gunk is unlikely. This argument, like each of the previously discussed 
arguments, comes down to simply insisting that gunk is possible and fails to provide any 
real objection to the nihilist. 
Schaffer makes a stronger argument by claiming that not only may physics 
require gunk in the future, but also that physics might require gunk now: 
Thus Dehmelt (1989) posits an infinite regression of sub-electron structure, 
Georgi (1989, 456) suggests that effective quantum field theories might form an 
infinite tower that “goes down to arbitrary short distances in a kind of infinite 
regression . . . just a series of layers without end,” and Greene (1999, 141–42), 
noting that “history surely has taught us that every time our understanding of the 
                                                        
222 Schaffer 2003, p. 205. In Sider 2013 p.31-5, he argues that the claim that there will be no final 
theory is a dubious induction at best, since we cannot estimate how much further down our 
physical theories will delve. Physical theories have only made three or four major revisions: 
atoms, subatomic particles, quarks, and perhaps superstrings. Sider argues that this is no grounds 
for a successful induction. 
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universe deepens, we find yet smaller microconstituents constituting a  new level 
of matter,” allows that even strings might be just “one more layer in the cosmic 
onion.”223  
 
Schaffer’s quote of Greene above is misleading. Greene does not claim that the strings of 
string theory must have further structure; he simply notes that it is an open possibility as 
to whether string theory is the final theory or not.224 Neither of these possibilities are 
incompatible with mereological simples. As for the other quotes, Schaffer could argue 
that if the theories proposed by Georgi or Dehmelt become the accepted physical 
theories, then the good Quinean must accept gunky objects. However, as Schaffer 
himself has pointed out, the scientific community has constantly evolved its 
understanding of the basic bits of reality. Therefore, it seems reasonable that when there 
is strong disagreement within the scientific community, the metaphysician should 
remain agnostic. If this is correct, then Schaffer’s argument about actual physical 
theories requiring gunky objects has no more force than the previously discussed claim 
that future theories might posit gunky objects. 
 In closing, I will turn from rebutting arguments against the possibility of gunk 
and discuss one of Sider’s arguments against gunk.225 This argument is somewhat similar 
to previously discussed problem of property instantiation at nested worlds. Sider argues 
that if a world is gunky, then there are no non-arbitrary candidates for the things that 
instantiate fundamental properties. Here is my interpretation of the argument: 
P1. Suppose Gunk is possible.  
P2. At the gunky world, fundamental properties must be instantiated by only one 
object. 
P3. For a given gunky object, no matter how small, there are infinite candidates 
that can instantiate fundamental properties. 
P4. Picking any one of these candidates over the other is objectionably arbitrary. 
P5. Therefore, fundamental properties cannot attach to gunky objects. 
                                                        
223 Schaffer 2010 60-1 
224 See Effinhgham 2010, p. 246. Interestingly, Effingham interprets Greene to be in support of 
nihilism here. 
225 I discussed debunking argument with respect to Korman’s ordinary object ontology in Ch. 2, p 
17. 
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C.   This contradicts P2; gunk is not possible.226 
Defenders of the claim that gunk is possible have several options that would allow them 
to resist the above argument, but none of these options are very appealing. The first 
option would be to reject P4 and claim that there are simply brute facts about what 
gunky objects are the bearers of fundamental properties. I have already argued that the 
strategy of appealing to brute facts is ad hoc, so I reject this response. The second option 
for the gunk theorist would be to reject P2 and claim that fundamental properties are, in 
some sense, gunky as well. I find the idea of a gunky property unintelligible and 
therefore will assume that P2 is true.  
The gunk theorist’s best option for resisting the argument is to reject P3 and 
claim that there is only one candidate for instantiating a world’s fundamental properties: 
the world itself. If this is true, then it follows that something like Schaffer’s priority 
monism is true. As a NP theorist, I reject priority monism although I do not have the 
time to articulate these arguments here. Therefore, putting priority monism aside, the 
above argument is sound. So even if my arguments against the possibility of gunk are 
rejected, the gunk theorist has the difficult choice of being forced to accept priority 
monism, or come up with an account of how gunky objects with fundamental properties 
are not arbitrary. 
 In this chapter, I have defended NP from both specific and general objections. I 
have shown that while NP is a restricted view of composition, its restriction is not 
arbitrary. I have also made several arguments against the possibility of gunk: that the 
evidence for the conceivability of gunk is lacking because any gunky world can be 
explained away as an illusion. Furthermore, I have argued that gunky nested worlds are 
impossible. I have also shown that empirical evidence does not support the possibility of 
                                                        
226 See Sider 201, p. 32-35. Sider presents this as an argument against actual gunk. However, if 
views on fundamentality are necessary, then there is no reason not to apply this argument to 
possible gunk as well and cover all the bases. 
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gunk as this time. Furthermore it seems that objects in gunky worlds cannot instantiate 
fundamental properties. In conclusion, NP can resist each of these serious objections. 
While there are undoubtedly more objections to NP, this project has provided a solid 
foundation for further exploration and development of the view. 
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